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ABSTRACT 
Weather directly accounts for nearly all Major Disaster Declarations 
nationwide and plays a critical role in FEMA decision making. However, the 
decision making process among FEMA, and emergency management in general, is 
not substantially embedded within existing literature. Despite the importance of 
weather information and continued increase in vulnerabilities due to climate 
change, population migration, etc., the decision making process in relation to 
weather events is not well understood. This study examines FEMA utilization and 
communication of weather information for maintaining situational awareness in 
support of decision making. The culmination of this work advances the profession 
and discipline of emergency management by providing a sound methodology and 
decision making process framework for FEMA, in relation to weather information. 
The utilization of which is applicable for FEMA beyond the scope of this study and 
can be extended analogously to be inclusive of all hazard types. The implications 
of this work are to enhance FEMA leadership weather decision making capabilities 
in support of more timely, relevant decisions and more effective, efficient 
operations to enhance their ability to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover 
from disasters leading to saved lives and property.  
The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap between meteorological 
needs and existing educational and informational structures, requirements, and 
impediments to enhance decision making, situational awareness, and 
communication within FEMA. The major overarching questions this research 
seeks to answer are: (1) How is weather information utilized and communicated 
within FEMA?, (2) What are the primary elements and influencers of FEMA 
xv 
leadership decision making regarding weather?, and (3) How can FEMA best 
prepare for disaster operations for weather events? Utilizing an exploratory case 
study design, based on the Baumgart et al. (2008) model of local emergency 
management severe weather decision making (comprised of three systems: (1) 
environmental, (2) informational, and (3) perceptual and cognitive) in conjunction 
with the Endsley (1995) model of situation awareness (comprised of three levels: 
(1) perception, (2) comprehension, and (3) projection), data analysis of qualitative 
surveys and interviews yielded several findings.  
First and foremost, (1) operational decision making at FEMA is heavily 
influenced by a multitude of factors including (a) organizational, (b) operational, 
(c) individual, (d) informational, (e) impact, and (f) hazard. Further complicating 
matters, FEMA utilizes a variety of information sources and communication 
mechanisms including media/social media, State/Tribe/Territory, private sector/ 
apps, television/radio, internet/web, Emergency Support Functions/partners, 
National Weather Service, and other agencies, yet (2) a communication gap exists 
between FEMA and the public. Furthermore, (3) utilization of weather information 
across FEMA is substantive for the purposes of (a) situational awareness, (b) 
analysis and assessment, (c) communication, (d) planning, (e) disaster assistance, 
and (f) overall decision making. (4) Maintaining situational awareness of weather 
hazards is an essential and mission critical FEMA function requiring (a) 
environmental information (weather and non-weather information), (b) impact 
information, and (c) communication elements, through an information 
management process of (a) monitoring, (b) collecting, (c) interpreting, (d) 
xvi 
analyzing, and (e) disseminating. However, (5) FEMA personnel lack weather 
experience, knowledge and training overall, posing significant challenges.  
These findings resulted in (1) a proposed decision making conceptual 
framework, in conjunction with a (2) descriptive decision making model, and (3) 
identification of associated influencers. Extending this work beyond theoretical 
notions into praxis, (4) an adaptation of the CDC’s Crisis and Emergency Risk 
Communication (CERC) model is proposed for FEMA utilization, and (5) 
operationalization of a FEMA weather training module for situational awareness 
was designed and implemented. Additional recommendations from these findings 
and results include: (1) development of weather driven FEMA decision/support 
policy for standardized coordination, (2) implementation of CERC principles 
within FEMA and emergency management for enhanced and continuous 
communication practices, (3) incorporation of evaluation into the Comprehensive 
Emergency Management (CEM) framework as a standalone element in accordance 
with CERC, and subsequent incorporation of evaluation findings consistently 
within FEMA for advancement of programs and procedures, (4) enhanced decision 
support and development of State and FEMA Region weather products, graphics, 
and overviews, etc. for improved situational awareness, and lastly, (5) inclusion of 
weather training requirements within FEMA qualifications for increased 
knowledge and awareness in support of more effective decision making and 
operations.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION   
Provided the contemporary and interdisciplinary nature of emergency 
management, this chapter provides a brief overview of the academic context of the 
discipline (section 1.1), the statement of the problem (section 1.2), research 
objectives and questions (section 1.3), overview of the research (section 1.4), value 
of this study (section 1.5) as well as the overall design of this dissertation (section 
1.6). Driven by the interdependence of weather/climate and disasters/emergency 
management, communication, utilization, and knowledge of weather/climate 
hazards and information is crucial for effective decision making. Conducting 
qualitative analysis of data collected through surveys and interviews of Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) personnel, this study hopes to (1) 
advance the field of emergency management, (2) contribute to the foundational 
knowledge of the discipline, and (3) provide a path forward for future academic, 
educational, and operational endeavors.              
1.1 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
Emergency management isn’t easily defined, and the field contains a wide 
array of facets with numerous specialties. An emergency manager must work with 
a variety of personnel and can be categorized as a jack-of-all-trades as they must 
possess a multitude of skillsets and knowledge of different subject matter areas. 
Effective emergency managers must be a good leader, communicator, decision 
maker, and critical thinker as well as work well under pressure, be independent, 
and flexible among other qualities. During incidents they may be required to 
complete tasks that are above and/or below their pay grade and skill level as the 
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situation warrants. Many of the skills emergency managers require can be difficult 
to obtain through training and formal education but can often be acquired through 
extensive experience and application. Nonetheless, training and education 
provides the necessary foundation, resources, and tools from which to build.  
Historically, the education of emergency managers was generally an on-the-
job experience. In the more recent decades, a much greater emphasis has been 
placed on the education and training of emergency managers specifically with 
regards to command structure.  Operationally, training components for emergency 
managers is widely available, primarily through FEMA. Formally speaking, 
emergency management as an academic discipline, was substantially unchartered 
territory that gained significant attention after 9/11. Although there was a small 
increase in the number of undergraduate degree programs in the mid 1990’s, since 
9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, dozens of undergraduate degrees in emergency 
management, homeland security, etc. are now available. However, far fewer 
graduate degree programs, including only a handful of doctoral degrees, are in 
existence that have begun in the most recent decade. In fact, only a handful of 
emergency management degree programs existed at the higher education level 
until the mid-2000’s. Despite the formation of such programs, education of 
emergency managers continues to rely largely on training hosted by state and 
Federal government agencies in addition to on-the-job experience. As formal 
education programs continue to grow, there remains a gap between the new and 
upcoming workers and those of today. It is also not apparent if the current degree 
programs will meet the needs of the future employed emergency manager. 
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By its very nature, the field of emergency management is interdisciplinary 
and less tangible than most disciplines. Many scholars and practitioners do not 
agree how to define what is included within the discipline. The depth of research 
and knowledge of the field as its own discipline is limited, with most studies having 
been conducted in the past decade. While there are conceptual and theoretical 
components that may be of value, overall the current state of the profession lends 
itself to experience and application. Despite utilization of themes from other 
disciplines, there are a myriad of gaps within the literature and associated 
challenges along the path to uncovering them.  
Emergency management as a discipline requires an extensive knowledge 
base and skillset that incorporates many fields such as education, political science, 
psychology, sociology, geography, and communication to name a few. 
Incorporating all subject areas would be too broad of a scope for one study, for the 
purpose of this research, emphasis will be placed on the decision making process. 
This study will provide a review of weather information utilization, situational 
awareness, communication, development of a weather training component, and 
policy recommendations. Contributing to the theoretical body of knowledge and 
providing operational support for emergency management are the two primary 
goals for this study. The implications of this research are to advance the knowledge 
base of the field of emergency management and offer a beneficial contribution to 
practitioners and society alike. This study and area of research provides a unique 
opportunity to advance the pioneering effort of establishing emergency 
management as a genuine academic discipline and laying foundational knowledge 
for further review and study.  
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1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation are the primary functions 
of emergency management and FEMA. All of these functions rely tacitly on one 
main component, maintaining situational awareness. Maintaining effective 
situational awareness is the lifeblood of the agency as it is vital to conduct safe, 
effective, efficient, and timely planning, response, and recovery operations. 
Ineffective or insufficient situational awareness affects the outcomes of the 
decision makers, the impacts of which are late or delayed response operations, 
inadequate planning efforts, and misappropriated resources, among others. 
Understanding the role that enhanced communication and weather information 
and resource training has on FEMA as a whole and its implications on their 
partners is imperative for successful engagement of the ‘whole community’ 
concept. 
 Weather phenomena directly accounts for the majority of all Federally 
declared disasters nationwide. However, all disasters regardless of cause involve 
weather information or support in some capacity. Throughout all phases of the 
disaster life cycle (mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) weather 
information and data is a critical component to manage the threat and ensure safe 
response and recovery efforts. Therefore, maintaining situational awareness and 
monitoring of weather conditions along with utilizing weather information is an 
essential function of emergency management and FEMA decision making and 
operations.  
Decision making regarding weather events is a primary function of an 
emergency manager not only surrounding an event, but throughout the disaster 
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life cycle. In order to make more informed decisions, emergency managers must 
have the knowledge and skills to aid the decision making process. Emergency 
managers deal with all types of hazards and disasters including both natural and 
technological. However, most disasters fall into the natural hazard category. Even 
though this is the case, the lack of standardized natural hazard/meteorological 
training available to emergency managers nationwide is prevalent across available 
training programs, particularly with regards to rapid response events. Areas 
include:   
• Basic meteorology, weather phenomena, and terminology 
• Weather information product availability and usage 
• Radar/Satellite imagery and software packages 
• Hazard and risk interpretation and analysis 
• Scientific limitations and potential impacts 
• General decision making strategy 
Currently, as it stands at this time, training regarding weather information 
and resource navigation has not permeated into the emergency management arena 
the way that other knowledge and skills have. Although there are some course 
options currently in existence they mainly address the needs of local authorities 
whose needs are more along the lines of rapid response and notification leaving a 
gap for Federal weather information users whose needs cover a longer time frame 
from months to years. Although they do provide some relevance, no existing 
weather training adequately serves the Federal users’ needs nor has one been 
integrated as the standard weather training component.  
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Further complicating matters is the evolution of the weather enterprise (i.e. 
- government, private, academic, media, etc.) and competition within. As a result, 
the expansion of available information sources, that at times, provide inconsistent 
reports from one another along with the amount of available information and 
access, created an era of informational uncertainty. In turn, this poses a challenge 
for some users and possibly impedes the decision making process. Additionally, 
changes in National Weather Service (NWS) weather products and services over 
the past two decades (i.e. - storm based warnings, product simplification, etc.) 
further exemplifies the need for education and training. However, there is little 
understanding of how FEMA and partners are utilizing this new information and 
the perspective of weather information usage overall among emergency 
management is limited.  
Dealing with uncertainty during decision making is one of the most pressing 
and prevalent issues facing emergency managers today, especially for rapid 
response events. The potential for impending disaster is greater than ever due to 
climate change, population growth, and migrations to larger and coastal cities. One 
goal for this work is to establish a standardized weather training program geared 
towards FEMA and their partners and their mission critical area of maintaining 
situational awareness. Decreasing or eliminating at least part of their potential 
uncertainty, the uncertainty due to a lack of meteorological understanding, is 
imperative for building effective emergency managers and further advancement of 
the profession and discipline as a whole. Making sure that emergency managers 
receive proper training in the area they most often deal with, weather, is crucial for 
making timely and effective decisions leading to saved lives and property. One way 
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to better prepare communities is to have well trained emergency managers, 
planners, and decision makers as to enhance their ability to mitigate, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from disaster.  
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
 The purpose of this study is to advance the body of knowledge and 
theoretical concepts applicable within emergency management and to 
operationalize certain components within the field by reviewing current practice. 
In support of this notion, there are two primary goals. The first goal of this research 
is to better understand the deficiencies of Federal emergency managers with 
regards to meteorological information and knowledge. In correlation, the second 
goal is to help bridge the gap between emergency management weather needs and 
the existing educational and informational structure. Ultimately, I hope to enhance 
decision making efficiency and communication for improved disaster operations.   
In order to accomplish this, (1) I will determine the utilization of 
meteorological information and deficiencies within FEMA; (2) review the 
communication flow of meteorological information within FEMA and amongst 
their partners and propose a standardized framework; (3) assess meteorological 
decision making amongst FEMA Senior Leadership and frame the decision making 
process; (4) develop meteorological training requirements, design a training 
program and determine best practices for enhancement of situational awareness, 
decision making efficiency, and information communication; and lastly, (5) I will 
provide policy recommendations and procedural guidance in support of effective 
disaster response and recovery operations. 
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The major questions this research sought to answer were: (1) How is 
weather information utilized within FEMA?, (2) What are the primary elements 
and influencers of FEMA leadership decision making regarding weather?, and (3) 
How can FEMA best prepare for disaster operations for weather events? To 
address these questions, I investigated the following:  
1. What is the FEMA decision making process? 
a. What are the key elements FEMA requires for decision making? 
b. What are their decisions/actions/thresholds? 
c. What factors influence decision making?  
d. What are the policy implications? 
2. What is the FEMA communication flow of weather information? 
a. From whom/where do they receive information? 
b. To whom/where do they disseminate information? 
c. What are the communication challenges? 
d. How can communication be improved? 
3. How does weather influence FEMA decision making?   
a. How do they utilize weather information? 
b. What are the critical pieces of information? Why are they critical? 
c. What information resources/channels/mechanisms do they utilize?  
d. What are the challenges associated with weather information? 
4. How does FEMA maintain situational awareness?  
a. What impacts are they most concerned about? Why those impacts 
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b. What is their situational awareness structure? 
c. What are the barriers to maintaining situational awareness?  
d. How can enhanced situational awareness be accomplished? 
5. What is the status of weather knowledge and training at FEMA? 
a. What is their weather experience/background? 
b. What weather training have personnel received?  
c. What weather training is available? 
d. What weather training is needed? 
To answer these questions, it is important to understand the meteorological 
knowledge level of emergency managers as well as emergency managers 
meteorological training needs. Knowledge level and training affect the decision 
making process, especially under uncertainty conditions. During hazardous 
weather outbreaks (i.e. - severe storms, winter weather, hurricanes, etc.) imprecise 
or ambiguous information can be prevalent. However, all events emergency 
managers face deal with weather information at some level, making it imperative 
that they have a good understanding of weather, impacts, and resources and 
navigation. It is also important to gain feedback on how to best provide training to 
meet the needs of emergency managers and to create meteorology training 
programs that will best aid or inform the decision making process.  
1.4 RESEARCH OVERVIEW  
 Through completion of a survey questionnaire and consequent analysis of 
the data, gaining a better understanding of emergency managers’ needs, will aid in 
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bridging their knowledge gaps and identification of possible vulnerabilities within 
the meteorological information and training system. Finalization of this analysis 
will provide guidelines for development of a needed training curriculum that will 
serve to inform and enhance efficiency in decision making and preparedness and 
lead to more timely and effective responses. This study seeks to further the body of 
knowledge concerning emergency management through meteorological training 
standards as well as provide the initial steps for creation of a useful training 
program to reduce deficiencies, increase effectiveness, and provide better decision 
support for various levels of emergency management.   
 Through this assessment, a review was conducted of training elements, 
information collection, requirements, and utilization, resources, challenges, 
situational awareness, communication, and decision making. There is heavy 
emphasis on the foundational pieces, so as to further advance theoretical and 
conceptual knowledge within the field of emergency management, yet also among 
the differing disciplines/areas comprising this study. Emphasis was placed on the 
informational and training elements as they influence situational awareness, 
which in turn influences decision making. Inherent throughout this process, end-
to-end communication is a vital component towards effective action taking and 
avoidance of a systematic breakdown. To avoid being remiss, mention of relevant 
communication components will also be noted throughout this work, with a more 
focused discussion in Chapter 6, regarding the advancement and utilization of a 
proposed adaptation of the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) 
framework.     
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1.5 VALUE OF THIS RESEARCH 
 This dissertation promulgates the extensive purview of situational 
awareness within FEMA and among its partners as well as the pivotal role that the 
FEMA Regional/National Watch Centers (RWC/NWC) play in maintaining 
situational awareness. The intent of this research is to identify the situational 
awareness, communication, and decision making structures and processes at 
FEMA, assess weather knowledge experience and utilization background of FEMA 
personnel, and establish the relationship with weather information usage to 
support development of enhanced weather information and resource training for 
FEMA personnel and partners. The results of this work will enhance the decision 
making capabilities of leadership and lead to more timely and appropriate 
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery efforts, in turn saving lives and 
property.  
 The ideas put forth in this dissertation contribute to the foundational 
knowledge base of emergency management by advancing various frameworks 
within several academic disciplines. This includes but is not limited to emergency 
management, communication, risk and crisis management and human factors via 
situational awareness. The end product of this work also has implications for 
public policy, which could result in operational impacts while also enhancing 
FEMA’s and other emergency management partners’ processes and procedures for 
more effective and efficient disaster support efforts. In finality, through conducting 
this research, I hope to advance the understanding of FEMA weather informational 
needs and put forth training requirements and communication strategies to 
facilitate the decision making process. 
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1.6 DISSERTATION OVERVIEW 
Including this introduction (Chapter 1), this dissertation consists of eight 
chapters in total. Chapter 2 provides a background overview of relevant subject 
matter and a historical perspective of emergency management. Chapter 3 provides 
an extensive literature review of the various areas, notions, and ideas addressed in 
this study. The research design and methodology utilized in this study are provided 
in Chapter 4 along with a proposed conceptual framework. Chapter 5 discusses the 
overall data analysis and results, while Chapter 6 discusses the overall extended 
findings and conclusions. Operationalization and overview of the weather training 
component developed from these findings along with training evaluation is 
discussed in Chapter 7. Lastly, a summary and discussion of future work is 
provided in Chapter 8.       
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT  
For additional context useful for gaining an understanding of the subject 
matter of this study, this chapter provides a brief overview of the history of 
emergency management (section 2.1), a description of the levels of emergency 
management (section 2.2), an overview of comprehensive emergency management 
(phases of emergency management) (section 2.3), an introduction to FEMA 
(section 2.4), highlights of disaster policy, legal authorities, and doctrine (section 
2.5) as well as an overview of FEMA disaster declarations and assistance (section 
2.6). Due to the specialized and not widely understood technical nature of FEMA 
and emergency management across disciplines, this chapter provides an overview 
and highlights of relevant content for perspective. It also serves as an abbreviated 
historical reference guide for emergency management and disaster response.            
 HISTORY OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: STATE OF THE FIELD 
 The field of Emergency Management, as it is known today, has evolved 
tremendously over the past several decades, since its inception and beginnings 
within Civil Defense. Although stemming from the Civil Defense era, the roots of 
disaster support and management in the U.S. are tied to early governmental 
programs as far back as the early 1800’s. “Congress would continue this pattern of 
providing assistance through special acts, passing some 128 such pieces of 
legislation between 1803 and 1950” (Canton, 2007). However, the idea of 
systemized disaster support began to be ignited particularly around the turn of the 
20th century to include the efforts of the Red Cross (Butler, 2007). Since population 
distribution has differed from today’s current status along with building standards, 
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technology, agriculture, and economics, the primary hazards at that time were 
fires, floods, earthquakes, and droughts (Bumgarner, 2008; Canton, 2007).  
Prior to the 1950’s and even up until the creation of FEMA in 1979, Federal 
disaster support was ad hoc. With the cold war era in full swing by the 1950’s, 
greater attention focused on the threat of nuclear war (Haddow, Bullock, & 
Coppola, 2017; Butler, 2007). As population growth, westward expansion and 
eventual migration to coastal cities and urban areas continued, earthquakes, 
hurricanes and tornadoes became more prominent and a new era of emergency 
management was born. Two pieces of legislation, the Federal Disaster Act of 1950 
and the Civil Defense Act of 1950, drastically changed the field by establishing roles 
and guidelines for the different levels of government and “laid the foundation for 
modern emergency management” (Canton, 2007). As disaster assistance evolved, 
it became more haphazard and complex with over one hundred agencies involved 
(Bumgarner, 2008). Following suit, many pieces of amended disaster legislation 
were passed, which led to an outcry from the States and reform of disaster support 
from the Federal government, culminating in the creation of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 1979 under President Jimmy Carter 
(National Governors’ Association [NGA], 1979; Exec. Order No. 12,127, 1979). 
Tasked with coordinating the disaster functions at the Federal level, the 
implementation of FEMA streamlined Federal disaster functions under one entity. 
FEMA is not only responsible for managing a variety of natural and un-natural 
hazards and disasters at the Federal level, but also tasked with providing 
overarching guidance for State and local authorities.  
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Since the creation of FEMA, robust and expansive legislative amendments 
have been made along with a vast amount of reorganization and policy 
implementation. Although civil defense notions waned in the 1990’s, after the 
September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, there was a resurgence of terrorism and civil 
defense related activities among the Federal sector, resulting in FEMA 
restructuring and creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
(Homeland Security Act [HSA], 2002). When Hurricane Katrina struck in 2005, it 
forced the issue of creating a balance between different types of hazards including 
natural, technological and terrorism. Various major disasters since Katrina and 
associated policy changes have tested and refined disaster assistance. FEMA 
remains in a state of flux, and expansion of mission areas to include cyber threats 
and immigration challenges among others.  
Within the past few decades, the field has been transitional resulting from 
greater emphasis placed on emergency management due to several large-scale 
catastrophes, population migration to urban and coastal areas and evolving 
impacts including climate change. The field of emergency management as well as 
FEMA’s role and responsibilities continues to evolve with every disaster as new 
challenges arise, technological innovation emerge and political and public 
demands increase. Today, the field of emergency management covers all types of 
hazards and includes members from a wide array of disciplines. The position of 
emergency manager falls across all levels of government as well as the private and 
non-profit sectors. Given the multifaceted nature of the field it is more difficult to 
define the position, rather than the mission. Therefore, emergency management 
may best be defined as ‘a group of people possessing a variety of skill sets, 
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working toward the same goal to save lives and property before, during and after 
a disaster and to aid in the resiliency of our populace and communities’.  
Due to the professionalization of emergency management as a grassroots 
effort, evolving disaster doctrine, and the reorganization of FEMA, developed or 
identified theoretical and conceptual frameworks and underpinnings are lacking. 
To advance the field and fill this gap, there is an enhanced need to build an 
established body of knowledge through research and associated educational 
programs. Research contributes to overall understanding of the field and facilitates 
establishment of guiding principles with progression towards a standardized 
ideology. Educational program development adds to or enhances existing skill sets 
and meets the growing demands of the field, which ultimately refines disaster 
operations and helps to lessen or prevent future disasters.     
 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LEVELS 
There are three primary governmental levels of emergency management: 
local, State/Territory/Tribal and Federal. While they all must work together to 
accomplish their missions, they have vastly different roles. The overarching 
disaster assistance system is designed such that when an incident exceeds the 
capabilities one level can provide, the next higher level will support. As ‘all 
disasters are local’, local public safety officials are the first responders for all 
incidents. If an event is too large to manage with existing resources, they may 
utilize assistance from other jurisdictions and/or the State/Territory. If the 
State/Territory is unable to provide appropriate assistance, FEMA and any 
relevant partners at the Federal level will be called upon to assist. Tribal Nations 
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are designated as sovereign nations, which allows them to also request assistance 
from FEMA similarly to a State or Territory, yet they also have the flexibility to 
receive assistance as a ‘local’ jurisdiction as well (Sandy Recovery Improvement 
Act [SRIA], 2013). 
Characteristics and responsibilities of emergency managers vary greatly 
between local jurisdictions. These differences between roles and positions allow 
for variation among educational and professional backgrounds, experience, 
resource availability, support, authority and the department in which they reside. 
Many emergency management positions or duties are located within a local fire or 
police department. Their duties differ from office to office, state to state and region 
to region. Some of these positions are paid, yet many are not or are dual-hatted 
with another position, such as a Fire or Police Chief. The diversity of the emergency 
management spectrum has both advantages and disadvantages. One of the 
greatest advantages, is the sharing of one another’s expertise and resources. 
Conversely, one of the biggest disadvantages is a lack of consistency amongst 
jurisdictional policies and protocols, which poses a challenge for the field as a 
whole, the discipline as well as disaster support operations. Emergency 
management at the local level, generally speaking, includes a fairly substantial 
amount of responsibilities. Some of which include ensuring the communities 
response capabilities, monitoring and/or managing mitigation projects, 
developing plans and exercises, conducting outreach, maintaining the warning 
systems and responding to disasters. They accomplish these tasks through 
collaboration and partnerships amongst the community, local governing body and 
through State and Federal assistance, support, and guidance.     
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At the State/Territory level, each governing body has some type of 
emergency management/public safety/homeland security office, department or 
division that is designated for supporting the local jurisdictions and serving as the 
liaison between the local municipalities and FEMA. Their role is to facilitate 
submission of disaster declaration requests to FEMA through the Governor, assist 
with the coordination of activities between multiple jurisdictions and manage 
State/Territory level programs (National Response Framework [NRF], 2013). The 
State/Territory serves as the conduit through which FEMA provides support and 
assistance. Otherwise, the process would escalate rapidly and overwhelm FEMA 
resources quickly. Additionally, although Tribal Nations can choose to submit 
independently for disaster assistance in line with the process of a State or Territory 
given their sovereign nation status, they design their own governance structure. 
Hence, the structures can vary from tribe to tribe. The size of a tribe and 
designation, resource availability, and assistance required determines the best 
suited avenue to pursue (SRIA, 2013). 
FEMA and other Federal agencies do not generally serve as first responders. 
Rather, they support disaster response operations when State/Territory/Tribal 
and local resources have been exhausted. Their primary role is to deploy assets and 
provide resources, funds, and assistance as warranted according to current policy 
guidelines. They also provide training, conduct exercises, develop policy and 
doctrine, implement support programs, provide financial assistance through 
grants, and lead the nationwide emergency management effort. Overall, FEMA 
maintains policies and programs, supports initiatives and ongoing efforts before, 
19 
during and after a disaster as well as administers assistance through a variety of 
mechanisms in collaboration with a vast number of partners.  
Due to the interdisciplinary nature of disaster response, emergency 
managers must act as liaisons between various departments, agencies, 
organizations (non-profit and private) and the public. Differing responsibilities 
and priorities across the spectrum from local first responders to Federal 
authorities lead to differences within weather information usage and decision 
making. Unlike local emergency management officials, whose focus is on localized 
threats no matter size or extent, FEMA’s area of responsibility is much greater. 
Covering up to multiple states at a time, FEMA involvement will be dependent on 
incident scale and impacts. Versatility among levels, jurisdictions, backgrounds, 
and responsibilities of emergency managers poses a challenge for obtaining a 
general understanding of the field, educational standardization, and theoretical 
development as there is no specified body of knowledge, function, structure, 
responsibility or authority.        
The scope of emergency management is quite broad, involving a plethora of 
players across a wide spectrum of hazards, tasks, and outcomes. While all aspects 
and levels of emergency management are important and valuable, emphasis for 
this study will focus more specifically on FEMA and the Federal level. Gaining an 
understanding of FEMA weather information usage, influencing factors, and 
motivation of actions will guide changes to existing policies or allow for the 
formation of new ones. All of which supports operational guidance, determines the 
decision making and communication structure, and leads to advancement and 
development of appropriate educational/training requirements.   
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 PHASES OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
The four primary phases of emergency management are to prepare, 
respond, recover, and mitigate (NGA, 1979). Although there are other variations of 
these components, these four main phases are widely recognized as the ‘Disaster 
Life Cycle’ (Neal, 1997). The life cycle, as indicated in Figure 2.1, is continuous with 
no clear beginning or end points and phases often overlap as concurrent activities 
are ongoing. Currently, the system is designed to begin and end with Mitigation, 
while preparedness activities are generally continuous throughout all phases of a 
disaster.  Responding to a disaster and recovering from one, often coincides with 
one another. While response mode will eventually fully transition to recovery, the 
duration of response and recovery operations will depend on the severity of the 
event and the spatial coverage.  
 
Figure 2.1: Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) also known as 
the disaster life cycle or phases of emergency management as adapted from 
National Governors Association (NGA) Comprehensive Emergency 
Management A Governor’s Guide (1979) (NGA, 1979). 
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2.3.1 MITIGATION  
Mitigation occurs “over the long term for the purpose of reducing or 
eliminating the risk of various hazards” (Bumgarner, 2008). This includes 
activities “to reduce the loss of life and property from natural and/or manmade 
disasters by avoiding or lessening the impact of a disaster” (NIMS, 2008). The goal 
of mitigation is to reduce vulnerability and build sustainable, resilient 
communities. A few examples of mitigation efforts include, floodplain mapping 
and buyouts, zoning and building code assessments, monitoring of dam and levee 
systems, and utilization of more resilient building materials are (Lindsay, 2012).  
2.3.2 PREPAREDNESS 
Preparedness and mitigation are often misconstrued. “Preparedness is 
distinct from mitigation because rather than focusing on eliminating or reducing 
risks, the general focus of preparedness is to enhance the capacity to respond to an 
incident” (Lindsay, 2012). Preparedness consists of activities “directed toward 
maintaining a state of readiness to respond to disasters and other large-scale 
emergencies” (Bumgarner 2008). Activities include performing outreach, 
planning, training, developing exercises, conducting after action reviews and 
subsequent lessons learned documents among other tasks (Haddow et al., 2017).  
2.3.3 RESPONSE 
The most urgent of all of the phases, “response activities are comprised of 
the immediate actions to save lives, protect property and the environment, and 
meet basic human needs” (Lindsay, 2012). “Response also includes the execution 
of emergency plans and actions to support short-term recovery” (NRF, 2008). 
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Response operations include, but are not limited to; information dissemination, 
public warning, mass care, and search and rescue, along with numerous other 
lifesaving missions (Haddow et al., 2017). 
2.3.4 RECOVERY 
Consisting of a multitude of elements, “recovery activities are intended to 
restore essential services and repair damages caused by the event” (Lindsay, 2012).  
These efforts will continue “long after a disaster strikes to restore an affected 
community to its pre-disaster condition or better” (Bumgarner 2008). A variety of 
measures ongoing throughout this phase strive to rebuild the affected areas via 
restoration of infrastructure, reconstitution of goods and services, and long-term 
housing missions (Haddow et al., 2017). 
 THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA) 
FEMA was established in 1979 under the Carter Administration (Exec. 
Order No. 12,127, 1979). Born out of necessity, “the National Governor's 
Association (NGA) sought to decrease the many agencies with which state and local 
governments were forced work” (FEMA, 2010a). The purpose of which was to 
assist and provide support to people and governmental jurisdictions in the event 
of a disaster either technological or natural (NGA, 1979). FEMA combined various 
disaster related services into one entity and acted as a clearinghouse of sorts. 
Throughout the agency’s forty-year history, evolution has included continuous 
transformation and innovation. “These organizational changes have largely served 
as a response to the unique and increasing external challenges confronting the 
agency, and ultimately the nation” (Adamski, Kline, & Tyrrell, 2006). Changes in 
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emergency management are often caused by disasters; as the essence of disasters 
has evolved over the years, so has FEMA. Over the past two decades, the agency 
and its responsibilities have changed greatly beginning with the events of 9/11. 
From inception, FEMA was a stand-alone agency. However, with the creation of 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003 following the events of 9/11, 
FEMA was reorganized underneath DHS where it resides today (HSA, 2002).  
FEMA is tasked with coordinating the Federal disaster response for all 
disaster types and providing guidance for U.S. Federal, State, Territory, Tribal and 
local authorities. “FEMA’s mission is to support our citizens and first responders 
to ensure that as a nation we work together to build, sustain and improve our 
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from and mitigate all 
hazards” (FEMA, 2010a). Composed of ten regions (Figure 2.2), in addition to 
headquarters (located in Washington, D.C.) and several training components 
around the country, FEMA Regions are organized into five divisions that reflect 
the phases of emergency management in addition to a Mission Support Division.  
Each division serves a specific set of functions, maintains certain ‘core 
capabilities’ (DHS, 2015b) and is responsible for managing all relevant programs 
that support those functions and capabilities. While there are some deviations 
among FEMA Regions regarding specific structure, positions, etc., generally 
speaking, the mission of each division is the same and can be defined accordingly:  
• Mission Support Division: Responsible for managing and maintaining 
continuity of critical business operations including administrative items, 
budgets, information technology, etc. (FEMA, 2010a). 
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• Preparedness Division: Responsible for the coordination and 
development of outreach, the exercise program, training, evaluation and 
improvement program, grant programs and technical assistance to 
prepare for all hazards (FEMA, 2010a). 
• Mitigation Division: Responsible for the coordination, development 
and implementation of programs that reduce the impacts of hazards and 
loss of lives and property damage. Programs include Floodplain 
Management and Hazard Mitigation (FEMA, 2010a). 
• Response Division: Responsible for maintaining situational awareness 
and analysis, as well as coordinating and implementing the Federal 
response to major disasters through planning, operations, logistics and 
communications (FEMA, 2010a). 
• Recovery Division: Responsible for providing Federal assistance to 
individuals and households, as well as eligible public facilities in counties 
declared as major disaster areas. The two primary programs are Individual 
Assistance, and Public Assistance (FEMA, 2010a). 
At FEMA Headquarters, the organization differs with Response and 
Recovery together under one umbrella, Mitigation under the Federal Insurance 
Mitigation Administration (FIMA), and Mission Support and Protection and 
National Preparedness as separate units (Figure 2.3). In addition to the emergency 
management functions, FEMA also manages FIMA, the U.S. Fire Administration 
and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR). Their roles are as follows: 
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• Federal Insurance and Mitigation Agency (FIMA): Manages the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and other programs designed to 
reduce losses to property, facilities, businesses, and infrastructure from all 
hazards. (FEMA, 2012a). 
• U.S. Fire Administration (USFA): Serves as a data collection 
repository highlighting current and emerging fire trends, causes, 
occurrence, demographics, and impacts. They also assess firefighter 
fatalities for reduction of casualties. (FEMA, 2012b). 
• Urban Search and Rescue (US&R): Conduct search and rescue 
operations and stabilize trapped individuals for all types of hazards and 
disasters including local incidents. (FEMA, 2012c). 
 
Figure 2.2: FEMA regional designations and associated areas of 
responsibility (FEMA, 2010b). 
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Figure 2.3: FEMA headquarters organizational structure as of 2017 (Source: 
(FEMA, 2017a).
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Despite the multitude of permutations, the agency has been slow to develop. 
Largely this can be attributed to the changing of political parties associated with 
presidential administrations. In conjunction with these changes every four to eight 
years, different priorities and strategies are introduced. These changes include 
various iterations of funding support across FEMA and emergency management 
impacting the number and types of programs available, response capabilities, 
planning efforts, disaster assistance procedures, etc. Although politics and public 
policy are one of the primary factors contributing to changes in disaster response, 
they are not the only ones. Weather patterns, climate variability and climate 
change also contribute to the severity, location, and ultimately a potential 
declaration of a disaster. For reference, Table 2.1 provides an overview of the 
number of Federally declared disasters over the past thirty years (1988 to 2017), 
since the inception of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and emergency 
Assistance Act of 1988 (Stafford Act).  
The highly political nature of the agency, the perceived unfairness of 
assistance provided along with the public’s perception of the policies, processes, 
and procedures has garnered quite a bit of criticism over the years, even more so 
in the most recent two decades. While there are a variety of contributing factors, 
the major sources of consternation can be attributed to the publics’ level of 
knowledge and understanding of emergency management policies and procedures 
and a breakdown of communication between the public and FEMA, 
State/Territory/Tribal, and local officials. As a result, the agency has been 
scrutinized by many and faced substantive oppositional backlash that has led to 
further refinement of disaster assistance and response operations.  
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YEAR MAJOR EMERGENCY FIRE TOTAL 
1988 11 0 5 16 
1989 31 0 1 32 
1990 38 0 5 43 
1991 43 0 2 45 
1992 45 2 6 53 
1993 32 19 7 58 
1994 36 1 20 57 
1995 32 2 4 38 
1996 75 8 75 158 
1997 44 0 3 47 
1998 65 9 54 128 
1999 50 20 40 110 
2000 45 6 63 114 
2001 45 11 44 100 
2002 49 0 70 119 
2003 56 19 48 123 
2004 68 7 43 118 
2005 48 68 39 155 
2006 52 5 86 143 
2007 63 13 60 136 
2008 75 17 51 143 
2009 59 7 49 115 
2010 81 9 18 108 
2011 99 29 114 242 
2012 47 16 49 112 
2013 62 5 28 95 
2014 45 6 33 84 
2015 44 2 34 80 
2016 46 7 50 103 
2017 59 16 62 137 
AVERAGE 52 10 39 100 
Table 2.1: 30 years of compiled yearly Federal disaster declarations from 
1988 to 2017 nationwide (Data source: FEMA, 2018a). 
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 DISASTER LEGAL AUTHORITY AND POLICY  
Despite the frequent misconception that FEMA is a first responder, the 
initial Disaster Relief Act of 1950 “asserted the Federal role in emergency 
management as secondary to state and local government efforts” (Adamski et al. 
2006). Since then, there have been various additions to the Federal legal authority 
designation of disasters including multiple follow up Disaster Relief Acts (DRA) in 
1966, 1969, 1970, and 1974. Although FEMA was established in 1979, it wasn’t until 
almost a decade later in 1988 that the Stafford Act was implemented, which 
authorized and outlined the modern-day programs and processes of Federal 
disaster and emergency assistance. Since inception of the Stafford Act (1988) 
additional amendments and modifications have been adopted as summarized in 
Table 2.2. Additionally, a plethora of guiding frameworks, policies, and doctrine 
outlining roles, structure and management of disasters have also been 
implemented as is discussed in the following sections.     
2.5.1 NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF) 
In 1992, FEMA implemented the Federal Response Plan (FRP), revised to 
National Response Plan (NRP) in 2004, and the National Response Framework 
(NRF) in 2008. Along with NIMS, the NRF guides national response by integrating 
the capabilities and resources of the ‘whole community’. They are “companion 
documents and are designed to improve the nation’s incident management and 
response capabilities. While NIMS provides the template for the management of 
incidents regardless of size, scope or cause the NRF provides the structure and 
mechanisms for national level incident response policy” (FEMA, 2017b).  
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  YEAR DISASTER LEGAL AUTHORITY MILESTONES 
1950 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950 (Pub. L. No. 81-875 (1950))  
Empowered the President to manage the Federal response to 
disasters without Congressional approval and with a minimal budget. 
1966 Disaster Relief Act of 1966 (Pub. L. No. 89-769 (1966))   Authorized a 50% Federal cost share for damage to public facilities. 
1969 
Disaster Relief Act of 1969 (Pub. L. No. 91-79 (1969)) 
Directed the appointment of a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to 
manager disasters and authorized temporary housing assistance.  
1970 
Disaster Relief Act of 1970 (Pub. L. No. 91-606 (1970))    
Included additional disaster support elements and authorized up to a 
100% Federal cost share for damage to public facilities from disasters. 
1974 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-288 (1974))   
Established the Presidential disaster declaration process, implemented 
the Individual Assistance program and authorized mitigation efforts. 
1979 
FEMA Established (Executive Order 12127, 44 Fed. Reg. (1979))  
Established FEMA and transferred a variety of disaster related tasks 
from other Federal agencies.   
1988 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act 
(Pub. L. No. 100-707 (1988))   
Authorized and outlined the programs and processes of Federal 
disaster and emergency assistance.  
2000 
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Pub L. No. 106-390 (2000) 
Required local Hazard Mitigation Plans and established pre-disaster 
mitigation programs.  
2002 
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA) (Pub. L. No. 107-296, (2002))   
Implemented the Department of Homeland Security and transferred 
FEMA as one of the agencies within.  
2003 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 
Directed the development of the National Incident Management 
System and the National Response Plan (Framework). 
2006 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 
No. 109-295 (2006))   
Amended HSA 2002/Stafford Act with new authorities for FEMA and 
mandated FEMA Administrator emergency management background. 
2011 
Presidential Policy Directive-8 
Directed development of the National Preparedness Goal and the 
National Preparedness System. 
2013 
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (Pub. L 113-2 (2013)) 
Authorized new procedures for Public Assistance and allowed Tribal 
Nations to submit for disaster assistance aside from the State. 
Table 2.2: Disaster legal authority milestones 1950 to present from the FEMA 
Disaster Operations Legal Reference (DOLR) (2017) (DHS, 2017a). 
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2.5.2 NATIONAL PLANNING FRAMEWORKS  
In recent years, FEMA has expanded from one framework (the NRF) to five 
National Planning Frameworks (NPF) (Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, 
Response, and Recovery), in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal 
(NPG). The NPG is to ensure “a secure and resilient nation with the capabilities 
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond 
to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk” (DHS, 
2015b). The purpose of each framework is to define the roles and responsibilities of 
the ‘whole community’ within each mission critical area. For example, the NRF 
"provides a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident 
response, while the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) provides a 
structure to manage and promote effective long-term recovery” (DHS, 2017a).  
2.5.3 EMERGENCY SUPPORT FUNCTIONS (ESF) 
Outlined in the NRF, there are 14 ESFs designated to support disaster relief 
(Table 2.3). They are not the only means of support, but they are the lead partners 
during disaster operations (DHS, 2016b). These functions, along with local, 
State/Tribal/Territory, and other partners, comprise the Regional Interagency 
Steering Committees (RISC). There is one RISC per FEMA Region, meeting 
quarterly at Region or within the area of responsibility. The purpose is to discuss 
new or evolving projects, and policies or initiatives that may affect disaster 
response. These meetings allow for partnership building before a disaster occurs 
and provides new and transitional personnel with the opportunity to learn their 
new role and the role of others in a non-disaster environment.  
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ESF #1 – Transportation (Department of Transportation) 
Coordinates the support of management of transportation systems and infrastructure, the 
regulation of transportation, management of the Nation’s airspace, and ensuring the safety and 
security of the national transportation system.  
ESF #2 – Communications (DHS/Cybersecurity and Communications) 
Coordinates government and industry efforts for the reestablishment and provision of critical 
communications infrastructure, facilitates the stabilization of systems and applications from 
malicious cyber activity, and coordinates communications support to response efforts.  
ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering (DOD/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) 
Coordinates the capabilities and resources to facilitate the delivery of services, technical 
assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and other support to prepare for, 
respond to, and/or recover from a disaster or an incident.  
ESF #4 – Firefighting (USDA/U.S. Forest Service & DHS/FEMA/U.S. Fire Administration) 
Coordinates the support for the detection and suppression of fires.  
ESF #5 – Information and Planning (DHS/FEMA) 
Supports and facilitates multiagency planning and coordination for operations involving incidents 
requiring Federal coordination.  
ESF #6 – Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Temporary Housing, and Human Services 
(DHS/FEMA) 
Coordinates the delivery of mass care and emergency assistance.  
ESF #7 – Logistics (General Services Administration and DHS/FEMA) 
Coordinates comprehensive incident resource planning, management, and sustainment 
capability to meet the needs of disaster survivors and responders.  
ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services (Department of Health and Human Service) 
Coordinates the mechanisms for assistance in response to an actual or potential public health 
and medical disaster or incident.  
ESF #9 – Search and Rescue (DHS/FEMA) 
Coordinates the rapid deployment of search and rescue resources to provide specialized 
lifesaving assistance. 
ESF #10 – Oil and Hazardous Materials Response (Environmental Protection Agency) 
Coordinates support in response to an actual or potential discharge and/or release of oil or 
hazardous materials.  
ESF #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources (Department of Agriculture) 
Coordinates a variety of functions designed to protect the Nation’s food supply, respond to plant 
and animal pest and disease outbreaks, and protect natural and cultural resources. 
ESF #12 – Energy (Department of Energy) 
Facilitates the reestablishment of damaged energy systems and components and provides 
technical expertise during an incident involving radiological/nuclear materials.  
ESF #13 – Public Safety and Security 
Coordinator: Department of Justice/Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives 
Coordinates the integration of public safety and security capabilities and resources to support 
the full range of incident management activities.  
ESF #14 – Long Term Community Recovery* 
*Superseded by the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) 2016  
ESF #15 – External Affairs (DHS)  
Coordinates the release of accurate, coordinated, timely, and accessible public information to 
affected audiences, including the government, media, NGOs, and the private sector. Works 
closely with state and local officials to ensure outreach to the whole community.  
Table 2.3: Emergency Support Functions as outlined in the National 
Response Framework (DHS, 2016b). 
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2.5.4 NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (NIMS) 
 Implemented in 2004, “NIMS is a set of principles that provides a 
systematic, proactive approach to guiding government agencies at all levels, non-
governmental organizations (NGO), and the private sector to work seamlessly to 
prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of 
incidents-regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity-in order to reduce the 
loss of life or property and harm to the environment” (DHS, 2011). Having evolved 
over many decades with its roots within the firefighting community, the 
overarching objectives of NIMS according to the NRF (DHS, 2016b) are:  
• Provide a systematic approach to incident management 
• Be applicable to all incident types and sizes 
• Provide guidance, structure for all hazards and disaster phases 
• Provide resource management procedures for coordination 
Provide communication/information management principles 
2.5.5 FEMA WORKFORCE TRANSFORMATION 
Aligned with priorities set forth by former FEMA Administrator W. Craig 
Fugate, in the FEMA Administrator’s Intent Memorandum (2010), and impending 
financial concerns, FEMA implemented a workforce transformation initiative. 
Components intended to refine the workforce under the notion that “every 
employee is an emergency manager” (former Deputy FEMA Administrator 
Richard Serino, 2012). The goal of the initiative was to enhance personnel 
qualifications through training and experience so that all FEMA employees possess 
the required skills to perform various tasks during both Stafford Act (disaster) and 
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non-Stafford Act (non-disaster) activities. In support of this concept, the FEMA 
Qualification System (FQS) was born which set forth the idea that employees 
would have two titles: one for Stafford Act activities (incident support (IS)) and 
one for non-Stafford Act activities (incident management (IM)). The system also 
provided new guidance and qualifications in the form of Position Task Books 
(PTB). Personnel achieve qualified (vs. trainee) status in their respective IS 
positions, through completion of the PTBs. Since the PTBs are based on experience 
and training it is necessary to establish consistent, standardized training programs 
and mechanisms to ensure that all personnel acquire the relevant skill sets.  
 FEMA DISASTER DECLARATIONS AND ASSISTANCE OVERVIEW 
Based on policy, authorities, and statutes, FEMA utilizes pre-established 
economic and demographic thresholds, among others, for declaring a ‘disaster’. 
Resulting from this process, there could be a hazardous event that is considered 
scientifically significant but not relevant to FEMA. For example, a flooding event 
that affects agricultural or recreational lands with little to no impact to people or 
infrastructure would likely not elicit a FEMA response. For the purpose of this 
study, as defined by FEMA, a disaster is “an event that results in large numbers of 
deaths and injuries; causes extensive damage or destruction of facilities that 
provide and sustain human needs; produces an overwhelming demand on state 
and local response resources and mechanisms; causes a severe long-term effect on 
general economic activity; and severely affects state, local, and private sector 
capabilities to begin and sustain response activities” (FEMA, 2014b). For the 
remainder of the document, this notion will be utilized when referencing ‘disaster’. 
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Figure 2.4: FEMA Major Disaster Declaration (DR) request process. The 
process begins with the State/Territory/Tribe resulting in a final decision 
from the President. (DHS, 2017b) 
2.6.1 DISASTER DECLARATIONS   
In order to receive Federal disaster assistance, State/Territory/Tribal 
governments must follow the process outlined in Figure 2.4. Upon incident 
occurrence, if initial damage surveys indicate that impacts will likely exceed State, 
Territory, and Tribal capabilities, the Governor, Territory or Tribal lead can 
request Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDA) from FEMA. Pending the 
outcome, they can then submit a request to FEMA for a declaration. Upon review 
of the event and PDAs, FEMA will then make a recommendation to the President 
for a final decision (FEMA, 2018b). However, the impending impacts of some 
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events (i.e. – hurricanes) are evident. As such, a declaration can also be issued, at 
the request of the Governor, Territory or Tribal lead, before an incident if 
significant impacts are imminent.   
If the impacts from a hazardous event have been determined to exceed the 
capability of state, territory, or tribal jurisdictions, FEMA can issue one or more of 
three primary types of disaster declarations: (1) Major Disaster Declarations, (2) 
Emergency Declarations, and (3) Fire Management Assistance Grants. “A Major 
Disaster (DR) could result from any natural or manmade event that the President 
determines warrants supplemental Federal aid. The event must be clearly more 
than state or local governments can handle alone. If declared, funding comes from 
the President's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF), managed by FEMA and the disaster 
aid programs of other participating Federal departments or agencies” (DHS, 
2016b). “An Emergency Declaration (EM) is more limited in scope and without the 
long-term Federal recovery programs of a Major Disaster Declaration. Generally, 
Federal assistance and funding are provided to meet a specific emergency need or 
to help prevent a major disaster from occurring” (DHS, 2016b). Lastly, a Fire 
Management Assistance Grant (FMAG), while not issued from the President, “is 
available to local and Tribal governments, for the mitigation, management and 
control of fires on publicly or privately-owned forests or grasslands, which threaten 
such destruction as would constitute a major disaster” (FEMA, 2018c).  
2.6.2 DISASTER ASSISTANCE 
 In addition to the declaration types, there are also differing types of 
assistance available. The type of assistance allowable under a declaration will be 
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determined by the damage sustained and the assistance requested through the 
declaration request. The three disaster assistance types are: (1) Individual 
Assistance (IA), (2) Public Assistance (PA), and (3) Hazard Mitigation Assistance 
(HM). As is indicated by the title, IA is provided to individuals while PA and HM 
are provided to jurisdictions. HM provides funding to communities for projects 
that will “prevent or reduce long term risk to life and property” (DHS, 2015a).   PA 
will assist with covering the cost of emergency work as well as damages sustained 
to infrastructure. There are seven designated allowable categories under PA as 
follows (DHS, 2018a):  
• Category A: Debris Removal 
• Category B: Emergency Protective Measures 
• Category C: Roads and Bridges 
• Category D: Water Control Facilities 
• Category E: Buildings and Equipment 
• Category F: Utilities 
• Category G: Parks, Recreational and other Facilities  
For some disasters, all types of assistance are made available if a DR is 
issued. While for others, only IA or PA is provided along with HM. HM is nearly 
always provided to assist communities with building or rebuilding more resilient. 
Additionally, as EM declarations are more focused and urgent, they primarily offer 
assistance for categories A and B under PA. If an EM declaration is issued, a DR 
can also be requested following the aftermath of an event upon assessment, when 
impacts are more widely known.         
38 
2.6.3 DISASTER SUPPORT 
While FEMA is not considered a first-responder per say, they do provide 
disaster support through funds, resources, planning, etc. In order to administer 
assistance, they rely on several disaster support units within the agency. The first 
line of defense at FEMA is the National and Regional Watch Centers (N/RWC). 
The N/RWCs maintain 24/7 situational awareness to establish a Common 
Operating Picture (COP) and support response efforts by facilitating an orderly 
transition from steady-state operations through National/Regional Response 
Coordination Center (N/RRCC) activation (FEMA, 2014a).   
The N/RRCC is the facility through which the Administrator/Regional 
Administrator (RA) directly controls and coordinates FEMA disaster operations 
and support until field operations are established and beyond as an incident 
warrants (DHS, 2013a). If necessary, an Incident Management Assistance Team 
(IMAT) will deploy to a disaster location or near a State Emergency Operations 
Center (EOC) (DHS, 2017b). Upon arrival, they will establish a Joint Field Office 
(JFO) which will provide disaster support to State, Territory, Tribal and/or local 
governments. Additionally, if IA was allowed in the received declaration, then 
Disaster Recovery Centers (DRC) will be established onsite in or near the disaster 
areas. These locations are where those impacted by the disaster can receive 
information about the various assistance programs available to them through 
FEMA, the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) and other non-profits. In 
addition, there will be personnel in the disaster area to provide disaster assistance 
information to survivors.   
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The N/RWC serves as a conduit for receiving and communicating mission 
critical information and analysis to Federal, State, Territory, and Tribal partners 
and at times local officials. Responsibilities include monitoring various sources of 
information to identify potential threats, determine emerging hazards, assess 
potential impacts, disseminate information through reports and daily readiness 
briefings to alert personnel of any potential threats, and notify personnel of 
significant event occurrence (FEMA, 2014a). Additionally, the N/RWC facilitates 
the implementation of N/RRCC activation and deployment orders in accordance 
with current FEMA policy and directives. Once established, operations will be 
carried out by predesignated personnel.   
Unlike local emergency management officials, whom utilize weather 
information to make immediate, potentially life-saving and time critical decisions, 
FEMA generally utilizes weather information and data in more of a supporting 
role. For example, N/RWC personnel are constantly monitoring and assessing 
weather hazards and impacts in order to alert FEMA personnel and response 
partners of potentially impending threats that may lead to a disaster declaration. 
Once an incident occurs, scope, size, scale and impacts of the incident will 
determine what further action by N/RWC personnel is warranted if any, such as 
coordination of resources and personnel. Throughout this process and in the 
aftermath of an incident, various types of weather information and/or data are 
needed along varying timelines. It is particularly valuable in assisting with accurate 
interpretation and analysis for hazard and impact assessment as it is imperative 
for maintaining situational awareness, coordinating response efforts and 
supporting Senior Leadership decision making.   
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
To fully encompass the topic of emergency management wholly, it is 
necessary to discuss existing literature for a variety of subject areas for this study.  
As such, this chapter provides a brief literature review of emergency management 
as a discipline (section 3.1), hazards and disasters (section 3.2), hazard messaging 
and communication (section 3.3), risk and crisis communication and management 
(section 3.4), situation awareness (section 3.5), decision making (section 3.6), 
weather training (section 3.7), and ending with a summation of existing knowledge 
gaps (section 3.8). Examination of the aforementioned areas informed this study 
by identifying knowledge gaps and providing a starting point to guide and build 
from. The topics discussed in this chapter serve as the foundational components 
not only for this study, but also for future endeavors.     
3.1 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 
 Emergency management can be defined in a multitude of ways and is often 
interchangeably referred to as disaster management, risk management, public 
safety, emergency response, etc. Simplistically, “emergency management is the 
discipline dealing with risk and risk avoidance” (Haddow et al., 2017) or “the 
expert systems that manage people and resources to deal with disasters” (Rubin, 
2007). A more advanced definition of emergency management is “the managerial 
function charged with creating the framework within which communities reduce 
vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters” (Blanchard et al., 2007). 
Operationally, emergency management is “the process by which the uncertainties 
that exist in potentially hazardous situations can be minimized and public safety 
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maximized” (Drabek, 2004). Officially, FEMA defines emergency management as 
those who “coordinate and integrate all activities to build, sustain, and improve the 
capability to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, or mitigate 
against threatened or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism or other man-made 
disasters" (Post Katrina Emergency Management Reformation Act [PKEMRA], 
2006). Among the group, “includes Federal, State, Territorial, Tribal, sub-state 
regional, and local governments, NGOs, private sector-organizations, critical 
infrastructure owners and operators, and all other organizations and individuals 
who assume an emergency management role” (FEMA, 2010c)  More succinctly, 
emergency management is “an ongoing process to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from an incident that threatens life, property, operations, 
or the environment” (National Fire Protection Association [NFPA], 2007).  
Cressman (1971) describes a very different state of the field, previous to 
“modern emergency management” (Perry & Nigg 1985). Providing a synthesis of 
public usage of weather information, he also extends beyond to include a brief 
discussion of social factors. He notes that “we are able to use sirens directly in only 
a few communities but are working with Civil Defense to extend this type of 
warning or to find a better and perhaps more modern or effective way” (Cressman 
1971). Emergency management is a diverse and changing field that has been put at 
the forefront of many political discussions over the past few decades. A greater 
demand has materialized due to increasing disasters associated with climate 
change, population migration, and construction among others (Riebsame, Diaz, 
Moses, & Price, 1986). Once the small and lackluster profession of civil defense, 
the greatly evolved field of emergency management has emerged from meager 
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beginnings. Transitioning from the era of civil defense to emergency management, 
the National Governors Association (NGA) initially put forth the idea of 
Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) as the organizing structure for 
the development and implementation of FEMA in 1979 (NGA, 1979). Composed of 
four phases: (1) preparedness, (2) response, (3) recovery, and (4) mitigation, CEM 
is an approach that includes all hazards and impacts throughout all phases and 
amongst all partners (Blanchard et al., 2007). While the first official notion of CEM 
may have been set forth in 1978, the idea of disaster phases and social influences 
dates back to 1932 (Carr, 1932). FEMA remains organized within respective 
divisional components according to this framework forty years later. Additionally, 
the phases of CEM, also frequently referred to as the disaster lifecycle, continue to 
serve as the overarching guide for emergency management disaster activities.  
Despite implementation of FEMA in 1979, it wasn’t until the early to mid-
2000’s, following the events of 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, that the field of 
emergency management came to the forefront. During this time, development and 
implementation of certifications and undergraduate degree programs in 
emergency management, homeland security and the like began. Master’s degree 
and eventually Doctoral degree programs followed suit. Discussion of ‘theory and 
emergency management’ began to emerge (McEntire, 2004; Drabek, 2004) as 
development of degree programs has expanded. Research in these areas increased, 
resulting in greater emphasis and study on disaster response within the academic 
sector. FEMA has since taken an emergent lead to advance the field of emergency 
management through FEMA’s Emergency Management Higher Education Project. 
Comprised of academics and practitioners, the convened working group proposed 
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eight principles to guide development and advancement of the profession of 
emergency management. The monograph entitled ‘Principles of Emergency 
Management Supplement’, outlines important characteristics for emergency 
management professionals to embody including comprehensive, progressive, risk-
driven, integrated, collaborative, coordinated, flexible and professional (Blanchard 
et al., 2007). 
Academically, compared to other disciplines, fairly limited research has 
been conducted to better understand emergency management in general, 
inhibiting theoretical or conceptual framework and model development. Theory 
development and theoretical applications are greatly understudied due to the 
‘newness’ so to speak of the discipline. Furthermore, much of the research that 
does exist focuses on lessons learned and policy with greater concentration at the 
local level. As a developing discipline, in conjunction with the multidisciplinary 
facets of emergency management, the field has struggled to establish a foundation 
within the academic sector. With no real theorems and models specific to 
emergency management and without an existing in-depth body of knowledge, 
some scholars argue for the application of relevant theories from other disciplines 
(Drabek, 2004), while others hope to work toward a ‘theory of emergency 
management’ (McEntire 2004). While one could make the argument either for or 
against a theory of emergency management, McEntire and Marshall (2003) 
identified ten challenges in attempting to do so:  
1. Defining ‘disaster’  
2. Defining ‘emergency management’  
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3. Deciding what hazards to focus on  
4. Giving preference towards ‘hazards’ vs. ‘disasters’ 
5. Deciding what variables to explore 
6. Deciding what partners to include 
7. Determining what phases are given priority 
8. Disciplines to include 
9. Determining what paradigms will guide the field 
10. Finding the proper balance for knowledge generation 
Despite continued academic efforts to advance the overall knowledge base, 
most emergency management ideas and concepts are not substantially embedded 
within peer reviewed, academic literature (Perry & Nigg 1985). This is true most 
notably for FEMA, the primary representation of Federal level emergency 
management. Rather, they are a culmination of ideas that have evolved over time 
based on operational needs. Operations continue to lead advancement of 
theoretical and conceptual developments within emergency management 
presently. Fundamentally, further solidification of foundational standards and 
comprehensively distinguishing the prevailing status of the field is required before 
substantive academic progress can be achieved.  
3.2 HAZARDS AND DISASTERS 
A natural hazard is defined “as extreme, low-probability meteorological or 
geological phenomena that have the potential to cause disasters when they strike 
human collectives” (Mileti, 1999). Examples include weather, earthquakes, 
tsunamis, volcanoes, etc. Technological hazards include human caused incidents 
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such as hazardous materials, nuclear/radiological events, etc. (Lindsey et al, 2011). 
Over the years, the idea of ‘hazards’ has expanded to include oil spills, explosions, 
terrorist attacks, public health, chemical and bioterrorism, active shooter 
scenarios, civil unrest, and cyber threats. A broader definition of a ‘hazard’ “refers 
to a situation, event or substance that can become harmful for people, nature or 
human-made facilities” (Rohrman, 2008). “Hazards do not necessarily imply the 
presence of vulnerability. However, vulnerability always takes into account 
hazards” (McEntire 2004). In other words, “a hazard is a physical entity while risk 
is not; it is an inference about the implications of a hazard for people (or nature, or 
assets) exposed to it” (Rohrman, 2008). Simply, risk can be defined as the impact 
of hazards on populations and vulnerabilities (Drottz, 1991; Fischoff et al., 1984; 
Renn, 1992; Taylor-Gooby, 2002; Yates & Stone, 1992). Furthermore, disasters are 
the characterization of risk and include both natural and man-made (terrorist and 
technological) events (Quarantelli, 1998). FEMA’s motto is to be ‘flexible and 
adaptable’, a bit of a play on words for the ‘F’ and ‘A’ in FEMA with regards to 
emergency management (the ‘EM’). As the agency and nature of disasters is 
constantly changing, mindfulness, or the need “to constantly adapt our perceptual 
skills to account for the ever-changing world around us” is important to best 
maintain awareness (Combs, 2007). 
George P. Cressman (1971) of the National Weather Service, speaking on 
behalf of meteorologist noted that “the public exposure to loss of life and property 
is increasing in spite of our best efforts in providing warning services” and that 
“this new aspect of increasing population, increased exposure of large number of 
people to environmental hazards, places a double burden on the profession.” He 
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also noted that “the magnitude of this problem is quite new” due to construction, 
population migration, evacuations, escape routes, flood plains, etc. (Cressman 
1971). Riebsame et al. (1986) proposed a preliminary listing of a multitude of 
socioeconomic trends thought to contribute to disasters and resiliency as well as 
information demands (Table 3.1). These items provide a snapshot of the beginning 
of a new era in disasters and disaster management.  
 
Table 3.1: Initially identified socioeconomic trends affecting sensitivity 
from atmospheric hazards (Riebsame et al., 1986, p. 1384). 
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 During the early days of hazards and disasters research, it was 
predominantly studied within the fields of geography and sociology (e.g. 
Quarantelli, 1960; Barton, 1969; Dynes, 1970; Kreps, 1984). Although somewhat 
limited in volume, early studies conducted in “geography has enabled scholars to 
understand the characteristics of hazards, while sociology fostered an 
understanding of the social causes of and human behavior in disasters” (McEntire, 
2004). While that tradition continues today, various other fields such as 
psychology, communication, public health, public administration, political 
science, etc. also conduct hazards and disasters research, re-affirming the 
interdisciplinary essence of emergency management, hazards, and disasters. The 
most relevant literature applicable for this study is more recent, yet a few 
prominent scholars paved the way by conducting instrumental disaster research 
since the 1960’s. For reference, these scholars include but are not limited to, 
Thomas Drabek, Russell Dynes, Charles Fritz, J. Eugene Haas, Gary Kreps, Dennis 
Mileti, Enrico Quarantelli, John Sorensen, and Gilbert White among others.    
Historically, much of the weather research conducted was science and 
mathematics based, with limited knowledge of perception, communication, usage, 
response, etc. Over the past two decades, integration of social sciences and 
meteorology has grown exponentially (e.g. Demuth, 2011, 2012, 2016; Morss, 
2005, 2007, 2008, 2015; Benight et al., 2004; Lazo, 2009, 2015; Baumgart et al., 
2008). In part, this rapidly growing field is due to an increasing disaster footprint 
on an expanding population, particularly among coastal areas, and associated 
rising cost (IPCC, 2014). Prior to now, there has been fairly substantial progress 
toward assessing warning messages and public response to hazards in general 
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(Sorenson & Mileti, 1987; Mileti & Sorenson, 1987, 1990; Mileti, 1999). However, 
understanding of decision making and communication among emergency 
management and public safety officials is not as well understood, which this study 
will begin to address.     
Early work from Quarantelli (1978, 1989) noted three problem areas within 
response: (1) “information flow problems in the communication processes within 
and between organizations, to and from organizations and citizens, (2) 
organizational decision problems resulting from losses of higher echelon 
personnel because of workload, conflict regarding authority over new disaster 
tasks, and confusion over jurisdictional responsibilities, and (3) problems in inter-
organizational coordination that results from a lack of consensus about what 
constitutes coordination, strained relationships created by new disaster tasks and 
the magnitude of the disaster impacts.” For this study, emphasis will focus on the 
first problem area for FEMA. Despite decades of change and technology, this issue 
is still relevant today. Communication of information is imperative for effective 
situational awareness and informed decision making, hence providing an 
elemental motivation for this study.    
Provided the varying hazards, extent of hazards, and the diversity of 
exposed populations, interdisciplinary and cross-cultural research is necessary 
(e.g. - Weber and Hsee, 2000; Grothman and Reusswig, 2006; Taylor-Gooby and 
Zinn, 2006; Zinn, 2008). Knowledge gained through further research will aid 
practitioners with decision making and operations. However, “the utilization of 
such knowledge requires an open-minded interdisciplinary collaboration of 
researchers and public authorities which are responsible for emergency 
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management” (Rohrmann, 2008). The likes of which I plan to perpetuate forward 
in future work and collaborations across a multitude of disciplines and into 
operations extending beyond completion of this study.     
3.3 HAZARD MESSAGING AND COMMUNICATION  
Although complex, at a primitive level, warning systems are designed to 
detect a threat, communicate it and enable response. The first step toward 
responding to a hazardous event requires identification of a threat and reception 
of information. Furthermore, the message must be specific, consistent, accurate, 
certain and clear while containing the nature, location, guidance, time and source 
of the hazard (Sorenson, 2000). Stemming from decades of work, Mileti (1999) 
states that the decision to take action from a hazard warning includes: (1) hearing 
the warning, (2) believing the warning is credible, (3) confirming the threat, (4) 
personalizing the warning, (5) determining if action is needed, (6) determining if 
action is feasible, and (7) determining what action to take. In addition, a variety of 
factors have been determined as influencing warning response. Mileti et al. (2006), 
categorized these factors as (1) socio-demographic, (2) personal, (3) 
source/channel, (4) information, and (5) threat. While mostly applied to instances 
regarding the public, these will also apply to emergency managers as well.  
Behavioral studies have investigated the public’s perception and response 
to natural hazards (e.g. – Drabek, 1986, 1999; Lindell and Perry, 1992; Mileti and 
Sorenson, 1990), which includes the notions of risk perception and approach. Risk 
perception pertains to one’s interpretations based on experiences or beliefs (Slovic, 
1987, 2000). “Human behavior in emergency management endeavors is 
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influenced by risk perception, risk attitude, risk communication and risk 
management facets” (Rohrmann, 2008). Discussed in more detail below, 
Rohrmann (2008) posits that “risk communication is the indispensable link 
between risk perception and risk management.” Not only does this relate to risk, 
but also to crisis which is “influenced by such factors as personal experience, 
framing, culture, and individual tolerance” (Seeger & Gouran, 2002). “Perceptions 
of risk and capability are also influenced by the manner in which experience is 
interpreted” (Paton & Flin, 1999).  
 “Risk perception is a key component in encouraging protective action in the 
context of natural hazards” (Sullivan-Wiley & Short Gianotti, 2017; Lindell & 
Perry, 1992; Wachinger, Renn, Begg, & Kuhlicke, 2013). A vast amount of research 
has been conducted on risk perception and influencing factors (e.g. – Fischoff, 
1995; Lindell and Perry, 1992; Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic, 1987; Wachinger et al., 
2013; Boholm, 1998). Sullivan-Wiley and Short Gianotti (2017) synthesize much 
of this work and the potential factors that influence risk perception, which are 
categorized among the following three areas: (1) hazard characteristics, (2) 
individual characteristics and (3) trust in communicating institutions.  
Hazard characteristics include (a) likelihood, (b) impact potential, (c) 
understanding, and (d) knowledge (Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic, 1987; Boholm, 1998). 
Individual characteristics include various self-efficacy factors such as gender, age, 
education and personal experience (Sjoberg, 2000; Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006; 
Wachinger et al., 2013;). Personal experience includes (a) recency, (b) frequency, 
and (c) severity of a hazardous event (Lindell and Perry 2012). Mileti and O’Brien 
(1992), refer to this as “normalization bias”, where an individual’s experience may 
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bias their perspective on future events. Furthermore, “many of the difficulties 
associated with hazard communication stem from the difficulties of choice under 
uncertainty” (Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 1996). Paton (2008) noted that trust is 
important for communication of decision making under uncertainty, “trust as 
determined by knowledge and expertise, openness and honesty, and concern and 
care” (Sullivane-Wiley & Short Gianotti, 2017; Kasperson, 1986; Peters et al., 1997; 
Renn & Levine, 1991). In emergency response there is an additional layer of 
complication, “even after a level of trust is established, security issues must still be 
considered” (Manoj & Baker, 2007).  
“Because the atmosphere is a dynamical system that exhibits limited 
predictability, weather forecasts are unavoidably uncertain” (Morss et al., 2008). 
“Current key knowledge gaps include understanding how people interpret weather 
forecast uncertainty and how to communicate uncertainty more effectively in real-
world (rather than theoretical or idealized) settings” (Morss et al., 2008), despite 
previous work from Murphy et al. (1980), Roulston et al. (2006), National 
Research Council (NRC) (2003, 2006), and Joslyn et al. (2007). Trust and 
communication with the NWS proved to be an important factor among the 
emergency managers studied in Morss and Ralph (2007). However, constant 
contact with NWS officials throughout an event is taxing to NWS personnel and 
they may be unable to satisfy all requests among many differing officials by the 
required time. These findings support the need for a widely available 
meteorological training program, where emergency managers could potentially 
further develop their skills and self-confidence. In turn, this would decrease 
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unnecessary communications with the NWS, due to a greater understanding of 
meteorological phenomena, products, resources, and impacts.  
Additionally, cultural (Sjoberg, 1996) and social (Sandman, 1987) factors 
may also play a role (Kasperson et al., 1988). For example, the Social Amplification 
of Risk framework (SAR) describes how social influence can affect risk perception 
(Pidgeon, 2003). Through communication of risks, perception can either be 
amplified or attenuated via direct or indirect experience (Kasperson et al., 1988). 
Within the information system, influencers include: (1) volume, (2) information 
disputes, (3) dramatization, and (4) symbolic connotations (i.e. – channels, 
language, etc.) (Kasperson et al., 1988), all of which compound decision making at 
FEMA. Beyond the information system, interpretation and response mechanisms 
include: (1) heuristics and values, (2) social group relationships, (3) signal value, 
and (4) stigmatization (Kasperson et al., 1988), which also contribute to FEMA 
decision making. The SAR framework showcases the social processes experienced 
by many personnel within the emergency management community. These 
processes can also be completed iteratively as the event and/or information 
changes. All of which leads us to the notion of communication overall.  
Communication within emergency management is multifaceted across 
internal and external partners. Nilsen (1974) best characterized many of the 
communication challenges also applicable to and encountered at FEMA and 
emergency management in general, including (1) incomplete information, (2) 
biased information, (3) statistical units that are inadequately defined/incomplete, 
(4) vague or ambiguous terminology, (5) erroneously implied relationships, (6) 
false sense of urgency, and (7) emotionalized language. Manoj and Baker (2007) 
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further identified three overarching types of communication challenges within 
emergency response: (1) technological, (2) sociological and (3) organizational. 
Furthermore, “relative to emergency management, communication with the public 
has one of three general objectives”: (1) information exchange, (2) educational 
contacts, and (3) support building exchanges (Perry & Nigg, 1985). This holds true 
for FEMA, “the more attention that an emergency manager can give to providing 
information on hazards, risk, and protective measures in non-crisis situations, the 
more likely it is that such information communicated during an actual emergency 
will result in adaptive citizen action” (Perry & Nigg, 1985). Although FEMA and 
others have focused efforts on informing the public about the threat, FEMA and 
emergency managers have been remiss at providing disaster assistance 
information before an event occurs. This shortfall does not allow the public to 
prepare adequately, leading to frequently misunderstood and false expectations 
from the public regarding available disaster funds after event occurrence.    
3.4 RISK AND CRISIS COMMUNICATION AND MANAGEMENT 
The terms ‘risk’, ‘crisis’, ‘emergency’, ‘disaster’, etc. are often used 
interchangeably and not consistently defined among a variety of fields. Coombs 
(2007) best synthesized various crisis perspectives stating that “a crisis is the 
perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of 
stakeholders and can seriously impact on organizations performance and generate 
negative outcomes.” Others see “crisis as creating a basic need for information, 
communication, structure, actions and related processes to reconstitute a basic 
understanding or interpretation of the situation” (Seeger & Gouran, 2002; 
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Hermann, 1963; Weick, 1988). More simplistically, “a crisis is simply a negative 
event that commands a person’s attention” (Sweeny, 2008). Variations among 
‘risk’ definitions also exist which include similarly plentiful aspects and factors. 
Reynolds and Seeger (2005) and Ulmer et al. (2007) provide further refinement.   
While the definition of a ‘disaster’ is also somewhat debatable, a disaster 
can be equated to a ‘crisis’ as it follows the same type of phasing structure and 
activities (Shaluf, 2003). Lastly, ‘emergency’ is most often utilized within the 
medical and public health professions. Despite this discrepancy, the term 
‘emergency management’ continues to be perpetuated today. Furthermore, 
emergency management contains aspects of both ‘risk’ and ‘crisis’. As a disaster 
incorporates elements of all of these areas for all types of hazards, ‘disaster 
management’ is a more appropriate term. Nonetheless, as ‘emergency 
management’ is more widely used for this purpose, I will keep within the tradition 
for this study, but offer it up as suggestion for future work and field advancement. 
Signal detection theory (SDT) postulates that ‘risk’ can turn into ‘crises’ 
(Fink, 1986) and consists of a three-part process: (1) information sources, (2) 
information collection and (3) information evaluation (Swets, 1964). Within SDT, 
event occurrence can be portrayed via a 2x2 contingency table, of which a false 
alarm is one option (Murphy, 1980). The caveat of the false alarm issue is that 
‘crying wolf’ too often can decrease response, leading a decision maker to find 
balance between information reception and response (Roulston & Smith, 2004). 
Stemming from this work and rooted in public relations, substantial work has been 
conducted within the fields of risk and crisis communication and management. 
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Many of these notions extend to support emergency management and associated 
areas, concepts and ideas. 
  Risk communication, as defined by the National Research Council (NRC, 
1989), is “an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among 
individuals, groups, and institutions.” For comparison, “crisis communication is 
what happens as an event is unfolding and in the immediate aftermath” (Manuel, 
2014). “Traditionally, risk communication concentrates on persuading individuals 
to take action to limit risk, whereas crisis communication focuses on responding 
to immediate public need for information” (Veil et al., 2008). FEMA utilizes a 
‘technology centered approach’ for risk communication, where “experts are called 
upon to make recommendations based on their sophisticated knowledge of the 
subject and situation. These recommendations are then translated into laws and 
regulations for managing the situation” (Coombs, 2007). However, this approach 
also contributes to difficulty in gaining and losing public trust, which is a frequent 
attitude exhibited toward FEMA. Sandman (1993, 2000) best characterizes the 
issue by defining ‘risk’ as inclusionary of ‘hazard’ (science) and ‘outrage’ 
(perception). Tied to ‘risk communication’, 'risk management’ encompasses “the 
activities of individuals or authorities to remove or mitigate the sources and/or 
impacts of hazardous events” (Rohrman, 2008), driven by cost and technical 
nature (i.e. “can the risk actually be eliminated or reduced?” (Coombs, 2007)).       
A wide variety of management stages have been proposed (e.g. Fink, 1986; 
Sturges, 1994; Mitroff, 1994; Gonzalez-Herrero & Pratt 1995, 1996; Richardson, 
1994; Birch 1994; Guth, 1995; Seeger et al., 2003). They all correlate within the 
elements of the Coombs (2007) general model. Synthesizing this work, Coombs 
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(2007) offers an adaptable three stage model consisting of (1) pre-crisis, (2) crisis 
event, and (3) post crisis. The ‘pre-crisis’ stage includes (1) signal detection, (2) 
prevention, and (3) crisis preparation, while the ‘crisis event’ stage includes (1) 
crisis recognition and (2) crisis containment. The final stage, ‘post crisis’, aims to 
“(a) make the organization better prepared for the next crisis, (b) make sure 
stakeholders are left with a positive impression of the organizations crisis 
management efforts, and (c) checks to make sure that the crisis is truly over” 
(Coombs, 2007). Furthermore, these also correlate within the four phases of the 
disaster life cycle/CEM.   
 Combining elements from both risk and crisis communication, “the Crisis 
and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model merges many existing 
activities into more comprehensive systems of communication” and 
“acknowledges that effective communication regarding crises and emergencies 
must begin long before an event erupts and continue after the immediate threat 
has subsided” (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).  Utilizing a five-stage framework, “the 
CERC model offers a comprehensive approach within which risk and warning 
messages and crisis communication activities can be connected into a more 
encompassing communication form” (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). “One important 
value to this systematic approach is that it reduces uncertainty and allows crisis 
managers to look ahead and anticipate subsequent communication needs and 
problems” (Reynolds & Seeger, 2005).  
  CERC evolved from training efforts initiated at the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) (Reynolds, 2002; Courtney et al., 2003). The CERC 
approach provides an overview of communication activities that should be ongoing 
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before, during, and after an incident. In turn, this framework facilitates the 
decision making process and helps to guide public response and recovery activities. 
Consisting of five phases: (1) pre-crisis, (2) initial event, (3) maintenance, (4) 
resolution, and (5) evaluation, each phase is outlined accordingly in Table 3.2 
(Reynolds 2002) as applied within the public health sector.   
 
Table 3.2: Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) five phase 
framework as applied within the public health sector (Reynolds, 2002). 
 In addition, six primary underpinnings or assumptions of the CERC 
framework are: (1) Risks and crisis are equivocal and uncertain, (2) Two-way 
communication is important, (3) Communication processes change as risk evolves 
into crisis and beyond, (4) Risk and crisis communication are interrelated, (5) 
Communication promotes self-efficacy, and (6) Risk and crises and 
communication of, affects a diverse audience (Veil et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
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there are six overarching principles associated with the CERC model to assist 
communication (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012): 
1. Be First: Crises are time-sensitive. Communicating information quickly 
is almost always important. For members of the public, the first source of 
information often becomes the preferred source. 
2. Be Right: Accuracy establishes credibility. Information can include what 
is known, what is not known, and what is being done to fill in the gaps. 
3. Be Credible: Honesty and truthfulness should not be compromised during 
crises. 
4. Express Empathy: Crises create harm, and the suffering should be 
acknowledged in words. Addressing what people are feeling, and the 
challenges they face, builds trust and rapport. 
5. Promote Action: Giving people meaningful things to do calms anxiety, 
helps restore order, and promotes a restored sense of control. 
6. Show Respect: Respectful communication is particularly important when 
people feel vulnerable. Respectful communication promotes cooperation 
and rapport.  
Stemming from its origins, the majority of CERC applications have been 
concentrated in the public health sector (Reynolds, 2005; Veil et al., 2008; 
Manuel, 2014). However, meteorology, like public health, exhibits both ‘risk’ and 
‘crisis’ elements through all five of the designated phases, making this model 
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applicable for weather hazards as well. FEMA engages with a variety of partners 
and publics, including the CDC, during hazards and disaster events. The 
similarities among missions and roles make this paradigm a good fit within the 
field of emergency management. In addition, the principles within this framework 
are “theory driven, research driven, and practice driven” (Veil et al., 2008) lending 
itself to the advancement of the operational field of emergency management. 
3.5 SITUATION AWARENESS 
“Communication also plays a critical role in acquiring situation awareness” 
(Son et al., 2007). “Most simply put, SA is knowing what is going on around you” 
(Endsley & Garland, 2000). Endsley (1988) defines situation awareness as “the 
perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near 
future.” Another definition is that “situation awareness requires decision makers 
to quickly detect, integrate, and interpret information gathered from the 
environment” (Zhang et al., 2002).  
Depicted in Figure 3.1, Endsley (1995) stipulates that situation awareness is 
one of the major components in the decision making process and consist of three 
levels: (1) perception, (2) comprehension, and (3) projection. Additionally, 
opportunities for uncertainty arise among each level (Endsley & Bolte, 2003). “SA 
is largely affected by a person’s goals and expectations which will influence how 
attention is directed, how information is perceived, and how it is interpreted” 
(Endsley, 1995). Although deemed critical for informed decision making, “high 
situation awareness does not always lead to better decisions. Other factors such as 
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strategy, experience, training, personality, organizational and technical 
constraints also effect the decision making process” (Son et al., 2007). 
 
Figure 3.1: Endsley (1995) Model of Situation Awareness in decision making. 
Black arrows depict flow between phases, while gray arrows indicate 
influences (Endsley, 1995).    
Endsley and Robertson (2000) determined a variety of causes for possible 
situational awareness errors in aviation: workload, communications, improper 
procedures, time pressure, equipment, weather, unfamiliarity, fatigue, night 
conditions, and emotion, among others. For level 1, perception, errors were caused 
by information (1) not available, (2) difficult to detect, (3) not observed, (4) 
misperception, as well as (5) memory error. For level 2, comprehension, errors 
were caused by (1) lack of/incomplete mental model, (2) incorrect mental model, 
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(3) over-reliance on defaults values in the mental model. Lastly, for level 3, 
projection, errors were caused by (1) lack of/incomplete mental model, (2) over-
projection of current trends, or (3) other. “A mental model is the underlying 
knowledge that is the basis for SA” (Endsley and Garland 2000a), essentially the 
situation model represents the current state of the mental model (Mogford, 1997). 
Endsley and Robertson (2000) also stated that there is a need for more 
research on situation awareness in other areas to advance understanding of 
developing and maintaining situation awareness in order to improve it. Situation 
awareness is generally built up over time, and training is one way that can help to 
expedite this process. “Effective improvement of situation awareness through 
training approaches will most likely be achieved by improving the skills and 
knowledge bases that are critical” (Endsley & Robertson, 2000).  
Situational awareness requires continuous monitoring of relevant sources 
of information regarding actual and developing incidents. For an effective national 
response, jurisdictions must continuously refine their ability to assess the situation 
as an incident unfolds and rapidly provide accurate and accessible information to 
decision makers. It is essential that all response partners develop a common 
operating picture (COP) and synchronize their response operations and resources. 
When it comes to decision making regarding weather information at FEMA, there 
are three levels of inputs that complicate matters further, in turn, making for a very 
complex situation which provides ample opportunity for communication 
breakdowns in addition to user inputs. It can be thought of as the telephone game 
where what was initially intended did not turn up in the end. Given that the 
weather data and information have three or more layers to go through, the initial 
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message can easily be ‘lost in translation’ so to speak. An additional complicating 
factor is that FEMA Watchstanders generally work in pairs and therefore each 
person may have their own inputs that the two may need to reconcile.  
Furthermore, “there is a significant lack of information about the scale of a 
disaster in the immediate aftermath; this is followed by large amounts of imprecise 
information” (Manoj & Baker, 2007). Hence, management and processing of 
information (Weick, 1993; Seeger et al., 2003) and the extension of, knowledge 
management (Wang & Belardo, 2005), are important components throughout the 
situation awareness and decision making cycles. Generally speaking, “situation 
awareness describes the point at which the crisis team feels it has enough 
information and knowledge to make a decision” (Coombs, 2007; Kolfschten & 
Appleman, 2006). Complicating matters is the decision makers need for expert 
knowledge, possible additional threats, managing casualties, and environmental 
concerns, etc. (Gouran, 1982). FEMA implores an information management 
system that operates to monitor, collect, analyze, interpret and disseminate 
information to establish the COP.  
Zhang et al. (2002) describes a knowledge management framework which 
connects the situation awareness and decision making processes within disaster 
relief and humanitarian aid. This includes acquisition, filtering, indexing, linking, 
sharing, categorization, creation, and maintenance. One of the biggest challenges 
is processing the information to knowledge, which includes (1) serial reproduction 
errors, (2) the MUM effect, (3) message overload, (4) information acquisition bias, 
and (5) decision making errors (Coombs 2007). “The production of knowledge, 
along with the imputing of meaning, requires trained, experienced receivers” 
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(Harrald & Jefferson, 2007). Figure 3.2 postulates how data is transformed into 
action through a process of understanding, meaning, interpretation, and 
comprehension influenced by experience, training, and judgement.       
 
Figure 3.2: Proposed model of the transformation of data into action through 
a process of understanding, meaning, interpretation, and comprehension, 
influenced by experience, training, and judgement (Harrald & Jefferson, 
2007). 
Furthermore, there are two general types of knowledge, tacit and explicit 
(Tsoukas, 1996; Seppanen et al., 2013). Explicit knowledge is accessible through 
consciousness and more readily communicated, while tacit knowledge is more 
applied and not easily communicated (Evans, 2008; Nonaka & von Krogh, 2009; 
Seppanen et al., 2013). Within knowledge management, “it is necessary to manage 
both tacit and explicit knowledge” (French & Turoff, 2007). For FEMA and much 
of emergency management, many aspects are tacitly possessed, posing a challenge 
for disaster response and the need for further academic study.   
 
64 
3.6 DECISION MAKING 
Yates (2003) defined a decision as “a commitment to a course of action that 
is intended to yield results that are satisfying for specified individuals.” Decision 
making, or the process by which one reaches a decision, has been studied 
extensively in psychology, sociology, and communication among a variety of other 
disciplines. Until the 1980’s, most decision making research focused on ‘normative 
models’, which “seek to improve the decision making abilities of people through a 
systematic approach to evaluating and selecting the best of several alternatives” 
and assume ‘ideal conditions’ (Clemen, 1991). One such example includes, 
expected utility theory, which deals with decision- making under uncertainty 
(Rabin, 2013). “It is generally assumed that people will follow the rules if they have 
sufficient information and time to dwell on the consequences of different paths” 
(Tarrant, 2006; Krimsky & Golding, 1992). Furthermore, descriptive models seek 
to understand and explain current decision making, while prescriptive models seek 
to improve decision making (Bell et al., 1988). 
Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM), or how people make decisions in real-
world settings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), gained momentum in the 1980’s. Scholars 
wanted to assess “how people make tough decisions under difficult conditions such 
as limited time, uncertainty, high stakes, vague goals, and unstable conditions” 
(Klein, 2008). NDM research has provided guidance for decision making training 
and associated research methods have been adapted into other fields such as 
situation awareness. NDM emphasizes experience in decision making, such as in 
the Recognition-Primed Decision Model (RPDM) (Klein, 1989) and has been “used 
to improve performance through revisions of military doctrine, training that is 
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focused on decision making, and the development of information technologies to 
support decision making and cognitive functions” (Klein, 2008). “Crisis response 
and crisis management are examples of naturalistic decision making situations 
that are characterized by time, pressure, risk and uncertainty, multiple and 
changing goals, and multiple organizations” (Schraagen & van de Ven, 2008).  
Furthermore, Simon (1957) described three types of decisions: (1) rational, 
(2) non-rational, and (3) irrational, as well as two types of processes (1) analytic 
and (2) intuitive. As both intuitive and analytic aspects are involved in the decision 
making process, after decades of work, Simon (1987) proposed the bounded 
rationality theory which “explains how people make decisions when bounded by 
the law, societal norm and cultural circumstances” (Hoekstra & Montz, 2017).  All 
of these factors play a role in the decision making process of emergency managers 
and ultimately impact the decisions made, which may vary from person to person, 
place to place, and level to level. Decision making regarding weather events is a 
frequent occurrence for an emergency manager and a substantial amount of time 
is spent on it, not only surrounding an event, but throughout the disaster life cycle 
of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In order to make more 
informed decisions, emergency managers must have the knowledge and skills to 
aid in the decision making process.    
3.6.1 UNCERTAINTY AND DECISION MAKING 
Signal detection theory (SDT) postulates that uncertainty is present for 
nearly all decision making (Swets, 2014). “Uncertainty is the difference between 
the amount of information required to perform a task and the amount of 
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information already possessed by decision making entities” (Cass McCaughrin et 
al., 2003). These situations can be described as ambiguous or unpredictable and 
include scenarios where one is unsure of the state of knowledge or when 
information is unavailable or incomplete (Brashers, 2001; Babrow et al., 2000; 
Babrow et al., 1998). Therefore, uncertainty promotes and can be managed 
through information seeking (Bradac, 2001; Brashers, 2001). Statistically, 
information theory postulates that uncertainty is related to the number of 
alternative choices and the chance that each will occur (Cass McCaughrin et al., 
2003; Argote 1982). However, the amount of uncertainty can influence 
identification of courses of action and decision making (Dutton & Webster, 1988; 
Milliken, 1987).   
According to Schmitt and Klein (1999), there are four sources of decision 
uncertainty: (1) missing information, (2) unreliable information, (3) ambiguous or 
conflicting information, and (4) complex information. Similarly, Lipshitz and 
Strauss (1997) addressed issues, sources, types, and tactics to manage uncertainty. 
They stipulate three fundamental issues of uncertainty as (1) outcomes, (2) 
situation, and (3) alternatives along with three fundamental sources of uncertainty 
(1) incomplete information, (2) inadequate understanding, and (3) 
undifferentiated alternatives (conflict). Furthermore, they define three types of 
incomplete information as (a) partial lack of information, (b) complete lack of 
information, and (c) unreliable information. Proposed tactics include collecting 
additional information, delaying action, soliciting advice, following SOP’, norms, 
etc., and assumption-based reasoning. The three types of inadequate information 
as defined by Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) are (a) equivocal information, (b) novelty 
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of situations, and (c) fast-changing or unstable situations. Tactics proposed 
include preempting, improving readiness, avoiding irreversible action, and 
weighing pros and cons. Lastly, the two types of conflicted alternatives they 
proposed are (a) equally attractive or unattractive outcomes and (b) incompatible 
role requirements. Ignoring uncertainty, relying on ‘intuition’, and taking a gamble 
are potential management tactics. Additionally, Sorensen and Mileti (1987) also 
categorized sources of uncertainty within warning systems into four types: (1) 
interpretation, (2) communication, (3) perceived impacts of decisions, and (4) 
exogenous influences with additional items further categorized within each type. 
Their findings concluded that these uncertainties affect warning system decision 
making and recommended planning as a resolve yet failed to discuss training 
mechanisms.    
Disaster response is multi-faceted and decision makers must process large 
quantities of information and manage a multitude of factors urgently (Kowalski-
Trakofler & Vaught, 2003). This includes but is not limited to (1) resource 
acquisition and deployment, (2) delegation, (3) communication and information 
management, (4) decision making, (5) inter-agency coordination, and (6) media 
and community liaison (Paton et al., 1998). Uncertainty further complicates 
matters as decision making is based on information that is ambiguous, incomplete 
or erroneous (Vaught et al., 2000). Stress is also of concern defined as “a process 
by which certain work demands evoke an appraisal process in which perceived 
demands exceed resources and result in undesirable physiological, emotional, 
cognitive and social changes” (Salas et al., 1996).  
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“Emergency Decision makers under stress not only have the effect of their 
own stress and its resulting consequences”, but that of others as well (Kowalski-
Trakofler & Vaught, 2003). However, little is known about stress among 
emergency managers (Flin, 1996). Paton and Flin (1999) discuss three stressors 
relevant to the emergency management perspective: (1) environmental (i.e. - 
complex, dynamic), (2) organizational (i.e. - communication, bureaucracy), and 
(3) operational (i.e. - decision making, responsibility, management). They also 
discuss three primary influencers including (1) personalities, (2) personal factors 
(i.e. – fitness, fatigue), and (3) psychological factors (i.e. – danger). Planning for 
an event along with communication and coordination may reduce the risk for 
stress yet training assist with management and reaction (Paton & Flin, 1999). As 
such, both experience and training are important for reducing stress during an 
event (Vaught et al., 1997).        
3.6.2 HAZARD RESPONSE DECISION MAKING 
The lack of peer reviewed, academic literature specific to FEMA and 
decision making was evident through the literature review process. Although 
limited, emergency management decision making research provides some 
background context relevant for this study. However, a larger, more expansive 
body of knowledge exist for warning response and the public that could also be 
utilized. Two of the more relevant decision making models applicable for 
emergency management are the (1) Tobin and Montz (1997) hazard response 
model and the (2) Protective Action Decision Model (PADM) (Lindell & Perry, 
2012). Tobin and Montz (1997) incorporates situational and cognitive factors in 
69 
their preliminary hazard response model regarding the public, as did Mileti and 
Sorenson (1990). Psychological and attitudinal elements comprise the cognitive 
system, while physical and socio-economic elements comprise the situational 
system. Although relevant, this model is not specific to emergency managers and 
not robust enough to capture all relevant components.   
One of the more widely utilized decision models within hazards and 
disasters research, to include risk communication, long-term hazard adjustments, 
and evacuation modelling is the PADM (Lindell & Perry, 2012). This model 
includes a more robust proposition of influential factors (i.e. – social cues, warning 
messages, situational impediments, etc.) (Figure 3.3). “The PADM identifies a 
series of information processing stages relevant to household adoption of 
protective actions” (Lindell & Perry, 2012). The model consists of environmental 
and social cues and messaging, psychological processes, and situational facilitators 
and impediments along with a feedback loop.  
 
Figure 3.3: Information flow within the Protective Action Decision Model 
(PADM) along with influencing factors (Lindell & Perry, 2012).  
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The decision stages within PADM are (1) risk identification, (2) risk 
assessment, (3) protective action search, (4) protective action assessment, and (5) 
protective action implementation. PADM information seeking activities include (1) 
information needs assessment, (2) communication action assessment, and (3) 
communication action implementation. “The dominant tendency is for such 
information to prompt protective action decision making, but information seeking 
occurs when there is uncertainty at a given stage in the protective action decision 
making process” (Lindell & Perry, 2012). “Greater ambiguity is likely to cause 
warning recipients to spend more time in seeking and processing information 
rather than preparing for and implementing protective action” (Lindell & Perry, 
2012). A big advantage of PADM is being able to detect erroneous perceptions and 
correct them, while a limitation is that PADM predicts some of the variables should 
form causal chains, but that is not always the case.  
3.6.3 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND WEATHER DECISION MAKING 
Meteorologists frequently criticize emergency management decision 
making because of a lack of understanding of decisional factors. One highly 
debated example at the local level includes tornado warning issuance and outdoor 
warning siren policies. Understanding the emergency management decision 
making process, requires an understanding of the weather information utilized.  
Due to the critical role of weather information with regards to disasters, emergency 
managers are continuously monitoring forecasts. However, weather information 
is not the only deciding factor (Stewart et al., 2004, 1984; Stewart, 1997; Katz & 
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Murphy, 1997). Rather, the emergency management decision making process, in 
congruence with forecaster decision making, depends on a variety of factors.  
A preliminary framework of the weather forecast decision making process, 
proposed by Lusk et al. (1990), includes two systems (1) environment and (2) 
cognitive (borrowed from social judgement theory (Hammond et al., 1975; 
Brehemer & Joyce, 1988)). Stewart and Lusk (1994) extended this framework to 
three systems consisting of the (1) environment, (2) information, and (3) cognitive. 
Consistent with several models discussed in this review section, “the hierarchical 
nature of the model implies that error at any phase can be passed on to later 
phases” (Lusk et al., 1990). Although utilized in reference to forecasters, “the data 
from numerous sources must be perceived and assimilated by the forecaster” and 
then assessed, which also holds true for emergency management (Lusk et al., 
1990). Effective decision making in this context is influenced by a variety of factors: 
(1) environmental predictability, (2) fidelity of the information system, (3) match 
between environment and forecaster (or in this this study emergency manager), 
(4) reliability of information acquisition, (5) the reliability of information 
processing, (6) conditional bias, and (7) unconditional bias (Stewart et al., 1994). 
Relevant in the context of emergency management, gaining a “detailed 
understanding of user needs and decision processes” has implications for guiding 
forecast improvements and assessing forecast value as well as supports weather 
policy decisions (Stewart et al., 2004).  
Focusing on local emergency management decision making, Baumgart et al. 
(2008) conducted a review of weather information sources and decisions. Adapted 
from Lusk et al. (1990), Stewart and Lusk (1994), and Stewart et al. (2004), they 
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proposed a decision making conceptual framework consisting of three systems: (1) 
environmental, (2) informational and (3) perceptual and cognitive (Figure 3.4) and 
developed a descriptive decision making model through four phases of severe 
weather (pre-storm, watch, warning, and event). The ‘environmental system’ 
contains information on the hazard and associated factors (i.e. - time, location), 
while the ‘information system’ consists of the collection and presentation 
processes. The perceptual and cognitive system is comprised of influencing factors, 
the decision process and the actual decisions. The ‘perceptual and cognitive’ 
system identified training and experience as two primary factors influencing 
emergency manager perception, assessment and ultimately decisions.  
 
Figure 3.4: Conceptual framework of local emergency management severe 
weather decision making as proposed by Baumgart et al. (2008). Solid 
arrows depict inputs from one system to another, while dashed arrows 
indicate influences (Baumgart et al., 2008).  
The initial model they developed provides a fundamental description of 
decision points during a severe weather event, yet it is incomplete in terms of 
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inputs, cues, sources of information, and excludes prior knowledge and experience. 
The primary shortfall of this model is that the decision points assume detection of 
a hazard and begin shortly before event occurrence. Initial decisions must be made 
prior to the detection of a hazard for appropriate decision making and adequate 
response. The model does not account for longer term, risk-based decisions made 
well in advance of event occurrence in terms of planning, preparedness, mitigation, 
response, and training. Additionally, a small sample size (N=11) of semi-trained 
Oklahoma local emergency managers posed a challenge for generalizability, it 
provides a solid foundation to build upon. Furthermore, while the hazard chosen 
for the study was severe weather, the model and framework are adaptable for other 
weather phenomena and hazards.  
Attempting to further quantify information sources and usage beyond the 
Baumgart et al. (2008) study, League et al. (2010) also utilized local Oklahoma 
emergency managers for a case study review of tornado warning communication. 
Specifically, in relation to radar technology and tornado warnings through (1) 
acquiring, (2) interpreting, (3) verifying, and (4) communicating information. 
Analysis yielded results pertaining to weather information sources and usage 
frequency both daily and during severe weather, yet it was unclear why they utilize 
certain products over others. The study also eluded to the influence of uncertainty, 
expressing a need for additional research on “how uncertainty affects the decisions 
they need to make” (League et al. 2010). Additionally, radar interpretation ability 
based on training was also assessed. Although helpful for local emergency 
managers, radar understanding is less of a concern for FEMA due to differing 
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responsibilities. Lastly, there were multiple discussions of training overall as an 
important component for communication and decision making.  
Another study from Morss and Ralph (2007), focused on emergency 
manager decision points and weather forecasts through the four phases of 
emergency management. Conducted during a field experiment, the exploratory 
case study investigated how local emergency managers utilize meteorological 
information during the decision making process. Emphasis was placed on the need 
for weather information not only before and during the event, but after for 
demobilization and recovery missions. Noted from this study, “emergency 
managers gather information from multiple sources, often seeking corroborating 
evidence as they assess the situation and decide on possible actions. Depending on 
the decision making stage, weather forecasts can play different roles” (Morss & 
Ralph, 2007). Additionally, participants indicated receiving “clear, concise, easily 
understandable weather forecast information” was important and that “decision 
making is influenced by forecaster confidence and trust in forecasters” (Morss & 
Ralph, 2007). While the study offered some insight, given the limited participation 
and research environment utilized in this experiment, it would be difficult to 
quantify and generalize any findings beyond the scope of the study.     
Furthermore, Hoekstra and Montz (2017) determined that “the source and 
type of weather information greatly influenced emergency manager decision 
making” in relation to hurricanes. They also found “differences in EM experiences, 
knowledge, and culture led to differences in both the nature and timing of 
decisions and subsequent actions” (Hoekstra & Montz, 2017). Ultimately, three 
primary decision influencers were identified in the study: (1) municipality 
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characteristics, (2) emergency manager characteristics, and (3) weather/storm 
characteristics. The first component may pose an additional concern for FEMA as 
they do not reside in or near the communities they serve. Additionally, “over the 
duration of weather watches and warnings, decision makers continuously change 
how they perceive an event as more information is received and processed. This 
process may even begin long before a watch is issued” (Hoekstra & Montz, 2017). 
In finality, policy pertaining to usage and management of weather 
information by emergency managers is also not well understood, particularly with 
regards to decision making. Similarly, to Baumgart et al. (2008) and League et al. 
(2010), Donner (2008) conducted interviews with 39 Oklahoma emergency 
management officials. Data analysis identified three reasoning modes guiding 
decision making in relation to long-term weather policy including the (1) unique 
traits that distinguish each weather type, (2) differing application of mitigation 
strategies among weather hazards, and (3) implications of emergency manager 
decision making. As such the overall process is “the embodiment of environmental, 
technological, and social influences in the form of emergency management policy” 
(Donner, 2008).    
In summary, “when it comes to the field of emergency management, the aim 
should be to develop new theory or adapt old theory to produce manageable policy” 
(Sylves, 2004). As discussed, the review of existing literature relevant to the 
decision making process of emergency management officials regarding weather is 
limited in scope, breadth, and predominantly ungeneralizable. Variations among 
emergency management roles and functions, small study population sample sizes, 
and difficulty accessing specific individuals (i.e. – FEMA, elected officials, etc.) has 
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hindered research in this area. Despite the obstacles, the aforementioned literature 
provides some insight into weather related decision making and serves as a guide 
for this study. Extending beyond this work, proposed policy recommendations will 
further advance the field. 
3.7 WEATHER TRAINING AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
“The question of how to train emergency planners and managers has 
received increasing attention in recent years” (Alexander, 2003). Furthermore, 
Woodbury (2005) states that in addition to basic prevention mechanisms and 
human factors, emergency management officials “need to know the science behind 
the threats, not just the potential, operational consequences” for effective 
mitigation and preparation. The author states the importance of not only 
understanding this information but how to apply it to all types of events and for 
planning purposes. Woodbury (2005) also describes the need for more advanced 
training over the current main learning venues of presentations and after action 
reviews.   
A common theme among the previously discussed literature is the need for 
development of new and/or continued support for existing weather training 
(Murphy et al., 2005). In both the situation awareness model (Endsley, 1995) and 
the Baumgart et al. (2008) model, comprehension and training is an integral part 
of the decision making process. In the Baumgart et al. (2008) study, the authors 
noted that additional training and tools could provide assistance with addressing 
perception and assessment issues. Both training and experience are contributing 
components to the perceptual and cognitive system of the framework, yet there is 
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no discussion of the influence they may have on the environmental and 
information systems. Additionally, many of the local Oklahoma emergency 
managers who had weather training reported “having the ability to accurately 
interpret that information”, but also noted that “continued training is an important 
component in the interpretation of weather information” (League 2010). One of 
the noted specific training needs for local emergency mangers was radar velocity 
and reflectivity interpretation, as OK-FIRST trained participants made better 
decisions regarding radar than non-OK-FIRST trained participants.  
 Currently, only a few entities provide meteorological training. Most notably, 
the in resident OK-FIRST training program run through the Oklahoma Mesonet in 
Oklahoma (Morris et al. 2001), as well as the UCAR COMET “Anticipating 
Hazardous Weather and Community Risk” module available online (FEMA, 
2019a). However, both course options are more advanced and technical than is 
required for Federal level staff. Geared towards Oklahoma emergency 
management personnel and not a nationwide program, OK-FIRST is designed to 
aid decision makers concerning weather information, emphasizing the online 
decision support toolkit (Morris et al., 2001). It has been shown that the OK-FIRST 
program is a useful tool for emergency managers and for decision making (Morris 
et al., 2001; James et al., 2000). Therefore, it seems logical that implementation 
of such a training program would be useful nationwide with modifications 
according to geography, types of weather hazards, etc. However, there is not a 
national model nor a consistent way to deliver such a training program across the 
country for a multitude of audiences.  
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 In addition to these discussed training offerings, a few academic 
opportunities are offered within or outside of a degree program as well. However, 
weather training is not an official degree requirement for the majority of 
emergency management degree programs (FEMA, 2019c), nor is it generally 
readily available. While some meteorological or natural hazard training is 
available, it is quite limited in quantity, fairly technical in nature and limited or 
topical in both content and scope. More extensive comparison of participants who 
have received no formal training against those who have (i.e. - OK-FIRST) would 
be of value.  
3.8 KNOWLEDGE GAPS  
Warning systems, hazard messaging, and response have been greatly 
studied with regards to the public. In contrast, emergency management is a 
relatively new field of study that is constantly changing and is not a well-studied 
group as a whole. It is difficult to define as there are varying levels with differing 
roles. Limited literature and knowledge exist for emergency management, 
particularly with regards to FEMA. Weather and emergency management is 
further limited in scope. However, as disasters continue to evolve, the knowledge 
base and field of emergency management continues to grow. As a varied field that 
is multi-faceted, with little academic supporting literature, the discipline requires 
an interdisciplinary approach. For these reasons, this study contributes to the 
overall lacking knowledge base by focusing on the weather decision making 
process at FEMA through a variety of lenses.      
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Through an extensive review of the literature, several areas were identified 
that provide value in this context including three primary areas (1) decision 
making, (2) situation awareness, and (3) communication. Decision making 
research in reference to emergency management is limited. Emergency 
management in relation to weather decision making literature is further limited. 
Over the past decade, interest it this area has grown, yet efforts have primarily been 
directed toward local emergency management officials. Nevertheless, Baumgart et 
al. (2008) provides a decision making framework in the context of severe weather 
and local emergency managers that can be adapted for this study in relation to 
FEMA and all-weather hazards with modifications in conjunction with the Endsley 
(1995) model of situation awareness.   
When an incident occurs, responders assess the situation, identify and 
prioritize requirements, and activate available resources and capabilities to save 
lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human needs (FEMA, 
2019b). Rooted within FEMA’s NRF (DHS, 2016b), there are four main priorities 
regarding situational awareness: (1) providing the right information at the right 
time, (2) improving and integrating national reporting, (3) linking operations 
centers and tapping subject matter experts, and (4) standardizing reporting. 
However, the processes of how FEMA maintains situation awareness, makes 
weather related decisions and communicates is not well understood. More 
primitively, it is not understood what and how FEMA utilizes weather information 
or what decisions they are making/actions they are taking and when. Decision 
making is a highly complex process that requires various inputs and can be 
influenced by a variety of additional factors. Barriers to decision making result 
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from a variety of mechanisms as the process is hierarchical with errors carried 
along the process or from influencers. Emergency management decisions often 
occur under uncertainty, stress, and non-ideal conditions which further complicate 
the process. Hence, the need for further study of emergency management 
behavior, practices, influences, perception, knowledge, training, and standards is 
apparent.   
Despite acknowledgement of the role of training in existing literature, 
limited knowledge exists regarding emergency managers’ meteorological training 
needs or gaps within the emergency management degree programs. There is no 
understanding of the implications of such programs or how weather training 
influences emergency management decision making, particularly at the Federal 
and State levels. How and why emergency managers utilize the weather products 
that they do is largely unknown. It may be due to any number of factors including 
level of understanding, training, or the product meets their needs. With all of the 
new technology and the addition of new communication channels such as social 
media, the need for preferred informational outlets and training is greater than 
ever. Enhanced training would provide the needed background required by 
emergency management officials to make more informed decisions.  
To address this gap, I operationalized a weather training component for 
FEMA personnel based on insight gained from data collection and analysis of 
FEMA roles and responsibilities, informational needs and utilization, and 
challenges. Reflection of the conceptual framework I propose in Chapter 4 
provided guidance for further investigation of training needs and curriculum 
development relevant to this study. It is my intent to work towards inclusion of 
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meteorological elements as part of the core curriculum not only at FEMA, but also 
for emergency managers at all levels as the field continues to grow in size, scope 
and rigor. Additionally, identification of FEMA and emergency management 
required weather information can be used to further guide and enhance the 
decision support services offered by the weather enterprise.           
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
Guiding the research structure and solidifying the research foundation this 
chapter provides insight into my perspective and worldview (section 4.1), my 
proposed conceptual framework guiding this study (section 4.2), the research 
design (section 4.3), data collection methods (section 4.4), data analysis 
techniques (section 4.5), and ending with a discussion of research challenges, 
limitations and assumptions (section 4.6). FEMA serves as the case study for this 
research to better understand the role, inclusion and influence of weather 
information on decision making. Deriving from existing literature, concepts 
addressed in this study include weather needs and usage, communication, 
situational awareness, and decision making. For this study, I will explore the 
FEMA decision making process through assessment of utilization, 
communication, challenges, and role/influence of weather information, 
knowledge, and interpretation. I will also operationalize a training component to 
support this process. I utilized two primary models/frameworks in accordance 
with associated relevant notions, concepts and elements to guide my study 
including the (1) Baumgart et al. (2008) framework of local emergency 
management severe weather decision making and the (2) Endsley (1995) situation 
awareness model.  
4.1 PERSPECTIVE AND WORLDVIEW 
Upon completion of my undergraduate degree in atmospheric science and 
mathematics and during the early stages of my master’s degree in meteorology, I 
developed an interest in disaster response and emergency management. At which 
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time I began volunteering through non-profit agencies that support disaster 
response and relief efforts and assisting local emergency management officials. 
Very early in my career transition from meteorology to emergency management, 
the lack of weather knowledge, training and available support became very 
apparent. My continued work within the field, revealed how prevalent weather 
associated shortfalls surrounding disasters and the field of emergency 
management were, despite all disasters (directly or indirectly), requiring 
utilization of weather information throughout all phases. My experience working 
across differing levels (local, State, Tribal, Federal, non-profit, etc.) of emergency 
management drove my desire to study the community and transition disciplines. 
My interpretation of the world is based on me identifying as an educated, 
Caucasian cisgender female, who is frequently younger than many colleagues 
encountered in my role. My formal educational training lies within meteorology, 
communication and geography with a non-military background. I have served as a 
professional within the meteorological and emergency management communities, 
with fifteen years of experience. I am passionate about the role of weather in 
emergency management and remain actively engaged in this context. Currently, I 
occupy a liaison position within FEMA serving both internal and external partners 
across varying levels.    
My personal worldview lies within the philosophies of constructivism and 
pragmatism. Extensive debate exists regarding these two paradigms (Hickman, 
Neubert, & Reich, 2009), with one school of thought dedicated to ‘Pragmatist 
Constructivism’ (Garrison, 1998). Pragmatism emphasizes practical application in 
assessing truth or meaning and makes use of both qualitative and quantitative 
84 
methods, focusing on the research problem and utilizing any and all appropriate 
approaches to best study a topic (Hickman et al., 2009; Creswell, 1998; Hay, 2010; 
Patton, 2002). Specifically, in this context, ‘pragmatic utilitarianism’ and 
‘evaluation’, which allows practitioners to answer concrete questions “in 
straightforward ways through qualitative inquiry and then judge the answers 
pragmatically by their utility, relevance and applicability” (Patton, 2002). 
Alternatively, Constructivism makes use of qualitative research methods as the 
belief is that people generate knowledge and develop meanings based on their 
experiences (Hickman et al., 2009; Creswell, 1998; Hay, 2010; Patton, 2002). My 
unique perspective situated between these two philosophies correlates with my 
inherent nature of finding value and gaining perspective through self-reflection of 
my own experiences and engagement with others on their experiences 
(constructivism), yet my inclination towards utility, systematic inquiry, and 
evaluation (pragmatism utilitarianism) (Patton, 2002). Philosophically speaking, 
I am a constructivist at heart, but my mind gravitates towards pragmatic notions 
as they provide me with more concrete, real-world resolutions. Essentially, I would 
consider myself a constructivist in a pragmatic world. As such, the constructivist 
paradigm predominantly guides this research with more pragmatic utilitarianism 
concepts extending this research beyond theoretical and conceptual notions into 
praxis.     
4.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
Utilizing local emergency managers from Oklahoma as the study 
participants, Baumgart et al. (2008) proposed both a conceptual framework and 
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descriptive decision making model for a severe weather event. Consisting of three 
systems (1) environment, (2) information, and (3) perceptual and cognitive, the 
descriptive decision making model consisted of four primary phases: (1) Prestorm, 
(2) Severe Weather Watch, (3) Severe Weather Warning, and (4) Severe Weather 
Event. These phases are appropriate to the decisions and actions required of an 
emergency manager during a severe weather event at the local level given the 
nature of the roles and responsibilities and being part of the first responder teams, 
whereas a wider view of the topic would best serve the Federal level involvement 
overall. Within each phase, usage of meteorological information sources were 
identified along with any decisions and/or actions that must be taken.   
Review of the Baumgart et al. (2008) framework indicates that while 
aspects of severe weather information usage and sources were analyzed to build 
the model, several items were not addressed. The most significantly notable item 
not discussed was an overview of potential outside influencing factors (i.e. – 
politics) and how those may or may not impact decision making. Additionally, 
although somewhat inherent or implied, this model is void of a discussion and 
analysis of communication processes and the relevancy throughout the model. 
However, decision making depends on a variety of communication elements. 
With a sample size of eleven local emergency management participants 
from Oklahoma, likely having received some meteorological training, and focusing 
on severe weather, the study is difficult to generalize. Regardless, the framework is 
adaptable to other weather phenomena, timeframes, decisions, and groups, as well 
as provides a glimpse into weather decisions and serves a good foundation to build 
from. Amongst the literature, the Baumgart et al. (2008) decision making 
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framework (Figure 3.4) was determined to be the most relevant for this study. Due 
to the completeness and adaptability of this framework, it is well posed as the 
overarching guidance for my study. Building from this framework, in conjunction 
with related concepts and personal experience and in combination with the 
Endsley (1995) model of situation awareness (Figure 3.1), which consists of (1) 
perception, (2) comprehension, and (3) projection, I developed a conceptual 
framework (Figure 4.1) to aid with visualization of the overall FEMA decision 
making process.  
 
Figure 4.1: Proposed conceptual framework of FEMA Decision Making based 
on literature and experience. Black arrows indicate information flow, while 
gray arrows indicate influences. Created by Somer A. Erickson.  
Currently, there is no existing literature for FEMA decision making. For this 
study, the conceptual framework focused on FEMA decision making surrounding 
weather threats. As this study is a first attempt to address FEMA decision making 
and weather, rather than viewing the framework from the perspective of a local 
emergency manager, I will be analyzing this framework from the Federal level 
perspective. At the Federal level, the decision making process is much more 
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expansive. FEMA covers a broad spectrum of responsibilities and serves as the 
guiding force for national, state, local and tribal level emergency management 
policies and procedures. While the Baumgart et al. (2008) decision stages could be 
studied at the Federal level, the decision and actions that FEMA would be actively 
involved with are generally longer term. Therefore, a broader perspective will be 
reviewed in this study as it is more relevant for Federal response efforts.  I will 
instead make use of the four phases within the disaster lifecycle/CEM lens 
(mitigate, prepare, respond, and recover) as it directly relates to how FEMA is 
organized. Doing so will provide an overall view of the decision making process of 
Federal level emergency management through each phase, and more easily allow 
for more specific topics within to be addressed in future studies.  
In addition to using different phases, a primary deviation in this study is 
that the utilized weather information sources within FEMA are unknown. It is also 
important to note that while the source of the information is important, the actual 
information they are looking for is also unknown. One confounding factor is that 
those personnel who are locating and supplying the information are often different 
personnel than the decision makers. Therefore, the decision makers mostly receive 
weather information from someone between the actual source and themselves. 
Complicating matters further is that the decision makers are also likely receiving 
some information from additional outside sources and at times directly from the 
source in addition to the internal designated personnel. Assessing this model 
within FEMA, this work will further assist with development of training geared 
toward FEMA leadership and other high-level decision makers as well as other 
relevant decision support tools.   
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Previous literature along with the components within the proposed 
conceptual framework served as a guide for study areas, training development, 
instrument development, data collection and analysis. Although discussed at times 
in reference to the study, provided the expansive nature of the framework and 
expertise, I did not directly address psychological (i.e. – perception, cognition), or 
sociological (i.e. – values, culture) aspects. Starting with the environment and 
ending with action, the framework identifies five components which includes three 
underlying processes. Four identified overarching influencing factors include (1) 
training, (2) experience, (3) uncertainty and (4) communication. Additionally, 
interpretation along with organizational, perceptual, and operational factors 
influence various components throughout the process from threat to action.  
Beginning with the environment component, which consists of hazard, 
geographic and demographic elements, the framework outlines three primary 
processes of: (1) information management, (2) situation awareness, and (3) 
decision making, before arriving at the action component. In relation to 
identification and awareness within the environment component, training, 
experience, uncertainty and communication serve as influencers as well as among 
the three processes identified. The information system identifies a process of 
collecting and presenting information and consists of human (i.e. – a reporter or 
personnel) and technological sources (i.e. – radar) through a variety of 
mechanisms (i.e. – internet, television, partners, etc.). This information is then 
processed into knowledge obtaining situational awareness through perception, 
comprehension and projection leading to the decision making process and action.   
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Stemming from this framework, I reviewed multiple facets of the FEMA 
decision making process in reference to the phases of the disaster life cycle (Figure 
2.1). There is no widely known or explicit knowledge available in the literature 
regarding FEMA weather usage and decision making. In order to develop a 
comprehensive overview of FEMA decision making and provide a strong 
foundational platform for future research in this area, there was a vast amount of 
considerations. For this study, I (1) assessed utilization of weather information, (2) 
developed a descriptive decision making model, (3) reviewed and proposed a 
working model for the overall communication process, (4) operationalized training 
for maintaining situational awareness, and (5) identified elements, processes, 
factors and/or influences pertaining to each component. Serving as a starting 
point, testing and verifying this framework will expand the usability and 
applicability of this model toward understanding emergency management decision 
making across all levels for all (natural) hazards.   
Furthermore, when it comes to weather related disasters, elements of risk 
and crisis communication are evident. Climate change supports the notion of 
changing events potentially impacting greater and/or different portions of the 
population. Given that meteorological hazards deal with portions of both risk and 
crisis communication, for this research I will also discuss and propose an 
adaptation of the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) model in the 
context of emergency management, FEMA and the disaster life cycle/CEM.  
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4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND OVERVIEW 
The research topics addressed in this work are primarily exploratory and 
descriptive in nature warranting a qualitative research design (Hay, 2010; 
Creswell, 1998). Following suit of the most relevant literature for weather decision 
making and emergency managers, a case study approach was employed for this 
research. “Disaster researchers have adopted experiential case study approaches 
for decades” (Veil et al., 2008). The case study was chosen as it provides an in-
depth analysis of a phenomena for a specific group or element and “may be used 
to understand and solve practical problems” toward advancement of knowledge 
(Hay, 2010). A case study is a research methodology that is frequently employed 
within both quantitative and qualitative research and among a variety of 
disciplines. Typically, case studies offer detail-oriented analysis and insight for 
future work while generalizability of results and researcher bias pose challenges 
(Hay, 2010; Creswell, 1998; Yin, 2009; Stake, 1995). Resulting insights from this 
work have implications for policy, procedure and future research (Merriam & 
Tisdell, 2016). This approach was chosen to determine not only the ‘what’, but also 
to assess the ‘how’ and ‘why’ (Yin, 2009) of weather information utilization within 
FEMA. 
Federal emergency management officials were the focus of this research as 
existing literature and theory does not adequately describe or acknowledge their 
roles and responsibilities, as they differ from local jurisdictions and the general 
public. The result of which is a gap within the body of knowledge pertaining to the 
decision making process at the highest level, particularly regarding weather 
information.  Through my observations, I determined weather information to be a 
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significant requirement for the FEMA mission. However, informational needs, 
usage and utility regarding weather hazards was unknown. Focusing on FEMA, the 
purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of the overall role of weather 
information, assess influencing factors on decision making and operationalize a 
weather training component.  
Initially, I planned to study weather usage across the three primary levels of 
emergency management (local, state and Federal) for this study. However, gaining 
access to FEMA personnel and an understanding of the agency’s overall design 
proved to be a challenge. Seeking access to this group, I served as an intern within 
one of the regional components which modified the plan I had originally intended. 
During my tenure I acquired an insurmountable amount of valuable insight about 
the agency, governing policies, roles and responsibilities, and overall structure and 
composition. I was able to observe firsthand weather information and data usage 
as well as establish trust and credibility among FEMA personnel, partners and 
senior level emergency management leadership. This unique opportunity 
(participant-observer role) allowed me to engage with FEMA in a manner that is 
difficult to accomplish externally. In turn, this allowed me the ability to study 
weather utilization, related communication and associated decision making within 
their environment and in a way that might not exist otherwise (Kearns, 2010). 
Provided with a new platform, I shifted the focus of my research to the FEMA 
perspective. While this research concept and work began before I joined FEMA, it 
was largely conducted and finalized during my FEMA tenure.  
 FEMA is a seemingly elusive and mysterious entity, comprised of a closed, 
tight knit group of personnel, attributable mostly to the high level and stressful 
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nature of the work along with the highly visible and political aspects associated 
with the mission.  FEMA is frequently scrutinized by the publics at large and often 
feels threatened by ‘outsiders’, inhibiting personnel accessibility. Tasked with high 
level responsibilities among a myriad of mission specific areas, working under 
urgent and limited time constraints, and consisting of high-ranking officials, 
further limits availability and awareness of FEMA structure. For researchers, 
knowing who to contact and identifying paths for obtaining access to FEMA 
personnel is challenging when seeking out desired research participants and 
conducting studies. Having access and an internal perspective of the agency and 
field, along with having gained trust and credibility amongst the community 
greatly assisted with identification of relevant personnel and data collection.      
Within FEMA, I have been provided with the needed access and appropriate 
background knowledge to assist with identification of those tasked with weather 
related decision making.  My acquired perspective provided context with which to 
conduct weather-related decision making research, as well as an observational 
perspective of the decision making process at times. Other than through 
observation, I have rarely been directly involved in the leadership decision making 
process beyond providing relevant weather data and forecasts, nor is it in my 
purview to do so. Through my experience, I have acquired knowledge of weather 
utilization relevant to certain areas but lack a widespread perspective of weather 
utilization agency wide. My unique position and perspective served to enhance and 
inform this work as relevant (Kearns, 2010), yet this work served to enhance my 
perspective. 
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Numerous studies have been conducted on the human/public side of 
disasters, as discussed in Chapter 3. While they may offer some insight, they do 
not directly support the notion of emergency management response decision 
making at high levels. Some social research focusing on emergency managers and 
weather decision making at the local level has been conducted, but there is little 
dedicated to the topic at the Federal and State/Territory/Tribal levels. As the roles 
between local, State/Territory/Tribal and Federal emergency management 
officials differ, existing literature from the local perspective cannot be completely 
generalized to the Federal level. Theoretically, this study attempts to build toward 
bridging this gap through developing an understanding of ‘how’, ‘why’ and ‘what’ 
weather information is utilized and communicated across FEMA for situational 
awareness and in support of decision making. Operationally, results from this 
analysis assisted with development of relevant weather training and describe 
FEMA weather needs and requirements for weather enterprise inclusion. 
Despite the number of emergency management educational programs that 
have developed in the recent decade or so, theory and academic applications 
remain low in volume. While many can make the case for a theory of emergency 
management or applying theories from other disciplines (Drabek, 2004) within 
emergency management, the body of knowledge to support emergency 
management is lacking, particularly with regards to Federal and 
State/Territory/Tribal emergency management. Either way, the goal is to continue 
to build out the discipline as the field continues to grow. This research contributes 
to the limited academic knowledge of weather applications within emergency 
management, provides substantial breadth and depth of weather information 
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usage within FEMA, and lays a foundation and path forward for continued and 
future work in this field.    
4.4 DATA COLLECTION 
I utilized multiple methods for this study in order to thoroughly address the 
previously identified research areas, while also assessing the value placed on 
weather information within the context of decision making. Data collection 
consisted of two primary methods: (1) surveys and (2) interviews. Observations 
from the researcher also played a crucial role throughout the research process by 
informing various aspects of this research including design, instrumentation, 
analysis, and interpretation (Hays 2010). Along with review of relevant policy and 
doctrine, observations were used to guide development of an open-ended survey 
instrument, which was conducted to gain an overall perspective of the status of 
weather information needs and usage and identify areas to address in a follow-up 
semi-structured interview. There were many moving parts in this study and the 
path forward was not always evident. Without this observational insight, 
development, direction, and completion of this study would have been arbitrary 
and impervious, restraining the utility of this groundwork.  
Purposive sampling strategies were utilized for administration of the survey 
instrument, while snowball sampling was utilized for the interviews. A purposive 
sampling strategy was initially adopted for administration of the survey 
instrument. Commonly utilized within qualitative research methods, purposive 
sampling allows the researcher to select participants based on various 
characteristics (Bradshaw & Stratford, 2010; Patton, 2002). The survey 
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instrument was designed to address the overall needs of those who utilize weather 
information and data most significantly within FEMA. Initially, the survey was 
voluntarily administered to a pre-identified group of FEMA personnel, as 
designated by each FEMA Region and Headquarters, who occupy the position of 
Watch Officer or Watch Analyst. The positions of Watch Analyst/Officer were 
chosen initially as they are responsible for maintaining 24/7 situational awareness 
to support FEMA and State/Territory/Tribal decision making as well as serve as 
the initial response for any FEMA requested disaster assistance. As most disasters 
are directly weather related, monitoring weather is a major function of their daily 
responsibilities (FEMA, 2018a).  
A survey instrument was utilized for this group, as participants are located 
nationwide, work varying shift schedules, and were able to be completed at their 
convenience. I was able to collect a greater amount of data across a more varied 
group of personnel in a shorter amount of time at low cost, in turn providing a 
more expansive perspective and ensuring a more robust analysis and results. 
Conversely, questions were less flexible with no opportunity to ask a follow up for 
clarification or explanation and there was no interaction or verbal cues. Questions 
were primarily open ended, with one hazard ranking question and three multiple 
choice questions addressing education, experience, and how they formulated any 
existing weather knowledge. Formation of the survey instrument was guided by in 
situ observations of emergency management officials and the conceptual 
framework and addressed multiple facets of the situational awareness-
communication-decision paradigm and the relationship with decisions and the 
decision making process.  
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The survey instrument was tested amongst a few relevant personnel 
associated with FEMA Region VII in Kansas City, Missouri. This location was 
chosen as I was an intern at this office at the time of survey development and had 
established a rapport. The initial test instrument was disseminated via a third-
party email account through FEMA regional personnel. The survey was optional 
and anonymous, allowing for electronic completion with the participants having 
the option to respond back to the email account through an anonymous link or a 
secure drop box location within the common administration area. Upon collection 
the surveys were provided to me for preliminary assessment and revision as 
relevant.  
The final survey focused on the following areas: (1) roles and 
responsibilities, (2) weather experience, (3) weather information utilization, (4) 
weather information requirements, (5) sources of weather information, (6) 
challenges working with weather information, (7) non-weather information 
requirements, (8) weather topics of interest, (9) weather items unable to be 
located, (10) weather concepts that are difficult to understand, (11) needed skills, 
and (12) weather training. Based upon review and analysis of the initial survey data 
collected, a weather training course was designed. Consequently, surveys were 
voluntarily administered to those who registered for additional weather course 
offerings. The tested and revised survey instrument was administered via email 
through the training or course manager and returned accordingly. Although 
registration was only open to FEMA Watchstanders initially, after the piloted 
weather training course all FEMA personnel were allowed to enroll.    
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 There were sections specific to each of the five weather types (fire, severe, 
tropical, water, winter) as well as in general.  General questions were asked first 
followed by the specific weather type sections. Generally speaking, the overarching 
purpose was to determine overall utilization of information, elicit feedback 
indicative of roles and responsibilities, and support activities, operations, actions, 
etc., all of which contribute to or result in decisions. Extending beyond utilization 
a determination of weather information requirements and needs was also elicited. 
It was important to determine what weather information and data is required for 
training content development and support evolution of the decision making 
framework. Related to information requirements and needs was the assessment of 
information resources and communication of information. This was important 
from the standpoint of resource access, utility, and navigation along with 
information and communication flow. Furthermore, as a big part of FEMA’s 
mission is dedicated to response and recovery, input regarding impacts and other 
non-weather aspects were also solicited. Lastly, issues participants have 
encountered when working with weather information and data was evaluated. 
Items they are unable to locate and terms or concepts they don’t understand were 
assessed, in addition to overall challenges, analysis of which revealed a myriad of 
problem areas. Demographic information was also collected separately to show the 
overall ‘perspective’ of the participants as a whole but was not utilized in the 
analysis. Additionally, sections more specifically designed to elicit training needs 
and elements were added in subsequent revisions of the instrument (i.e. – topics 
of interest, needed skillsets, format, etc.). 
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Those who registered for the course were provided the survey either before 
the course offering following the protocol above or the day of. Those who did not 
receive the survey until the day of, were provided a paper copy of the survey if 
desired, time for completion, and an available drop box. The survey continued to 
be administered to course registries as those who desired or were required to take 
the course have a role in situational awareness or utilizing weather information in 
some capacity. However, many students continued to be Watch Analysts/Officers, 
as the position has a fairly high turnover rate due to the requirement that personnel 
work rotating shifts that includes nights, weekends, and holidays. In combination 
with the lack of existing weather training for FEMA personnel, despite the 
identified need, there is a continued demand for additional course offerings and a 
constant flow of new students participating. These participants provide unique 
perspectives and continue to add value to the overall understanding of weather 
information utilization.      
Following analysis of the survey data, I constructed an interview guide to 
gain additional insight into the decision making process and the role of weather 
information and influences (Jacob & Furgerson, 2012). The interviews were 
conducted with various high-ranking FEMA officials. Through my work with 
FEMA I identified contacts within leadership who were willing to assist with the 
study and pass along to additional relevant parties. I targeted personnel from 
specific regions including FEMA Regions III, IV, V, VI, VII and VIII as they are the 
regions that deal with the greatest variety of the most frequent occurrence of 
weather threats. On the contrary to the surveys, which allowed me to specifically 
target the greatest users of weather information, for administration of the 
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interview a snowball sampling strategy was implemented (Bradshaw & Stratford, 
2010) to reach the most relevant decision makers. The downside of this process 
was that recruitment took longer and was more time consuming. To start the 
process, I reached out to a few pre-identified members of FEMA Leadership via a 
recruitment email. The email requested willing participants for the interviews and 
that they pass along the email containing study information to relevant personnel. 
Based on my previous interactions with members of FEMA leadership, I chose the 
interview method, as senior leadership is more inclined to participate in an 
interview versus a survey, focus group, etc. due to availability, time constraints, 
etc. Interviews are also flexible, yet allow for more in-depth descriptive, 
exploratory analysis (Steinar, 1996), which aligns with the purpose and objectives 
of this research study. On the contrary, challenges included the amount of time to 
conduct the interviews as well as transcribe and analyze the data. 
The number of FEMA leadership is a much smaller pool compared to the 
rest of the agency and some are also political appointees. For identity protection to 
avoid any potential political criticism or repercussions I took extra precautions by 
conducting interviews via phone from a secure room to minimize exposure and 
anonymous correspondence. Typically, each interview lasted approximately one 
hour and allowed time for the participant to ask any questions or convey any 
concerns they may have. They were also provided with contact information for 
myself as the Principle Investigator (PI) and the Internal Review Board (IRB) 
should they have any additional follow-up questions or concerns at a later time.  
After being advised of and receiving verbal acceptance of the consent form, 
to ease participants into the interview process, I began with an overview of myself 
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and my work followed by encouragement for them to do the same (Jacob & 
Furgerson, 2012). Interviews then followed a semi-structured format to allow for 
flexibility yet ensure a response for all elements (Steinar, 1996). Utilizing the pre-
approved interview guide participants where asked a series of broad, overarching 
questions or provided a scenario seeking narrative responses, followed by more 
specific questions as appropriate. Ambiguity among the overarching questions was 
intentional as to not bias their response and allow them to discuss what they felt 
was most pertinent (Steinar, 1996). Interview questions and data collection 
focused on weather events in relation to situational awareness, communication, 
and the decision making process. Primary areas addressed in the instrument 
included (1) the communication flow and (2) role of weather information along 
with (3) weather support, and (4) factors that influence decision making. Analysis 
of the interview data along with elements of the survey analysis contributed to 
advancement of the proposed conceptual framework (Figure 4.1). Additionally, 
extension of the decision making model to Federal emergency management has 
implications for consistent, standardized decision support, refined response 
operations, and training, among other uses. 
Additionally, continuing to assess and refine the weather training, following 
the conclusion of each course offering, standardized evaluations were voluntarily 
administered through the training or course manager. Compilation of the data and 
analysis yielded results that served as the foundational platform for revision 
guidance. Based on these findings, a few defined areas emerged, which I employed 
to implement relevant training component revisions accordingly. In reference to 
the piloted training, pertinent identified areas encompassed (1) course content and 
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materials, (2) presentations and instructors, (3) activities and exercise, and (4) 
format as well as a few overall (5) logistical items. The evaluation process was 
repeated for all other course offerings, analysis of which has resulted in further 
refinement and revision of relevant course related components. This evaluation 
process was not a full program evaluation, but rather a preliminary assessment of 
the newly developed training for purposes of enhancement. A full training program 
evaluation is desired, but rather is reserved for future work along with analysis of 
the effects the training has on decision making.    
Due to the lack of existing knowledge and literature on emergency 
managers’ meteorological informational needs, I assessed meteorological 
information usage along with needs and inadequacies among FEMA personnel. 
The intent of this study was to provide foundational knowledge to guide future 
research through identification of FEMA decision making influencing factors and 
a greater understanding of how to better prepare emergency managers to make 
more informed decisions. Data analysis yielded guidance that informed 
development of weather training that perpetuates a baseline understanding of 
meteorological information, products, and concepts. Due to the inherent 
uncertainty and technical nature of meteorological information, understanding 
basic concepts, impacts, terminology, and product availability supports 
interpretation and utilization. The developed educational program facilitates 
decision support, guides communication, and contributes to the overall curricular 
framework  
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4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
For collection of the survey data, participants had the option to return 
surveys electronically or via paper. Upon receiving the survey data, I digitized any 
written data and compiled as appropriate combining with the existing electronic 
data. Interview data was recorded and transcribed if consent was received, 
otherwise notes were taken. Once all data was compiled I reviewed the dataset 
several times for familiarity and to gain the general ideas portrayed overall. Each 
time I reflected on the meanings implied and any emerging themes. During the 
first few passes I digested information with no real attempt at analysis. After 
several thought only review sessions, I began to make notes along the way 
regarding any general thoughts, themes, ideas or questions. After letting the data 
formulate in my mind I began to separate the data section by section. As the 
narratives often contained more than one idea or theme, it took a while to sort 
through all of the data and separate the combined narratives appropriately. 
Initially, I separated data by common themes or ideas, some of which were 
able to be categorized according to the pre-identified categories determined 
through observation and the framework, but not all. Next, I began to assign codes 
to the data based on the overall theme of each data statement or element. Once all 
codes were assigned for a data section I grouped the data according to the codes. 
Analysis of the data contained within each code was then re-assessed and 
organized in-vivo. To preserve the meaning or intent of a respondent’s feedback, I 
maintained their language, words, and phrases to the fullest extent including the 
codes themselves and category name. I coded and recoded the data for several 
iterations until reaching a consistent set of results. Throughout this process I 
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would often go back and re-read the data and reflect. Eventually, some codes where 
grouped together with other similar codes. I categorized the more easily 
characterized data first setting aside any items that didn’t fit into a predesignated 
category. After all initial data was categorized I went back to the more difficult 
items and coded and categorized them as appropriate. Ultimately, a handful of 
themes emerged for each section addressed. Upon completion of the data analysis, 
I compared the analysis with the original data for further confirmation that the 
themes identified were viable, consistent, and made sense.                             
Objectivity and bias can be a difficult balance for all researchers to achieve 
as many factors influence one’s perspective. Each person views the world through 
a different lens based on their experiences and attributions. While some measures 
can be adapted to reduce the influence, one may contribute during study 
development, data collection, interpretation, and analysis, it cannot completely be 
eradicated. My reflexivity or acknowledgement and recognition of this bias speaks 
to the validity of the study (Mansvelt & Berg, 2010). Several other strategies were 
also employed in this study, with respect to validity, based on the eight strategies 
discussed in Creswell (2014). Before proceeding with the data collection, I had two 
research colleagues separately review my initial research design and methodology 
along with survey and interview questions. I also utilized and triangulated different 
data sources and was able to verify findings from the survey data through 
interviews. After completion of data analysis, I utilized member checking of my 
identified themes through a few participants to ensure accuracy. Additionally, a 
robust description was utilized in the analysis and results to ensure conveyance of 
multiple perspectives. While my fifteen years of experience within emergency 
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management and FEMA could present bias, it also provides a more detailed and 
thorough understanding relevant for this study. Furthermore, I also took into 
consideration measures of reliability. In this context, transcriptions and compiled 
data were reviewed for errors and I often assessed and revisited the data in 
comparison with the analysis, even recoding portions of the data to assess 
consistency of findings (Yin, 2009; Saldana, 2016).    
Through this analysis I assessed FEMA weather training and information 
needs, identified the communication and situation awareness structures, and 
described the decision making process. Analysis provided an extensive and in-
depth overview of weather information utilization, sources, flow, and requirements 
as well as identified numerous challenges. Review of the results led to the 
establishment of the communication process and mechanisms in conjunction with 
a depiction of the situation awareness maintenance process. I also determined 
decisions, actions, critical decisional elements and potential influencers. Utilizing 
qualitative research methods provided a robust understanding of the role of 
weather information within FEMA and a comprehensive understanding of 
incorporation and impact of weather information throughout the decision making 
process and across all phases of the disaster life cycle. Findings provide a 
foundational knowledge base t0 build from, contribute to the advancement of 
emergency management decision making understanding, and serve as a starting 
point for possible theoretical development, helping to solidify its validity as a 
discipline within academia.                    
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4.6 CHALLENGES, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS  
Challenges and limitations in conducting this research study were difficult 
to navigate, and complicated and extended the research process. The primary 
challenge was an artifact of the interdisciplinary and pioneering nature of this 
research. This topic of study required extensive background research and 
knowledge across a variety of areas and disciplines. In relation, the ‘newness’ of 
the area of study allows for a broad spectrum of paths with multifaceted ideas, 
further enhancing the difficulty of narrowing down the topic. Additionally, given 
the qualitative nature of the data collected, analysis was tedious and time 
consuming requiring multiple rounds of coding for each defined area. 
Furthermore, since this work extended beyond to also serve operational 
components, once the analysis was complete, I developed weather training 
elements to meet the needs assessed in this research for FEMA personnel and 
partners. These components were quite time consuming, requiring multiple, 
iterative rounds of assessment and revision.            
The mission of the agency and disaster work led to urgent, unforeseen 
scenarios that when combined with deployments to the field, heavy workloads, and 
transitional leadership posed a challenge for data collection. Availability of senior 
leadership for conducting interviews as study participants was an issue and limited 
the sample size (N = 8) and participant pool. It may have influenced the type of 
personnel responding consequently limiting the scope of participant’s positions 
and hence feedback. Different components had to be interviewed about different 
pieces in order to form a complete picture as a result of the design of the agency. 
This proved to be both challenging and time consuming. Ultimately, it was decided 
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that the decision portion of the study would be addressed through leadership with 
the informational and training portions relegated to those responsible for 
providing and assessing weather information. Due to response operations, 
interviews with FEMA leadership were delayed and difficult to obtain.  
While it was advantageous to conduct this research from within the agency 
with access to internal personnel, my observations as a participant in the research 
process also potentially limited the perspective as discussed above. Additionally, 
coding the data and utilizing in-vivo codes allowed me to gain a greater 
understanding of their perspectives and meanings inductively (Saldana, 2016). 
While insights gained in this study may be applicable in other areas, one limitation 
of utilizing the proposed methodology is that findings will not be fully generalizable 
beyond FEMA. Although the work completed for this study does not entirely 
address all aspects or breadth of this topic, regardless, an in-depth analysis of the 
data for this initial exploratory, descriptive study yielded substantial insight and 
value to the field/discipline. 
Associated with these factors, there are also a few assumptions to note. 
First, as was discussed previously, ideally, I performed this research as objectively 
and unbiased as possible. While attempts to limit personal bias within this 
research were taken, the paths through which I have experienced the world have 
implications on the formulation of my belief system. Therefore, I possess potential 
favoritism towards the notion that weather information and training plays a 
significant role in emergency management decision making. Subsequently, I 
assumed that available, timely, understandable weather information along with 
associated knowledge and understanding of, is imperative for effective and 
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efficient disaster support operations. In relation, I assumed that the conceptual 
framework I developed for this study to describe Federal emergency management 
decision making is relevant and that working toward theoretical development 
within emergency management is a feasible and worthwhile endeavor. Lastly, I 
assumed that developing weather training and proposing an adapted 
communication model will be useful for Federal level emergency management.  
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
Utilizing both surveys and interviews for data collection and subsequent 
qualitative data coding, this chapter provides data analysis and results of the pilot 
survey I conducted with FEMA personnel (section 5.1) as well as overall all survey 
respondents from within FEMA and interviews from FEMA leadership (section 
5.2). Interest in varying weather phenomena along with roles and responsibilities 
were identified in the pilot survey. These results guided further data collection with 
topics focusing primarily on weather information utilization, information 
resources and requirements, and challenges of weather. Demographic information 
was also collected as a whole but was not utilized in the analysis due to anonymity 
concerns.        
5.1 FEMA PILOT SURVEY ANALYSIS 
An initial survey was administered in 2013 to a group of FEMA personnel 
who occupied the position of Watchstander. Residing within the FEMA National 
or Regional Watch Centers (N/RWC), personnel are responsible for maintaining 
24/7/365 situational awareness and are the primary conduit for weather 
information flow across the agency. Watch Personnel are tasked with monitoring 
and identifying potential threats of any kind and assessing any possible impacts. 
Comprised of personnel from all ten FEMA regions as well as HQ, survey 
respondents (N=23) were also designated as possible participants of the yet to be 
developed weather training course. The intent of the survey was to gain insight into 
their roles and responsibilities, information and resource utilization, and 
challenges. Utilizing the results of the initial survey data analysis, a pilot weather 
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training course was developed and administered. Voluntary evaluations 
administered to participants upon conclusion of the pilot course and completion 
of an associated After Action Review (AAR), facilitated course revisions 
accordingly. Subsequently, a revised version of the survey instrument along with 
evaluations continued to be voluntarily administered to participants registered in 
additional offerings of the “Weather and Climate for Situational Awareness” course 
through 2017. Survey responses continued to be analyzed and feedback gleaned 
from the evaluations was synthesized accordingly and relevant revisions 
implemented. Although the initial survey and pilot course was directed toward 
FEMA Watchstanders, follow up surveys included additional roles as the course 
attracted personnel from a multitude of positions across the agency such as 
planning, mitigation, external affairs, preparedness, operations, etc.  
Ten courses were offered over the five-year period from 2013 to 2017, with 
174 participants total and 123 survey respondents, 23 of which were from the initial 
survey and pilot course. Initially developed as an ‘in-resident course’, over time I 
revised the format to accommodate mobile course offerings, decrease maintenance 
costs, greater utilize technology, and facilitate usage of locally available SMEs as 
instructors. Class sizes ranged from ten to twenty-five on average and included 
participants from across the country. Surveys were administered via email or paper 
copy, through the appropriate training or course manager, and submitted either 
electronically or onsite. Survey completion was optional, but participants were 
provided time to complete surveys at the start of each course. Allotted time 
contributed to a high response rate of ~71%. Despite some surveys being returned 
incomplete, I included all responses in the analysis due to the qualitative nature.  
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My research consisted of multiple iterative layers as follows: administer 
initial survey, conduct survey analysis, develop product, administer initial 
evaluation, conduct evaluation analysis, revise product, administer revised survey, 
conduct survey analysis, administer evaluations, conduct evaluation analysis, 
revise product, develop other products, etc. The data analysis I performed 
consisted of several parts related to this process. For this section, I will discuss a 
brief overview of the initial survey analysis I conducted. Since I also included the 
initial survey responses with the others collected, I will defer further details to the 
full survey analysis in section 5.2 and evaluations will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
5.1.1 DEMOGRAPHICS 
Comparison among groups of participants by demographics was not 
intended for this study but will be considered in future work. Regardless, a few 
optional demographic questions were included as part of the survey to show the 
general consistency of the group and assess weather usage experience and training 
background. Initial survey participants identified predominantly as male at 70%, 
with 26% identifying as female, and another 4% choosing not to respond. The 
majority of participants (61%) indicated they resided in the 30’s and 40’s for age 
ranges, with 17% distributed equally above and below (Table 5.1). Of the initial 
participants, 22% chose not to respond for both age and race. However, just over 
half of the participants, at 52%, indicated they identified mostly with the 
white/Caucasian race, with an additional 26% divided between black/African 
American, Asian, Hispanic, and Native American/Pacific Islander (Table 5.2). For 
education, the majority (78%) of participants had achieved a bachelor’s or master’s 
111 
degree (44% and 35% respectively) and no one indicated having achieved anything 
beyond a master’s degree (Table 5.3). Of the remaining, 17% indicated having less 
than a bachelor’s degree with no response from 4%.  
AGE RANGE TOTAL 
Under 20 0% 
20 to 29 9% 
30 to 39 35% 
40 to 49 26% 
50 to 59 9% 
Over 60 0% 
No Response 22% 
Table 5.1: Pilot survey participants age range distribution based on results 
from the data analysis. 
RACE TOTAL 
African American/Black 13% 
Asian 4% 
Caucasian/White   52% 
Hispanic 4% 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 4% 
Other 0% 
No Response 22% 
Table 5.2: Pilot survey participants race distribution based on results from 
the data analysis. 
EDUCATION TOTAL 
High School/GED 13% 
Associates Degree/Technical School 4% 
Bachelor’s Degree 44% 
Master’s Degree 35% 
Doctorate 0% 
Other 0% 
No Response 4% 
Table 5.3: Pilot survey participants educational background based on results 
from the data analysis.   
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WEATHER EXPERIENCE TOTAL (N=23) 
Less than 1 year 9% 
1 to 5 years 26% 
6 to 10 years 9% 
11 to 15 years 13% 
16 to 20 years 4% 
21 to 25 years 13% 
More than 25 years 17% 
No Response 9% 
Table 5.4: Pilot survey participants weather information usage experience 
based on results from the data analysis.  
WEATHER TRAINING TOTAL 
Colleagues/On the job training  52% 
Self-taught/Trial and error 44% 
None 9% 
Formal weather training 0% 
Other: SkyWarn Spotter Training 4% 
No Response 13% 
Table 5.5:  Pilot survey participants weather training sources based on 
results from the data analysis. 
Experience utilizing weather information was distributed according to 
Table 5.4 (no response from 9%), with the lack of formal weather training evident 
in Table 5.5. Over half (57%) of respondents indicated having up to fifteen years of 
weather usage experience, with an additional 34% having more than fifteen years. 
More equally divided, 44% had less than ten years with 48% having more than ten 
years. Approximately one third of respondents (35%) indicated having five years 
or less experience. Despite the variance among experience levels, none of the 
participants indicated having received any formal weather training. Not 
surprisingly, 22% of the participants did indicate they had received some exposure 
to understanding weather elements within the military. Participants listed 
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informal venues such as on the job training/from colleagues (52%) and/or trial and 
error/self-taught (44%) as their primary source for weather knowledge. 
Additionally, while 13% choose not to respond, 9% indicated they had no weather 
training exposure informal or otherwise and 4% listed the NWS SkyWarn Spotter 
training.  
5.1.2 WEATHER PHENOMENA 
 In the initial survey, respondents listed the hazards of concern for their 
respective region. Analysis of the data yielded a variety of threats that I classified 
within the five primary weather types as I have defined below:  
1. Water Weather: flooding, ice jams, flash flooding, coastal flooding 
2. Winter Weather: winter storm, snow, ice, freezing rain, sleet, blizzard 
3. Severe Weather: tornadoes, severe storms, wind 
4. Fire Weather: fires, drought, dust storms 
5. Tropical Weather: tropical storms, hurricanes, typhoons 
For ease, I made a minor deviation in defining the five general weather type 
categories, utilizing water weather rather than hydrology. Aside from this change, 
the data provided some insight into participants concerns, although limited in 
scope given the homogenous group of participants and regional bias. Case in point, 
water weather hazards had the most frequent mentions, with tropical weather 
hazards mentioned the least; an artifact of tropical weather occurring primarily in 
coastal areas and not all hazards occurring or having the same frequency of 
occurrence in all regions. Winter weather hazards followed water weather hazards 
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with the second greatest number of mentions, followed closely by severe weather 
hazards. Fire weather hazards fell just above tropical weather hazards. Although 
fire weather is more prevalent in certain locals, it can occur essentially anywhere 
in the U.S. in comparison with tropical weather. Future survey iterations asked 
respondents to rank the five primary types with no significant results.    
Additionally, there were a few questions on the utilization of climate and 
seasonal forecasts. Of the 23 respondents, 70% indicated they did not use such 
forecasts, 13% indicated they did, and an additional 17% indicated they did 
sometimes. Respondents that did utilize longer term seasonal forecasts noted 
usage for long term planning and situational awareness. Respondents who 
indicated utilizing such forecasts sometimes stated doing so for spring flooding, 
with one participant clarifying they used it “only if it’s significant or has certainty.” 
Individuals who did not utilize such forecasts felt there was value for situational 
awareness and planning, or as some indicated, they did not know how it would be 
helpful. Overall, regarding climate and seasonal forecasts, there was not a good 
understanding of what was available, from where, or how it could be applied.   
In the initial survey, participants identified weather related threats in their 
regions, which provided a frequency of weather-related threats of concern. I 
determined overall resource usage, information requirements and challenges. I 
also assessed informational needs, challenges, and impacts for each weather type. 
However, impacts were found to be mostly redundant across all phenomena. For 
the final survey, I categorized the hazards underneath the five primary weather 
types I defined and had them rank the priority of each type. I determined overall 
information requirements and challenges and assessed hazard specific resource 
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usage, information needs, and challenges. Impact questions were moved to the 
overall section as they were determined to be redundant across all weather types. 
Lastly, I removed the climate/seasonal outlook questions as the majority of initial 
survey respondents did not use them and I added a few training related questions.    
5.1.3 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
 Analysis of the initial survey data resulted in three primary categories 
emerging under the umbrella of maintaining situational awareness: (1) 
monitoring, (2) conducting briefings, and (3) developing reports. Further review 
of the data determined this was in an effort to support leadership decision making, 
assist various partners, and respond to or support disasters as appropriate. 
Although primarily tasked with maintaining situational awareness for FEMA 
Leadership, FEMA Watchstanders also identified various other minor functions 
along with a secondary important function. Beyond providing situational 
awareness, they also assist in the maintenance and activation of the 
National/Regional Response Coordination Center (NRCC/RRCC) as guided by 
leadership, along with the associated task of notifying relevant personnel. Initially, 
upon incident occurrence, they serve as the first line of defense supporting 
response operations. Performance of these primary functions is essential to the 
agency’s overall ability to respond in a timely manner.  
5.1.4 INFORMATION AND RESOURCES 
Due to the roles and responsibilities of Watchstanders, monitoring, 
collecting, and communicating an extensive amount of weather information is 
required to support leadership with mission critical tasks. Preliminarily, review of 
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the survey data indicated that personnel most frequently monitor NWS ‘alerts’ (i.e. 
– watches, warnings, advisories, etc.) and utilize NWS forecasts, discussions, and 
outlooks. Most notably, there was repeated mention of the need for FEMA Region 
specific information, including graphical depictions, which is currently largely 
unavailable and “information pertinent to ‘my’ Region.” Participants also 
mentioned requiring current conditions and an all hazards overview in relation to 
a variety of weather phenomena (i.e. – hurricanes, storms, fires, etc.) or “anything 
that makes my job easier.” A few additional respondents also sought out 
informational weather briefings, GIS friendly data, and weather trends. Lastly, 
although not weather related, information on earthquakes and tsunamis was also 
listed, discussion of which is reserved for Chapter 7.  
For weather events, most indicated the need for timing/timeframe, 
intensity/severity, location, and impact information. Although impacts were noted 
as important required information, and specifically addressed in the survey, there 
was difficulty discerning specific impacts. Many respondents listed hazards rather 
than impacts. The same confusion has been observed among meteorologists as 
well. Regardless, overall findings related impacts to people, property damage or 
any threats that may require “possible FEMA involvement” (i.e. - “lifesaving, life 
sustaining activities and resources”). A few other areas noted were operations, 
agriculture, power outages, evacuations, and shelters. 
The two primary channels determined to be utilized to receive weather 
information was through the internet and television. Primarily, most indicated the 
use of NWS/NOAA websites and resources to include the NCEP centers, local 
offices, regions, RFC’s and the JTWC/PTWC. Examples include, NWSChat 
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weather.gov, NOAAWatch.gov, and the Enhanced Data Display (EDD). However, 
respondents also indicated utilization of National and local television, along with 
a host of additional open source (i.e. – google, yahoo, etc.) and social media outlets 
(i.e. – twitter, Facebook, etc.). The least utilized sources indicated were private 
weather entities, although some respondents did indicate occasional usage of such 
products. A caveat of FEMA being a government agency utilizing government 
information, yet this is also a result of inaccessibility to most private weather sector 
products and systems as they often require a fee.   
5.1.5 CHALLENGES 
Along with understanding FEMA Watchstander roles and responsibilities 
and information requirements, a determination of challenges or difficulties they 
experience was also assessed. Across all of the topics addressed, challenges elicited 
the most substantial amount of data and associated findings. Extensive review and 
coding of the data revealed a numerous amount, including, but not limited to, 
“determining the potential severity of ‘severe’ weather” and “how ‘severe’ weather 
impacts the community/lives of those experiencing it.” Preliminarily, I categorized 
key words and phrases from the responses and listed them below according to the 
most (first listed) and least (last listed) frequently mentioned as follows:  
• Website Navigation: so/too many websites/tools, organization, 
complexity, obscurity, manipulation, confusing, frustrating  
• Information: most important, latest/most current/up to date, timing, 
accuracy, contradiction, focused specifics/details, so/too much available 
• Analysis: impacts/real impacts, applications, consolidation, relevancy  
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• Resources: most accurate, best available/most useful, availability/new 
tools, timeliness/knowing when graphics update 
• Terminology: laymen’s terms, weather centric, lingo, uppercase 
• Understanding: interpretation, graphics, data, reading models, too many 
watches and warnings 
• Communication: conveying outcome/results, contact information, photos 
properly depict/best graphics 
• Technical: flash player, website issues, slow to load graphics   
Beyond the categorized challenges, analysis also determined items 
respondents are unable to locate, areas they do not understand, and inconsistency 
concerns. Confirmed tornado reports, historical data, local data, NWS forecasts, 
snowfall totals, and projections were listed as items they are unable to locate. 
Additionally, I identified three primary areas they have difficulty understanding. 
‘El Niño’, ‘La Niña’, ‘ENSO’ and associated terms were the most significantly noted 
as something heard, but not understood. Space weather was also listed, which is 
related to the implementation of it being briefed during the morning ‘FEMA Daily 
Operations Briefing’. The third concept identified as something they have difficulty 
understanding concerned terms or visuals associated with radar (i.e. – reflectivity, 
imagery, etc.). Less frequently mentioned items included a variety of terms 
associated with specific phenomena (i.e. – nor’easter, supercell, alberta clipper, 
pineapple express, etc.). Furthermore, nearly half of the initial survey participants 
had experiences with inconsistency, the majority of which primarily described 
issues between NWS offices (i.e. – National vs. regional vs. local). Other 
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inconsistencies included between products or updates (i.e. – format, content, etc.) 
and among forecasters (i.e. – language, style, etc.). Methods indicated to reconcile 
these discrepancies included discussion with NWS or source, comparing with other 
sources or perspectives, or locating additional information. Lastly, as alluded to 
within various portions of the data, it is noteworthy to mention that combining 
weather information and data from a multitude of sources is quite tedious for the 
FEMA regions. As noted by one individual, “I must read forecasts and create a 
combined forecast to cover a larger area. I need FEMA Region overviews.” 
5.2 FEMA OVERALL DATA ANALYSIS 
5.2.1 DEMOGRAPHICS 
Demographic information was not recorded for the interview data, due to 
easier identifiability. However, all in total, there were 123 survey respondents 
among the 174 course registrations (including the 23 participants from the pilot 
survey). Of the participants, 61% identified as male and 33% as female with 6% not 
responding. Regarding race, 54% identified mostly as white/Caucasian followed by 
15% black/African American and 8% Hispanic (Table 5.6). An additional 5% 
identified as Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, Asian or other with 18% choosing 
not to respond. Most participants ages ranged among the 30’s (37%) and 40’s 
(25%) with only 9% younger (20’s) and 22% older (50’s - 14% and 60’s - 8%) (Table 
5.7). No one identified themselves as below twenty or above seventy with 7% 
choosing not to respond. In comparison to the pilot survey, age was dominated by 
the 30’s and 40’s, and gender was predominately male albeit to a lesser extent. 
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RACE TOTAL 
African American/Black 15% 
Asian 2% 
Caucasian/White   54% 
Hispanic 8% 
Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 2% 
Other 1% 
No Response 18% 
Table 5.6: Total survey participants race distribution based on results from 
the data analysis. 
AGE RANGE TOTAL 
20 to 29 9% 
30 to 39 37% 
40 to 49 25% 
50 to 59 14% 
60 to 69 8% 
No Response 7% 
Table 5.7: Total survey participants age range distribution based on results 
from the data analysis.   
Educationally, nearly half of the participants (~46%) had acquired a 
bachelor’s degree with 37% having also acquired a master’s degree (total = 83%) 
(Table 5.8). About 12% indicated they had achieved less than a bachelor’s degree 
with only 1% indicating they had achieved a doctoral degree. The remaining 4% 
chose not to respond. Additionally, a plurality (29%) of participants fell between 
one and five years of experience working with weather information, of the defined 
ranges (Table 5.9). Overall, 40% had five years or less of weather experience. The 
lowest percentage of participants (3%) resided in the sixteen to twenty-year range 
of experience, of the defined ranges. The twenty-one to twenty-five-year range 
wasn’t far behind, encompassing ~7% of participants. Overall, survey participants 
as a whole favored less experience than was initially assessed in the pilot survey.  
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EDUCATION TOTAL 
High School/GED 4% 
Associates Degree/Technical School 8% 
Bachelor’s Degree 46% 
Master’s Degree 37% 
Doctorate 1% 
Other 0% 
No Response 4% 
Table 5.8: Total survey participants educational background based on 
results from the data analysis.   
WEATHER EXPERIENCE TOTAL 
Less than 1 year 11% 
1 to 5 years 29% 
6 to 10 years 15% 
9 to 15 years 16% 
16 to 20 years 3% 
21 to 25 years 7% 
More than 25 years 15% 
No Response 3% 
Table 5.9: Total survey participants weather information usage experience 
based on results from the data analysis.  
Initially assessed from the pilot survey, a lack of formal weather training 
among participants is evident (Table 5.10), with only 4% having received formal 
weather training. The majority (53%) learned on the job through other colleagues 
with an additional 29% self-taught through trial and error. Found to be consistent 
with the initial survey, most respondents learned via on the job training/from 
colleagues and/or trial and error/self-taught as their primary source for weather 
knowledge. While 6% chose not to respond, 5% indicated they had no weather 
training exposure, informal or otherwise. Further supporting the need for 
development of educational weather components, only 4% had received any kind 
122 
of weather-related training via the NWS SkyWarn program, one of the military 
branches and/or a state emergency management conference.  
WEATHER TRAINING TOTAL 
Colleagues/On the job training  53% 
Self-taught/Trial and error 29% 
Formal weather training 4% 
None 5% 
No Response 6% 
Other: SkyWarn Spotter Training (2), 
Military (2), State EM Conference 4% 
Table 5.10: Total survey participants weather training sources based on 
results of the data analysis.  
5.2.2 UTILIZATION: ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES  
 To determine utilization of weather information, I assessed respondents’ 
roles and responsibilities. The position each respondent held was not overtly noted 
in the survey, yet the respondents’ role in the agency determined weather 
information and data utilization. This includes FEMA Watchstanders, planners, 
GIS personnel, safety officers, field personnel, operations, mitigation, and external 
affairs, among others. A vast amount of feedback was provided for this section, 
second to challenges. Pervasive usage of weather information and data throughout 
the agency and at the Federal level became quite evident. As a multitude of inputs 
were assessed for this section, coding the data took several iterations. Arduous 
review and analysis of the data eventually revealed six primary categories of FEMA 
weather information utilization quantified as:  
• Situation Awareness: monitoring, reporting, briefings, life safety/ 
operations, future trends  
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• Analysis and Assessment: interpretation, GIS mapping/modelling, 
risk assessment, threat assessment, impact assessment, damage 
assessment 
• Communication: infrastructure, visuals, dissemination, 
messaging/outreach 
• Planning: crisis, deliberate, hazard mitigation, continuity of operations, 
exercises/scenarios 
• Disaster Assistance: preliminary damage assessments, event 
summaries for declaration requests, disaster assistance and grant 
determinations 
• Decision Making: posture/activation, resource allocation, 
support/mission assignments, field applications 
Situation Awareness 
 Within each of the six categories, data analysis determined several 
additional subcategories. Each subcategory describes the activities attributed to 
each specific category. Situational awareness was identified as being one of the 
fundamental and most frequently mentioned codes. All participants indicated that 
they were either directly involved in maintaining awareness or the recipient of the 
awareness products. As one participant stated, “it’s helpful to understand what’s 
going on with the weather from a holistic standpoint.” Varying levels and ranges 
of personnel included situation awareness in their input as follows:  
• Monitoring: potential or ongoing threats 
• Reporting: daily reports, event reports, situation reports  
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• Briefings: States, ESFs/partners, Leadership, Command and General 
Staff, pre-deployment, daily operations brief 
• Life safety/operations: field personnel/impacts 
• Future trends: climate, patterns, seasonal outlooks 
 The majority of respondents for this section indicated that they utilized 
weather products for situational awareness through monitoring, developing 
reports, and briefings. One respondent best summarized these activities stating 
that “we are constantly monitoring NWS sites for potential weather hazards to 
our region. We then create situational awareness reports to alert the necessary 
departments of possible involvement and response to a weather incident. We also 
provide a morning brief every day, which includes national and regional 
outlooks of 72-hour forecasts.” Another respondent extended this notion by 
stating that “we monitor any weather event that may lead to a significant loss of 
life, destruction of private property, or damage to infrastructure.”  
Participants also indicated that weather information was utilized for 
situational awareness for “life safety” missions and “impact on operations.” A 
number of positional roles within the field from ‘safety officers’ to leadership felt 
this was part of their role. Further assessment of the data determined that this was 
the result of roles not always being consistent, not all positions available or present, 
and that more than one role felt responsible for personnel safety due to a tiered 
command structure. As one respondent stated, “in a leadership role of field teams, 
I notify staff of impending hazards in order to ensure safety.”  Furthermore, 
another participant responsible for a multitude of situational awareness tasks, 
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stated that “I brief field operations on weather impacts to the operating area and 
monitor the weather, alerting operations and field personnel of weather threats 
and impacts as necessary.” Another participant best summarized this notion by 
stating that “I am looking to make sure the FEMA responders don’t become one of 
the survivors.”   
Going beyond utilization for short term situational awareness, weather 
information and data is also important “to do long term planning.” In this study, 
it was specifically mentioned with reference to monitoring and assessing impact 
potential “mostly as it relates to spring flooding.” However, long term planning 
for all hazards, as is feasible and relevant, is valuable by extending the advanced 
timeframe from which to prepare. Essentially, personnel are monitoring not only 
for personal safety and the impacts on ongoing operations, but also for potential 
threats, how future events could impact a newly modified disaster area, and how 
best to plan and prepare for possible seasonal events accordingly.  
Ultimately, situational awareness associated activities were conducted to 
support decision making. For example, as one person noted “we provide weather 
phenomenon information to the regional directors for decision making as well as 
provide weather data support to our deployed personnel.” Inherent within the 
support provided is the decision to deploy field personnel. “As an ‘IMAT’ (Incident 
Management Assistance Team) member, weather determines our readiness to 
deploy. Once our team is in place, we monitor weather for changing conditions 
that affect our situation and operations.” Although decision making will be 
discussed more in depth later, situational awareness and decision making are 
directly tied together as showcased in the conceptual framework.  
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Analysis and Assessment 
Maintaining situational awareness was found to be pervasive throughout 
Federal emergency management. Tasks pertaining to analysis and assessment 
were also found to be a vital piece of the overall picture being established. Although 
related to situational awareness, these activities require more than monitoring and 
disseminating information. Rather, these items focus on interpretation, risk and 
vulnerability, and impact mapping. Respondents that were tasked with the 
application or extension of situational awareness most notably indicated activities 
as follows:          
• Interpretation: hazards/threats, information/data, text/graphic 
products, forecasts, outlooks, alerts/watches/warnings/advisories   
• GIS mapping/modelling: scope, extent/coverage, area/location   
• Risk Assessment: vulnerabilities, historical data, historical review 
• Threat Assessment: potential hazards/threats, recommendations  
• Impact Assessment: potential impacts, recommendations 
• Damage Assessment: disaster declaration requests, assistance 
These activities include analysis of current or future threats along with 
ongoing events as well as implications for existing or potential vulnerabilities. 
Aside from interpretation, these tasks were generally spread across a variety of 
more specialized positions and not a responsibility of all. However, these tasks 
were determined to be cross cutting across the divisions within FEMA and relevant 
throughout all of the CEM phases  
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Interpretation was mentioned as being conducted for preliminary, brief 
review to know what to include in situational awareness products as well as 
discussed as a more in-depth analysis of past, current, and future weather data. 
Feedback from one survey stated that “we (FEMA) analyze and interpret weather 
information and data for our situational awareness reports and briefs to 
national/regional leadership. We also use said information and data to project 
current and potential future impacts to an area.” In addition, “Planning utilizes 
weather information in development of GIS products.” GIS mapping of threats is 
a critical component of the decision making process and can assist with the 
interpretation process along with other visuals. Furthermore, another response 
indicated that “in GIS, weather drives the support we provide and products that 
are developed, which involves preplanning, response, mitigation and recovery.”   
 Interpretation and GIS mapping were identified as advanced elements of 
situational awareness, yet essential to weather analysis overall. The more 
substantial components were the four primary assessments: threat, impact, 
disaster and risk. Survey responses mentioned these four assessments based on 
role as well as timeframe. The ‘Threat Assessment’ determines the possible 
threats/hazards an area may face with regards to future planning. What is noted 
as the ‘Impact Assessment’ concerns current or ongoing events and emphasizes 
impacts based on vulnerabilities, demographics, etc. After a disaster, some 
respondents indicated responsibilities associated with conducting ‘Damage 
Assessments’ in order to administer funds. Lastly, ‘Risk Assessment’ was discussed 
in the data as important for pre-identifying and planning for vulnerabilities.    
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 Utilizing CEM, and in accordance with FEMA divisions and timelines, a 
‘Threat Assessment’ would be performed in the preparedness phase, while a ‘Risk 
Assessment’ would be in the mitigation phase. The more urgent assessments would 
be the ‘Impact Assessment’ in the response phase with the ‘Damage Assessment’ 
primarily in the recovery phase. Keeping in mind that these phases are continuous, 
despite the separation of phases, often times there is overlap among the different 
activities. As such, it is imperative that each group work together throughout the 
disaster lifecycle and across divisions.  
  Through these assessments, respondents indicated they are attempting to 
identify potential hazards and vulnerabilities and quantify impacts and damages 
(i.e. - “how does or could this impact my region? how bad?”). It was also 
determined that the impact and damage assessments rely largely on current data, 
while the threat and risk assessments rely more on historical data. 
Consequentially, analysis indicated that ‘Threat Assessments’ assist with 
preplanning and preparing for potential disasters and make use of climatological 
data. Similarly, it was determined that ‘Risk Assessments’ assist with identifying 
or determining potential areas of concern that can be useful for mitigation projects 
and response and recovery operations. As was indicated by the data analysis and 
will be discussed in a later section, respondents felt that historical and 
climatological data was the most difficult to locate and many felt it was not as 
readily available as current weather data. Although useful for these assessments, it 
was also found to be important for other tasks.  
 A respondent who occupied a position with Mitigation stated that “I mostly 
utilize historical weather data. It goes into the Risk Assessment/Management 
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portion of our response plans.” It was explicitly stated by one respondent that at 
FEMA “NOAA/NWS data is used for the risk assessment and hazard profiles for 
hazard mitigation plans” and that “local mitigation plans rely on NCEI data to 
develop their risk assessments” as well. For “mitigation plan review, we (FEMA) 
need a good understanding of hazard analysis with impacts and probabilities 
along with historical data.” This statement exemplifies how areas within 
emergency management are intertwined. A position may be delegated certain 
responsibilities, yet a team effort is required to accomplish the goal. As was 
indicated by the previous weather usage experience and training discussion, many 
respondents indicated doing these tasks without inherent knowledge of weather 
and climate. Respondents indicated that a variety of resources are utilized to 
accomplish these tasks, hence weather training and understanding along with 
collaboration is essential.       
Communication 
 In addition to situational awareness and analysis and assessment, 
communication of information is also essential. The communication category 
contains a variety of aspects of including infrastructure, visuals, dissemination, 
and messaging, as determined from the data analysis. Maintaining and restoring 
communication infrastructure was assessed to be imperative, along with the below 
identified components, as FEMA supports disaster response with a life safety 
mission.  
• Infrastructure: maintaining/managing  
• Visuals: development of products/graphics/displays 
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• Dissemination: communicate information to leadership/partners 
• Messaging/Outreach: threats and assistance via media, social media, 
briefings, press conferences 
During analysis, communication or form of, was often listed in conjunction 
with situational awareness. Respondents indicated that upon completion of 
monitoring, collecting, interpreting, and analyzing information, it must then be 
communicated appropriately to relevant audiences, along with pertinent visual 
aids. As weather and disasters have a spatial element, visuals greatly assist with 
the understanding of the potential impacts. One example of the overall process was 
described as such, “we (FEMA) produce an operations brief and a situational 
awareness report daily. Each product details potential weather impacts and 
includes weather warnings and watches.” Extending FEMAs reach beyond 
internal personnel and partners, data highlighted the importance of messaging 
threats, actions, and available support. One response best summarized this notion 
stating that “as the Federal emergency management entity providing assistance, 
the public and authorities depend on FEMA for information and guidance. As 
such, operable infrastructure and redundancy are imperative.”   
The survey for this study focused on characterizing weather information 
usage and training elements. However, respondents frequently mentioned 
discomfort with communicating weather information. As one respondent noted, 
they had a desire to learn “techniques for communicating information about 
weather hazards.” Another stated that they wanted to learn “how to report the 
weather when you are not a meteorologist.” It was determined that while FEMA 
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personnel are predominately not meteorologists with little weather background, it 
is imperative for them to understand and communicate weather information 
effectively, as it plays such an integral role in the decision making process. One 
participant noted, “I utilize weather information daily as our section is 
responsible for interpreting and communicating the impacts weather will have 
on our operations and actions.”  
Situational awareness, analysis and assessment, and communication are 
key components throughout the disaster lifecycle and are inherent within planning 
support activities. As one respondent noted, “as a member of the planning section 
unit, I analyze information, explain in products, and provide updates at senior 
leadership meetings.” Although a wide variety of roles and responsibilities 
encompass emergency management, planning is the lifeline. Without planning, 
responding to and managing disasters would be far more arduous and haphazard. 
Not only does “FEMA Planning prepare briefings and reports for Senior Leaders 
regarding potential weather impacts”, but they also carry out a variety of other 
mission critical activities.     
Planning 
Provided the wide array of elements, demands, and factions, further inquiry 
determined that planning activities across FEMA reside amongst a multitude of 
branches and divisions dependent upon the type and purpose further solidifying 
the value and crucial contributions of planning across all disaster phases (and 
FEMA divisions). Among FEMA and coincident with emergency management in 
general, some of the primary planning functions discerned from the data are:   
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• Crisis planning: resource tracking, situation reports, regional support 
plan, incident action plans 
• Deliberate planning: non-crisis plans, all hazards plan 
• Hazard Mitigation planning 
• Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning 
• Exercises/Scenarios: develop, conduct  
Determined to be the most urgent of the planning functions, crisis planning 
is activated to manage an ongoing disaster response. As one respondent 
summarized, “the planning section utilizes weather information during 
activations and for field/JFO activities to ensure the staff is aware of any 
conditions that could impact operations. This information is used in the IAP and 
SPOT reports on any significant events.” During activation, it was assessed that 
the planning unit will monitor the situation, track resources and assets, and 
provide reports regarding incident activities. Along with crisis planning, deliberate 
planning was discerned as being tasked to the response division. These plans were 
identified as being developed as a framework for managing a disaster response for 
all hazard types. Furthermore, as was briefly mentioned earlier, local and state 
hazard mitigation plans are developed in close coordination with FEMA personnel 
according to existing FEMA policy within the mitigation division. Lastly, 
“development of scenarios for planning based on weather impacts to assess 
plans” as one respondent noted along with COOP plans are often coordinated out 
of the preparedness division. COOP plans ensure that mission critical operations 
will continue despite some a catastrophic failure or inaccessibility to facilities.    
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Weather information was deemed to be utilized in all of the aforementioned 
planning types and plays a crucial role in planning for disasters in both the short 
and long term. Development and utilization of various plans support emergency 
managers before, during, and after a disaster. Plans provide a disaster response 
structure and assist with decision making yet can be adapted as needed. Data 
analysis revealed that directly supporting planning efforts, are the assessments 
mentioned in the previous section. Comprehensive assessments will facilitate and 
refine planning efforts, and ultimately an efficient, effective response and recovery. 
Disaster Assistance 
Once a disaster occurs, as noted previously, FEMA provides funds to 
Federal, State, Territory, Tribal and local entities through the disaster assistance 
programs discussed in Chapter 2. In order to receive assistance from these 
programs, generally speaking, FEMA must assess the damage and make a 
determination if an applicant qualifies based on pre-determined thresholds. 
Review of the data elicited three primary tasks, during this process that require 
weather information and data. They are as follows:  
• Preliminary damage assessments: conduct, extent, location, severity 
• Event summaries for declaration requests: develop, FMAGs, 
Emergency Declarations, Major Disaster Declarations  
• Disaster assistance and grant determinations:  substantiate, 
eligibility, type of assistance (IA, PA, HAZMIT)  
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According to the process, FEMA must first assess the damage, extent, and 
severity of an event. Pending the assessment, upon completion the State, Territory 
or Tribal government may then submit a request for a disaster declaration. If 
received, FEMA must then verify the information by researching the event for 
write-ups and recommendations in the final submission to the President. As was 
indicated through interviews with FEMA leadership, this is frequently done 
through or in conjunction with the NWS. During the review process, FEMA must 
substantiate the information provided to determine whether an applicant is 
eligible and for what types of assistance. Throughout this process, respondents 
indicated that FEMA utilizes weather information to identify areas to conduct 
damage assessments, develop event summaries, and assess assistance eligibility.   
Decision Making 
Inherent among these activities, decision making for disaster support is the 
finality of all of these functions. Throughout the disaster life cycle, personnel are 
continuously performing these functions in support of FEMA Leadership, States, 
Territories, Tribal Nations and other partners for “major events that overwhelm, 
result in or potentially could result in requests for assistance from State and 
Tribal partners.” A miscommunication or information breakdown can result in 
errors, inadequate response, legality issues or even life-safety concerns. Despite 
varied representation, not all decisions were discussed in this data set as more 
extensive analysis is required. However, the primary emergent decisions included:  
• Posture/Activation: determine level of support/staffing, develop 
activity plan of available resources, alert personnel, deployments.  
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• Resource allocation: personnel, assets (equipment requirements, 
facilities, mobilization plans, commodity movement/distribution) 
• Support/Mission Assignments: assess needs, evacuations, 
transportation, mass care, life safety, levee/dam support 
• Field applications: establish support, State liaison, IMAT, JFO 
Upon event occurrence or just prior to, one of the initial decisions that 
leadership indicated they needed to make was determining posture/activation. 
Further review of the date revealed this could include assessing the level of support 
required, determining staffing levels, alerting or deploying personnel, and 
deciding who to mobilize where. Data yielded a variation for each event and 
according to FEMA Leadership as well as expected potential impacts (discussed 
further in the next section). Taking many things into consideration, leadership 
must decide whether or not to establish field support. The size and format of which 
will be guided by the severity of the event and how widespread the impact. This 
may be done in advance of an event, such as a hurricane or after an event, such as 
an earthquake. As stated by a member of regional leadership, “when an event 
happens, HQ Leadership will sometimes request an activity plan with what/who 
we have available for deployment. Depending on which detachment we are 
augmenting or the event, the assets may vary as to what may be needed.” 
Carried out in communication with relevant partners, FEMA leadership 
indicated the need to assess shortfalls, support, and the status of ‘lifelines’ to 
facilitate “lifesaving and life sustaining” missions, administer “mission 
assignments” (delegation of support to subject matter experts), and “determine 
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actions to take.” In relation, resource allocation regarding both personnel and 
assets was also deemed critical. Provided examples included equipment staging, 
facility availability, mobilization plans, and commodity movement and 
distribution. Once in the field, personnel and leadership must decide “how best to 
make protective action decisions/recommendations in a deployed environment.” 
For example, one individual noted having to work with officials to “order enough 
flood protection (i.e. – sandbags).” 
Overall, the primary goal is to determine “what the impacts are for FEMA” 
and the “relevance of impacts to FEMA operations” (i.e. – “how does this impact 
‘my’ region?”, “how do ‘we’ respond?”). Frequently, “decisions have to be made 
with incomplete data” and “getting decision makers to not use model data” was a 
concern noted from one respondent. “Developing plans for decision making”, 
“anticipating conclusion to mobilize personnel”, and “making critical decisions” 
were among the most frequently mentioned associated activities, yet also identified 
among the most challenging.  
Decision making at FEMA was determined to not only be relegated to the 
urgency of threats and incidents, but something that is carried out daily as it is 
inherent across all functions. As was indicated by leadership, FEMA is not always 
and in fact often not, the lead for a decision, but rather a support system. Specific 
examples listed frequently in the dataset related to evacuations and associated 
information and triggers. It can be “difficult to see how FEMA should respond” to 
an event, particularly those that “FEMA doesn’t usually respond to.” One example 
provided in the survey responses was drought. A few individuals expressed the 
opinion that FEMA “can’t do much about drought.”  While FEMA may not assist 
137 
as much as they could with drought currently, this is certainly an area that has been 
identified for further review and discussion.   
Concluding this section, utilization of weather information within FEMA is 
pervasive and a primary guiding factor, yet it is not a standardized element 
amongst training nor is meteorological expertise prevalent. It does not consist of 
standalone tasks, but rather a cyclical pattern and iterative process that involves a 
multitude of collaborations and partners. To summarize this section best, one 
individual noted that “I utilize graphics, forecasts, analyses, discussions, and 
historical data from various NWS products. These products allow me to produce 
quality products of my own that keep leadership informed of real-time weather 
situations and potential issues in the near future. They also allow them to make 
informed decisions when it comes to preparedness, emergency activation, 
staffing, and deployments, as well as commodity movement/distribution and 
advising State and local emergency managers and leaders.” 
5.2.3 INFORMATION: RESOURCES AND REQUIREMENTS 
Review and discussion of how FEMA utilizes weather information leads into 
the next topic of what information they are in need of and how they 
receive/disseminate information. Not only did the analysis indicate a tremendous 
amount of information being utilized, but it also indicated that respondents are 
seeking information from a vast amount of resources. Having copious amounts of 
information available to them in ‘the information age’ further complicates the 
already complicated scenario of navigating a multitude of NWS resources, 
products, tools, and services.  
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Information Resource Channels and Mechanisms 
NWS products were found to be the most widely utilized across the agency. 
However, there were also a myriad of other resource outlets that personnel 
frequently visited. As one individual stated, “’we’ utilize the active alerts and 
warning map, as well as the National Forecast map as an at a glance SA tool for 
potential ‘severe’ weather around our region. We also monitor many local news 
sites from around the region for what is happening on the ground.” Below is the 
complete list of all channels mentioned in the data set, listed from the most to least 
frequently mentioned:  
• NWS (resources/websites/calls/briefings/tools) 
• Local/National Media/Television/Radio 
• FEMA (briefings/reports/liaisons/field)  
• Social Media 
• State EM offices (web systems/EM calls/Local officials) 
• Open source media (photos/videos) 
• Phone Apps/FEMA App  
• Private sector (internet/apps/software)  
• Other Agencies: U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA), U.S. Forest Service (USFS), U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE), National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) 
I conducted analysis for the five weather types (severe, tropical, winter, 
water, and fire) individually as well as overall. All of the above channels were found 
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to be a commonality across all weather types. However, respondents listed 
additional resources for fire weather not included in these categories and usage of 
additional non-governmental sources for tropical weather. Weather information 
usage frequency according to specific sources was not overtly addressed in the 
survey for this study; however, response feedback indicated that the majority 
engaged in daily usage for situational awareness although the frequency of each 
mechanism was not determined. Inspection of the data implicated personal 
preference, positional role, and knowledge of resource availability influenced 
utilization patterns. For example, some respondents indicated usage of apps or 
engagement through social media while others did not. Responses also indicated 
that some roles require more frequent or different usage than others. As training 
for weather navigation was determined to be primarily through others or oneself, 
source knowledge was limited to what was inherent to different areas and regions.  
Overall, all of these channels were consistently accessed across the board as 
a collective group either directly or indirectly. No discernable pattern of channel 
usage was able to be assessed for each specific position or role. Although, due to 
their situational awareness role, FEMA Watchstanders utilized the greatest 
number of resources most frequently. Respondents who served in a role other than 
Watchstander were more likely to access weather information on an as needed 
basis aside from the daily situational awareness briefings and reports. Further 
review of the FEMA leadership interview data collected confirmed this notion. 
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National Weather Service 
Due to proprietary reasons, I will not name any specific private sector 
resources or for profit entities. However, with regards to the NWS products, 
services, and tools, many respondents indicated that they “need more resources”, 
while others stated that “there are too many resources.” Below are the NWS 
resources explicitly listed in the survey responses: 
• National: National Weather Service (NWS), Climate Prediction Center 
(CPC), Weather Prediction Center (WPC), Storm Prediction Center (SPC), 
National Hurricane Center (NHC), Central Pacific Hurricane Center 
(CPHC), Advanced Hydrologic Prediction Service (AHPS), National Center 
for Environmental Information (NCEI), National Operational Hydrologic 
Remote Sensing Center (NOHRSC) 
• Region: River Forecast Centers (RFC), Regional Operation Centers (ROC)  
• Local: Warning Forecast Offices (WFO) 
• Tools: NWSChat, Enhanced Data Display (EDD), Radar, iNWS, NOAA 
Weather Radio, Damage Assessment Toolkit (DAT) 
One of the participants noted that “we (FEMA) can only use authorized sites for 
information such as NOAA.” However, a variety of other sources are also being 
referenced. In part, this is likely due to the increase in available information, as 
media and social media are more readily available and accessible. These channels 
are also utilized as they provide user friendly and less technical products. 
Reasoning for the usage of each venue was not specifically addressed and will 
require further study. One perspective for going external to the NWS was that “they 
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(non-NWS) seem to have a much better track record than the NWS”, which could 
be legitimate in some cases. More likely this is attributable to misunderstanding 
the information provided or the design of the weather enterprise in addition to 
personal experience.  
Information Requirements 
Describing the utilization of information by FEMA personnel is imperative 
for advancement toward a greater understanding of the decision making process. 
Reviewing information resources, they access and identifying the information 
requirements is an important piece for developing training and enhancing decision 
support. Analysis of the data revealed four primary information categories:  
• Weather Information: historical data, forecast/predictions, current 
conditions/situation overview  
• Non-weather information: general information, time of year, 
confidence/uncertainty, topography/terrain, flood maps/plains, 
levee/lock/dam data 
• Communication: visuals, overviews/summaries, outreach/education 
• Impacts: life safety, critical infrastructure, property damage, human, 
insurance losses, environmental, agriculture and livestock, economic    
Respondents placed heavy emphasis on impact information, yet the 
remaining three categories provide an in-depth overview of the required 
information as reported by the respondents. While communication and visuals 
provided good insight into needed graphics, the non-weather information category 
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showcased some of the required fundamental elements along with additional 
geographic and system data. The largest of the remaining categories, ‘Weather 
Information’, was further broken down into three subcategories: (1) 
forecast/predictions, (2) current conditions/situation, and (3) historical data. All 
of which were comprised of a multitude of in-vivo codes within each subcategory.   
Weather Information    
A review of the responses from the information section of the survey, was 
conducted utilizing the five primary hazard types. However, the differences only 
occurred in some of the specific codes for each hazard with the same resulting 
categories and subcategories. Some of the codes were also redundant across the 
weather types. Overall, there were more similarities than not and not enough 
specific codes to refine this analysis by weather type. As such, for this purpose all 
data was categorized according to past, present, and future as per below:   
• Forecast/Predictions: precipitation type and amount, daily 
temperature, humidity/RH, fronts and pressure systems, threats/hazards, 
NWS advisories/watches/warnings, wind speed and direction, fuels, 
expected crests/surge/inundation, models/comparison, and GIS data 
• Current Conditions/Situation Overview: antecedent conditions, soil 
saturation, drought status/end drought, gauge levels, reservoir capacity, 
flow levels and release rates, water content of snowpack and rate of 
snowmelt, ice jams, storm reports, radar/satellite, and the size of active fires 
with acreage burned and percentage contained and spread projection  
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• Historical Data: historical record, past events, past impacts, local climate 
info/microclimate and flood stages and associated known information  
The forecast/prediction subcategory is comprised of basic weather factors 
and atmospheric parameters along with any relevant associated data and alerting 
products. General weather conditions and information pertaining to existing or 
ongoing events are contained within the current conditions/situation overview 
subcategory. Furthermore, climate data and event history reside within historical 
data. As one respondent noted, “there is a need for both historical occurrences of 
events and information on their impacts.”   
Non-weather Information 
Most of the non-weather category is comprised of general information (i.e. 
- what, where, when, size, duration, severity, and track). Many respondents also 
indicated that “time of year” was important along with “confidence/certainty.” As 
one individual noted, “I need to know how bad and how likely”, while another 
stated that “I need a sense of certainty and factors that effect this.” Additional 
codes included some geographic details (i.e. – topography, type of land, flood 
plains/flood maps). Information regarding levee and dam systems was also 
mentioned as described below. To some extent, differing factors play a more/less 
important role for differing hazards, but as one respondent noted “it is all pretty 
much the same for all hazards.”    
• General Information: what, when/timing/timeline, duration, 
where/location, size/coverage, intensity/severity, path/track/direction  
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• Time of year 
• Confidence: certainty/uncertainty, sense of 
• Topography: terrain, type of land 
• Flood maps/plains 
• Levees/Locks:  levee data, locks, USACE products on dams 
“It is important to know where, who, and what to deploy as weather 
approaches.” All of the discussed information is helpful along with “direction of 
the storm, landfall, timeframe, wind speeds, surges, etc. – as we need to know if 
more equipment needs to be flown in advance, or if we need to call for assistance 
from other regions.” In relation, there was also an implied need among other 
sections of the data for information regarding transportation and “escapes routes.” 
“Deployments to or within areas of concern pose threats for personal safety and 
safety in the field.” It is important to “obtain data to determine the safest route of 
travel to an affected area prior to and during weather.” “We need conditions 
between where we are located and where our personnel are driving to.” 
Therefore, is it imperative to monitor “weather between ‘us’ and our destination 
with trucks and personnel and what they will encounter when they arrive at that 
location.” This also holds true for “islands being hit and coordinating delivery of 
supplies when infrastructure is down.” Additionally, one respondent noted the 
need for “training to deal with and manage weather events.”  
Communication 
Furthermore, a variety of items were mentioned in the data regarding 
various aspects of communicating weather information. Inputs included 
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contextual information, messaging, verbiage, as well as visual displays and 
depictions as described below. Utilization of these items depends upon one’s ability 
to locate and understand the information, hence challenges ensue as are discussed 
in the next section.      
• Visuals:  
o Maps/graphics/charts – monitoring, situational awareness, assess 
magnitude/extent/scope/scale, tracking/tornado tracks, 
validation/confirmation/verification  
o Radar/satellite imagery  
o GIS maps/data/products – from local, State, FEMA, FS 
o Areal/ground truth photos/videos/reports  
• Overview/Summaries: text/discussions, terms/language, wording  
• Outreach/Education: messaging, early warning, advanced notice  
One of the most frequently mentioned items was the need for visual 
products, both before and after an event. Before an event there was a need for 
graphical displays to support framing and conceptualization. For example, “river 
flood gauge maps to pinpoint where problems exist which may be compounded 
by QPF graphics and excessive rainfall graphics.” A continued need after events 
was also identified to assist with things such as assessment, tracking, and 
verification. Verbiage to accompany these visuals was also requested to assist with 
explanations and understanding for the development of reports and the execution 
of briefings. For example, there is a need for “graphics indicating areas under a 
flood watch along with text describing flood potential and expected impacts 
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based on previous flooding.” Of particular note was in reference to flash flooding 
with one respondent stating that “we need to figure out a better way to make 
leadership happy about this.”  
To further assist with the communication process, respondents desired 
products or services regarding “available messaging to assist the public.” It is 
important to know “how big is big, how bad is bad and getting the word out to 
residents – having a clear method that is understood by citizens so that they know 
what to do.” In addition, early warning to support leadership decision making and 
“advanced notification for FEMA to deploy prior to an event when possible would 
be helpful.”  In summary, “anything that keeps me ahead of CNN.” 
All of the aforementioned informational items discussed are important, but 
ultimately, as was quoted by a member of leadership, “for FEMA, it’s not the what, 
it’s the so what.” The hazard may drive the potential impacts and essence of a 
disaster, but ultimately what happens or what may happen despite the cause is 
what matters. The hazard combined with population, other demographics, and 
vulnerabilities will provide the risk and initial guidance towards preliminarily 
understanding the ‘so what’ factor. As one survey respondent stated, that 
regardless of the phenomena, “weather that impacts communities is most 
important” vs. weather that impacts less densely populated areas.  
Assessment and identification of risk and potential threats through a variety 
of products, maps, and analysis were found to be instrumental for the FEMA 
decision making process. The larger the disaster, the larger the number of 
personnel, resources, etc. required and vice versa. Although some incidents are 
unanticipated, the goal is to be as best prepared as possible. Since all disasters can 
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be approached with many of the same guiding principles and priorities, this helps 
to streamline the process. Additionally, aside from small perturbations among 
specific incidents, impacts were found to be essentially standardized.    
Impacts           
Correspondingly, questions addressed the impacts of concern overall, and 
for each specific weather type. Analysis of the data revealed no discernable 
differences between the impact information requested for each specific type. 
Primarily, this can be attributed to the characterization of disasters, FEMA policies 
and procedures, declaration requirements, and disaster support and assistance. 
Generally speaking, impacts included “storm surge damage, wind damage, 
tornado damage, flooding damage, evacuation issues, human and animal safety, 
power interruption, damage to infrastructure, damage to transportation routes, 
and interruption of food/water supply.” Below is the compiled list of impacts from 
respondents, categorized primarily between infrastructure and ‘lifelines’:  
• Consequence Management: analysis, overall impacts, areas of impact 
• Life/public safety: life sustaining, threat to public, mass casualties/life 
losses/lives, personnel/field safety 
o public health/healthcare 
o evacuations, routes, transportation, ability to evacuate in time 
o mass care: sheltering needs, survivors, evacuees, food and water  
o stranded people/water rescues/rescue operations 
o emergency services/medical care 
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• Human impacts: communities/population centers/people/urban 
areas/rural areas affected/displaced/homes displaced, 
vulnerabilities/functional needs  
• Critical Infrastructure: schools, hospitals/medical, dam/levee 
breeches/failures, transportation (roads, barges, rivers, ports, railroads, 
airports, shipping, closures, navigation), utilities (nuclear, oil and gas, 
electric generation/power outages/downed lines, water and sewer) 
• Property Damage/Debris: homes/protection of property/structure 
damage/amount of debris/debris management 
• Losses: individual vs. public, NFIP/uninsured damage/rebuilding per 
NFIP/compliance 
• Environmental  
• Agricultural: loss of livestock/animals/pets/plants 
• Economic: private sector, lost businesses 
Consequence Management in general or the overall impacts from an event, 
along with activities associated with property damage, infrastructure disruption, 
and life safety were listed most frequently. As one participant characterized, 
“consequence management: life safety, evacuations, mass care, impacts to 
critical infrastructure, etc., things out of the norm.” It is important to understand 
“current and anticipated activities, what is happening and where, and what will 
be the impact.” Of the utmost importance, feedback indicated the “threat to life 
and life safety”, which encompasses those activities that directly contribute “to life-
saving and life sustaining” missions for both survivors and responders to prevent 
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“injuries”, “loss of life” and “mass casualties.” This would include healthcare and 
medical services, evacuations, mass care, and rescue operations. For example, “the 
ability to evacuate population in time and addressing evacuation and sheltering 
needs that will arise from those impacts.” Other examples mentioned were “rapid 
snowfall that traps vehicles on highways resulting in rescue operations” or 
“impacts affecting prior recovery operations.” Local emergency management or 
public safety officials and responders primarily manage these functions in 
coordination with a variety of partners and the State. FEMA provides support for 
all these functions through personnel, resources, and funds. How widespread or 
severe an event is will dictate FEMA support. Communication of this most urgent 
information is imperative for a timely and efficient operation to prevent casualties.          
Human impacts, which includes population and demographics, also affect 
life safety. Some of the contributing factors mentioned include the amount of 
people impacted and population displaced, type of communities (i.e. - urban vs. 
rural, new vs. old, low vs. high economic status, etc.) affected along with those who 
with other vulnerabilities or functional needs. Case in point, “power outages and 
transportation – especially for vulnerable populations without heat.” All of these 
factors combined indicate the level and types of resources that will be or will 
potentially be required to fully support each incident. For example, “a large 
densely populated area being hit by tropical weather” will require a different level 
of support than a more isolated, smaller scale event. As each disaster is different, 
having a good idea of such information assist FEMA and partners’ ability to right-
size each event accordingly, based on need, and determine the types of disaster 
assistance available to jurisdictions and/or individuals.           
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Related to life safety and human impacts respondents indicated impacts 
associated with “infrastructure and infrastructural damage”, such as “damage to 
critical infrastructure and structures (i.e. - power, hospitals, water and waste 
water, transportation, etc.) and amount of debris.” Comprised of medical 
facilities, transportation modes, utilities, schools, flood walls/levees, etc., after an 
event this infrastructure is crucial for the re-establishment of critical services for 
further reduction of casualties and the path to recovery. For example, “wind that 
knocks out power, therefore home heating” and “impacts to roads and bridges to 
get resources into an area or near an area to provide assistance.” Identifying 
which sectors have been impacted and how badly will facilitate efforts to restore 
critical services through determination of the type and extent of damage and 
identification of required resources. For example, “not having power for long 
periods of time will create a demand for many of our resources (i.e. -power 
outages in evacuations, shelter openings, food/water, and generator 
transportation.” Even without an impending event, this infrastructure is 
monitored to avoid potential harm and mitigation projects completed to further 
prevent or reduce impacts. Of particular note are “impacts to the public such as 
roads, power grids, and long-term future flooding.”  
“The protection of property” and “structural property damage” both 
personal/individual (i.e. – homes, apartments, etc.) and otherwise (i.e. – 
government, private, etc.), was mentioned as a concern for debris management, 
immediate response, and long-term recovery solutions. The continuous 
monitoring and communication of this information was found to be important for 
ensuring coordination of appropriate partners for debris removal and life safety 
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missions. For the longer term, this information was also determined to be 
important for providing disaster assistance to survivors and jurisdictions alike and 
assessment of mitigation measures that could be implemented. Based on 
previously discussed FEMA policy, the distinction between individual and public 
losses, insurance coverage (including home, flood, etc.), and the type of structures 
is important information in order to determine availability of funds, resources, and 
assistance. Additionally, data indicated that during the rebuilding phase, eligible 
recipients of disaster funds will also be monitored for compliance and adherence 
to existing policy and program guidelines according to type of funds appropriated.  
 The remaining three impacts respondents mentioned in the survey include 
environmental, agricultural, and economical. While these are not typically as 
imperative for urgent lifesaving missions and initial stabilization, they are critical 
elements of long-term recovery and sustainment. Environmental impacts will need 
to be addressed in order to prevent further harm to both the ecosystem and 
humans. They could also lead to further agricultural concerns, beyond the 
economic loss of plants, crops, and livestock. Furthermore, economic impacts 
would also include the private sector, loss of businesses, lack of spending, damage 
or loss of goods, and rebuilding in general. These three categories were listed as 
important in order to assist personnel with enacting or developing appropriate 
recovery plans, assessing qualifications for mitigation projects, and performing 
relevant mitigation projects to build toward future resiliency.          
The greatest concerns respondents frequently mentioned were “what are 
the unmet needs that ‘we’ need to provide or be prepared to provide via ‘our’ State, 
Territory and Tribal partners” and “continuous monitoring for anything that will 
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hamper or halt field operations.” This includes “other threats or incidents that 
may occur as a result of the ‘severe’ weather, how it may affect operations in the 
area, and State and local resource gaps in responding to the event.” Regarding 
consequence management overall, leadership best summarized “’we’ would be 
most concerned about impacts to life, property, and infrastructure (specifically 
transportation, electric generation, water treatment, nuclear, etc.). For FEMA, 
damage impact is most important as the amount of damage to property affects 
our deployments.”  
To summarize the ‘Information: Resources and Requirements’ section 
overall, the information FEMA requires consists of “where, when, severity, was it 
pre-identified or no notice, people affected or potentially affected, other incidents 
that may occur as a result of the ‘severe’ weather, how it may affect operations in 
the area, State and local resource gaps in responding to the event, road closures, 
electrical and water outages, and transportation concerns.” Respondents 
indicated that they obtain this information through a variety of sources, yet the 
significant amount of available information and large number of resources makes 
data collection and analysis quite difficult. Educational outreach, training 
elements, and development of additional weather and impact products relevant to 
FEMA may not resolve all of these issues but would certainly enhance current 
practice.   
5.2.4 CHALLENGES 
Among all of the sections in this chapter and chapters within this 
dissertation, the ‘Challenges’ portion elicited the greatest amount of discussion 
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within the survey responses. Overall, the primary concerns pertained to difficulties 
associated with maintaining situational awareness and how they complicate 
decision making. The implications were inherent across various portions of the 
data. Closely related, was the notion that hazard occurrence varies across regions 
and personnel may not have the most relevant experience for all hazards. As was 
best stated by a regional respondent, “our Region is reliant on the requirements of 
those Regions affected by tropical weather since ‘we’ aren’t directly affected by 
tropical weather.” Therefore, some challenges and needs may be unknown, i.e. – 
“what are the obstacles in my way.” 
Despite this caveat, many challenges mentioned in the data can be easily 
remedied, providing further evidence of the need for development of weather 
training along with additional weather support and products. Given the 
overabundance of input, the analysis was substantially more time consuming, 
requiring multiple iterations of data coding. The feedback could have been coded 
into different categories, according to the researchers’ perception, experience, 
background, etc., yet ultimately, analysis yielded the categorizations as follows: 
• Equipment and Technical: timeliness, security and compatibility, and 
equipment 
• Resource Navigation: data collection, resource availability, too many 
resources, and products and alerts 
• Knowledge and Understanding: roles and services, prioritizing 
hazards and threats, weather phenomena and basic meteorology concepts, 
weather phenomena, and education and training 
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• Interpretation, Trends, and Analysis: informational and 
geographical, interpretation, trends and analysis, demographics and 
vulnerabilities, and impacts 
• Communication: visuals, inconsistency, dissemination and format, 
messaging, and terminology 
After extensive review of the data, five definitive and overarching categories 
emerged consisting of resource navigation, knowledge and understanding, 
interpretation and analysis, communication and equipment, and technical issues. 
One of the respondents best summarized the challenges overall as a “general lack 
of understanding of weather and weather products, the inability to effectively 
communicate weather-related information to leadership and constituents, and 
the lack of preparedness to interpret weather information during active 
situations.” Encompassing the majority of the primary challenges concisely, this 
statement is largely representative of many of the responses put forth by many of 
the respondents and across all disaster phases.  
Resource Navigation 
The most frequently mentioned challenges were incorporated under the 
‘Resource Navigation’ category, which includes data collection, resource 
availability, too many resources, and products and alerts. Described below in more 
detail, these challenges were fundamentally problematic for weather utilization:  
• Data collection: locating/finding/collecting info/where to get/getting all 
the info needed, data in rural areas, historical data/archival data, confirmed 
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tornado reports/info/tornado track data, GIS data/needed format/some 
not available/some not through services, local forecasts/incident specific. 
• Resource availability: where to get info/where to find answers/don’t 
know where to look/lack of knowledge of where to locate info/which 
websites to use/where to go for what information, resource support, what 
are the best resources/most critical information/good/best info sources. 
• Too many resources: lots of info/too much info available, speed/too 
little time/takes too much time/finding info quickly/overwhelmed, 
reviewing multiple products/finding all needed info in one place/too many 
reporting systems to sort through. 
• Products and Alerts: explaining the difference between 
products/product confusion, unaware of new products/services/changes, 
non-standardized/lack of Standardization, alert differences/meaning, EM 
not understanding watch/warning thresholds, difficulty sifting through 
watches and warnings nationwide/keeping track of alerts/alert changes. 
Some of the challenges identified were “reading maps, finding information, 
and knowing sources”, in addition to being “not sure which product is easiest or 
knowing which website to use.” Difficulty with “not knowing where to find data 
and a lack of understanding of what data means”, nor “a good understanding of 
where to locate the products ‘I’ need” was also established. Historical data, rural 
data, local data, tornado tracks, and reports as well as GIS data and services were 
among the most frequently listed problem areas. Examples of more specific data 
location challenges include: agriculture/vegetation cover/moisture, storm surge 
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information, hotspots/fire induced weather/fire information in differing area of 
responsibility, flood maps/what is flooding/estimated levels of precipitation, 
river/flash flooding/ice jams information, past 24-hour snowfall/how 
much/depth reports/rates/totals, and icing amounts. Additionally, a lag in 
determination of recent snowfall was identified as an issue for some respondents 
along with the speed of fire spread vs. reporting (untimely or inconsistent fire 
updates).  
Knowing where to locate information and what is available is first and 
foremost throughout the situational awareness and decision making processes. 
Nonetheless, at FEMA, the gap between knowing what the best weather sources 
are vs. the information required was identified, with little support available. As a 
tremendous amount of weather information exists via an array of outlets, 
personnel can easily be overwhelmed by the time it takes to navigate and compile 
the data. “Not knowing what resources are out there, with information scattered 
across multiple sources, it makes it difficult to sift through quickly to find the most 
relevant information.” Overall, the consensus was that, “’I’ would like to be able to 
get the whole weather story in one location, but analysis requires going to several 
NOAA sites.” Frustration and the inability to locate required information led some 
respondents to seek out non-governmental sources. However, one response noted 
that “while navigating NWS/NOAA websites is a pain, it is the only way to ensure 
valid information, but nearly impossible to find what you really want.” 
Not only are there “too many products”, but there are also a variety of 
supporting entities such as “multiple river forecast centers, which require several 
searches” and “multiple sites for one state.” Further complications arise as there 
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is little to “no standardization among weather offices” across all NWS levels (WFO 
vs. Region vs. National vs. Center), or between agencies (NWS vs. FEMA vs. 
USACE vs. USGS). For example, “not all offices have ‘weather stories’” and “there 
are too many NWS regions for ‘my’ FEMA region.” It is difficult to “review multiple 
texts, summaries, and correlations for regional assets and keep track of new 
watches and warnings” while attempting to compile all relevant information into 
one coherent COP. In fact, there currently is no mechanism in place to do so.   
Furthermore, confusion among the respondents regarding differences 
between forecast products was observed. Case in point, “’I’ lack an understanding 
of what products are telling me and their meaning/impact. ‘I’ am not sure if ‘I’ 
am interpreting them correctly and ‘I’ would like to have more confidence in ‘my’ 
analysis.” Data analysis determined that the meaning of or thresholds for the 
different NWS alerts (watches, warnings, advisories, etc.) are not well understood 
or are confusing. A few examples noted are “what conditions lead to red flag 
warnings?”, “what is a severe thunderstorm watch?”, and “what does advisory 
mean?” Some respondents also expressed concern about being unable to maintain 
current on relevant or related NWS product or service updates and felt out of the 
loop or unaware of new products and services or modifications to existing ones.   
Knowledge and Understanding 
The challenges grouped within the ‘Resource Navigation’ category focused 
on understanding and knowledge issues, among others, encountered specific to 
weather resources. However, several general, more scientifically based knowledge 
and understanding challenges were also identified in addition to confusion over 
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supporting agencies and responsibilities. Areas include education and training, 
roles and services, prioritizing hazards and threats, basic meteorology concepts, 
and weather phenomena as listed and described below. The first four categories 
(education and training, roles and services, prioritizing hazards and threats, basic 
meteorology concepts) describe the overall, widespread concerns as expressed by 
the group of respondents. The last category, ‘weather phenomena’, is a listing of 
more specific issues respondents have encountered and therefore represents a 
more individualistic perspective rather than a collective viewpoint.        
• Education and training: how/where to obtain training/what’s available, 
for situational awareness/analyze/need better understanding to assist with 
a more informed analysis/understanding, how to use tools, leaderships 
understanding/leaders want info/answer than doesn’t exist.  
• Roles and services: difference between NWS, USACE, USGS, etc./don’t 
know what they do/who they are/what do they provide/who does 
what/what resources do they have, who to contact/availability of 
SMEs/how to utilize liaisons/staying connected. 
• Prioritizing hazards and threats: what to monitor/what not, figuring 
out/identifying primary hazards/threats, hazard/threat/risk assessment, 
don’t know what is most important/critical, not knowing what to request.  
• Basic meteorology concepts: overall/in general, cause and effect, 
context/impact, intensity/severity, forecast/prediction, understanding 
limitations of the forecast/predictability/ambiguity in forecasts/why 
forecasts change, what the technical/details mean, the differences in 
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scales/categories/how they are defined/what do they mean/what 
determines the classifications. 
• Weather phenomena: lack of knowledge of tropical weather/surge 
products/how wind impacts surge/wobbling of hurricane track/factors in 
steering/movement/intensity/explaining that category is not the only 
factor in a storm, tornado probabilities, fire behavior/factors affecting fire 
weather, dynamics/hydrology in relation to flash flood/saturation/river 
observations/forecasts, impact of rapid snowmelt with rainfall, drought 
mitigation from snowpack levels/what it will take to end drought. 
As was previously mentioned, most respondents indicated they had no 
formal weather training despite weather playing such a crucial role at FEMA. 
Likewise, respondents indicated they acquired the necessary skills on the job, 
through other colleagues, and via trial and error. Part of this issue can be attributed 
to the fact that suitable weather training components and requirements are 
lacking, yet respondents also indicated they did not know from whom to obtain 
training. Respondents overwhelmingly supported the notion, all but one survey 
response, to develop such training so as to provide better situational awareness, 
learn about available resources and tools, and assist leadership. Although none of 
Senior Leadership took part in the survey, respondents indicated that leadership 
would also benefit from weather training due to a perceived a disconnect between 
leadership and weather information demands. Succinctly stated, “there is a lack of 
understanding by leadership, they often want information that simply isn’t 
available like definite answers on impacts.”  
160 
With the background of most FEMA personnel stemming from primarily 
non-weather factions, they lack an understanding of the overall weather enterprise 
and associated partners. Case in point, as one participant noted, they have the 
disadvantage of “not knowing NWS people or services” or whom to contact and 
what services might be available to them. Limited background and training 
combined with limited access to support and expertise has forced limitations on 
their level of understanding and stunted knowledge progression.  
One of the more significant shortfalls identified was the inability of 
respondents to prioritize hazards and threats. The challenge was in “not knowing 
what weather pattern/incident to monitor and what not to monitor” and in 
deciphering the most critical elements. This was true on both the short- and 
longer-term timescales as many struggled to understand the hazards, threats, and 
risk their region faces and associated frequency, seasonality, etc. Due to the lack of 
understanding, knowing what to request and from whom was deemed onerous.                 
A more extensive discussion of training content will be discussed in Chapter 
7. However, a brief overview of the most relevant topics within basic meteorology 
concepts and weather phenomena discerned form the data analysis is discussed in 
this section, as it addresses more specific challenges related to understanding. For 
example, “flooding classifications and cresting”, “drought indices and finding a 
good index with drought duration/intensity” and “radar interpretation/interface 
understanding.” Aside from general meteorological parameters, such as weather 
patterns, scales, terminology, etc., respondents had difficulty “understanding the 
accuracy and limitations of forecasting” and associated predictability and 
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ambiguity. There was also a myriad of knowledge gaps and questions related to 
more specific weather phenomena gaps mentioned in the data, as is listed above.  
In summary, the lack of experience and availability of training, in 
conjunction with the challenges discussed compromises FEMA’s capability to 
adequately support the mission. Weather training and educational components at 
all levels was deemed to be a valuable endeavor and a much-needed area for 
development, given the critical function of the subject matter with nationwide 
implications. Furthering this point, the lack of weather training is not only of 
concern among FEMA personnel, but among partners and emergency managers in 
general. Several respondents noted that when needed, “we (FEMA) are 
training/teaching emergency managers and others” about different weather-
related topics such as “an overview and explanation of storm surge products.” 
This is just one indicator of the need for audience based, appropriate weather 
training across the growing field of emergency management and related 
fields/disciplines.    
Interpretation, Trends, and Analysis 
 Provided the shortfalls identified among ‘Resource Navigation’ and 
‘Knowledge and Understanding’, correspondingly complications extended beyond 
to ‘Interpretation, Trends, and Analysis’. Addressing the previously discussed 
challenge areas through developed educational components will further contribute 
to enhanced skills among these areas as well. However, some of the elements may 
require additional or more advanced components that are beyond the scope of this 
work and will be reserved for consideration in future studies. Nevertheless, the five 
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primary components identified within this area consist of ‘Informational and 
Geographical’, ‘Interpretation’, ‘Trends and Analysis’, ‘Demographics and 
Vulnerabilities’, and ‘Impacts’, all of which are further discussed in detail below.   
• Informational and Geographical: details/specifics, what kind, 
timeline/timeframe/timing/onset/when/lead time/time of impact/time to 
locations/more exact timing, duration of hazards/how long/speed of 
events, location/exact location/where/distances to locations, where is it 
going to land/track/direction, topography/geography/diverse region, 
spread out region, being familiar with an area, region specific information.  
• Interpretation: how to interpret/interpreting weather information/data 
properly, what data means/model analysis/one vs another, 
misinterpretation by EMs and the public, able to read/reading 
graphics/diagrams/charts/identification of map features. 
• Trends and Analysis: trends/projections/providing analytical 
projections with accuracy/correctly by state and locals, severity/how 
bad/how much/extent/size of possible impacted area, assessing potential 
impact/what it will impact/projected impacts. 
• Demographics and Vulnerabilities: population/how many 
people/home counts, identifying vulnerabilities/those with functional 
needs/non-native speakers/danger to lives, evacuation numbers/needed 
shelters, evacuation time/timeframe/triggers. 
• Impacts: ‘real’ vs. ‘bogus’ impacts, obtaining/finding/locating 
observed/accurate/real time/current hazard event impacts/reports/ 
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information/getting states to report impacts, lodging options/availability, 
transportation/facilities/utilities/public transit/compiling power outage 
info/power failures, when are roads clear for travel/road closures/icy 
roads/safety for ‘us’/public/determining safe travel routes. 
Generally speaking, the ‘Informational and Geographical’ challenges 
identified through data analysis are associated with detail-oriented aspects and 
geographical considerations specific to an area of concern. As was previously 
discussed in the information section of this chapter, challenges concerning the 
informational requirements such as “when? where? how bad? what kind? and 
how long will the weather last?” Consternation regarding timing, timelines and 
duration of hazards/threats was the most frequently mentioned overall. Examples 
include, “timeframe to crest and recede”, “timing of downstream water from 
mountains for snow events”, “when has flash flooding subsided” and “when will 
severe threat exit ‘my’ region.” Further issues identifying or locating information 
related to incident location, track, and areal coverage were also evident. One 
specific issue that was noted several times is the interest in tornado track data. 
However, such data is not readily available immediately following an incident. As 
one respondent noted, “leadership wants tornado track data, but ‘we’ are always 
asked to provide it quicker than it is available.” Collectively, all of these issues are 
particularly notable for regional requirements within an area of responsibility 
(AOR) since weather products are not designed specifically for FEMA needs. 
Furthermore, one respondent also noted that “not being familiar with an area 
further complicates awareness at times.”   
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Aside from the ‘Informational and Geographical’ concerns, as noted, “how 
to interpret information relating to weather overall is a challenge.” 
‘Interpretation’ issues involve a variety of areas such as forecasts, radar data, river 
gauges, models, etc., with one individual referencing a “vagueness in fire 
products.” In relation, a good portion of the respondents reported having difficulty 
reading and interpreting the various weather graphics and maps available. One 
example discussed was “trouble finding flood graphics and maps and being able 
to read them.” Otherwise, a few responses indicated that the potential for 
misinterpretation is of concern not only for FEMA, but also for emergency 
managers in general and the public. Specifically mentioned was the suite of tropical 
weather products (i.e. – cone of uncertainty, storm surge, etc.).   
Extending beyond ‘Interpretation’ and transitioning to ‘Trends and 
Analysis’, one individual best expressed the concern that “’I’ am not sure if ‘I’ am 
interpreting correctly and ‘I’ would like to have confidence in my analysis.” The 
‘Trends and Analysis’ category consists of identified challenges associated with 
monitoring trends and conducting assessments. FEMA personnel indicated 
utilizing a multitude of available data and tools to assess the potential of an 
impending or ongoing event. Review of the data determined issues among accurate 
and correct assessment of the severity and extent of the hazard/threat as well as 
for the impact projections. Specific examples included “surge, current flooding, 
what is flooding” and “accurate assessments of acreage burned, spread potential 
and fire line/area of fire map.”  
Related to the ‘Trends and Analysis’ challenges are those associated with 
‘Demographics and Vulnerabilities’. I considered combining the two categories, 
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but ultimately decided the components differed enough to be separated. Review of 
the data revealed ambiguities when attempting to identify the potential number of 
homes and population impacted as problematic for decision making. Of greater 
concern, are issues related to assessing and managing vulnerable populations (i.e. 
- functional needs, non-native speakers, etc.). Evacuations are particularly 
challenging with regards to the number of people, needed shelters, timeframe and 
triggers.       
The first four components within the ‘Interpretation, Trends, and Analysis’ 
category (‘Informational and Geographical’, ‘Interpretation’, ‘Trends and 
Analysis’, and ‘Demographics and Vulnerabilities’) focused on a wider, more 
holistic view. The final component ‘Impacts’ has a more specific and timelier or 
urgent perspective. In general, the overall challenges respondents indicated were 
in obtaining actual impact information and deciphering between credible vs. non-
credible reports. As was discussed in the ‘Information Requirements’’ section, 
impacts are what matter most. Therefore, “not knowing the damages following an 
incident is a problem for FEMA activities and deployments.” However, compiling 
impact information is difficult as one must determine needs, assess relevance, and 
evaluate sources. Congruent with previously discussed impact information needs, 
important elements identified were impacts primarily associated with the 
aforementioned areas of critical infrastructure, transportation, and that which 
poses a threat to life safety (i.e. - facilities, utilities, roads, etc.). Specific elements 
within each area are described in more detail above.    
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Communication 
The first three ‘Challenges’ categories (‘Resource Navigation’, ‘Knowledge 
and Understanding’, ‘Interpretation, Trends, and Analysis’) essentially build upon 
one another. Therefore, shortfalls or gaps within one area will create problems in 
others. Likewise, many of the issues discussed so far can be overcome through 
improved education and training. Aside from a few exceptions, the final two 
‘Challenges’ categories (‘Communication’ and ‘Equipment and Technical’) provide 
insight into areas of needed improvement across the weather enterprise, and how 
to best serve FEMA, partners, emergency managers, etc. The communication 
category focuses on five communication principles, detailed below as per the 
respondents, that include ‘Visuals’, ‘Inconsistency’, ‘Dissemination and Format’, 
‘Messaging’, and ‘Terminology’.  
• Visuals: visual graphics not available/not the graphics needed, better 
graphics/visuals/with radar/not user-friendly products/graphics, colors 
are difficult to read/color coding, need timing across region/states, region 
specific information/graphics/just my area of responsibility.  
• Dissemination and Format: dissemination of information in an easy to 
understand/more user-friendly format/easy to understand 
information/format, dissemination during a large geographic response, 
providing and receiving important information, preparing for 
dissemination/briefings/reports, communication in general, jurisdiction 
issues/who reports what. 
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• Messaging: convey information and impacts/effective communication of 
threats/explain/brief weather/models in briefings/reports to senior 
leadership/others, knowing what to include/pass along and not to, 
summarizing products/information, language barriers/more Spanish 
products/translating information and severity.  
• Terminology: complex information, technical forecasts/scientific 
lingo/too much use of technical jargon/have to spend time deciphering the 
language, use of acronyms, shorthand used in products, need definitions.  
• Inconsistency: conflicting/varying/inconsistent messages/information 
between NWS/media/state/county, forecasters providing conflicting 
information/interpretation from different forecasters, conflicting reports 
from media/eyewitnesses, hype/sensationalism/inflation/overexcitement 
of media/partners/leadership, etc., de-conflicting info. 
Issues concerning ‘Visuals’ were the most frequently mentioned of the five 
communication subcategories. Overall, items that were mentioned included the 
desire for more visually appealing graphics that utilize appropriate color schemes 
and incorporate timing information along with more user-friendly maps. As one 
respondent stated, “maps may have multiple layers and information that is 
broader than what my audience needs.” Many respondents felt that the graphics 
they needed were not available. The primary gap identified among graphical 
displays was the lack of graphics specific to their area of responsibility (AOR), 
which is usually correlated with a FEMA Region or State. The demand for more 
appropriate, relevant regional and State graphics is growing as “management is 
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requesting more predictive weather and graphical weather stories” that are not 
widely available or unavailable entirely. Greater coverage of inundation maps is 
one example, yet enhancement of graphical products in general is desired.  
Identified FEMA communication requirements consist of “disseminating 
data to FEMA, translating to leadership the situation and stressing the severity.” 
However, “products are not always brief friendly or produced in a manner to be 
briefed graphically.” As such, “FEMA needs a product that is simple enough to 
share vs. too complex to communicate to others if they are not weather-versed.” 
Generally speaking, review of the data identified challenges in both dissemination 
and reception of information and communication as a whole. Additionally, issues 
with communication of information and format during a large disaster and across 
multiple domains were also mentioned. Development of enhanced and relevant 
visuals according to their needs, enhanced information flow, and consolidation of 
appropriate resources is the end result for resolving these difficulties. 
Messaging, as it relates to conveying weather and hazards, also emerged as 
a common theme within the analysis. Among many of the FEMA personnel who 
completed the survey, “communicating complex information to other people with 
a wide range in experience/knowledge” is a significant responsibility within their 
role. The overall difficulty resides in needing guidance on summarizing, conveying, 
and explaining weather information to leadership, partners, and others. As one 
respondent noted, “I have trouble translating weather information into briefings 
and knowing what to show.” On a related note, product availability in other 
languages, of particular interest is Spanish varieties, is limited. Translation to 
other languages can be time consuming and tedious, assuming there is an 
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appropriate translator available. Availability of information in other languages or 
access to appropriate experts would bolster information dissemination and assist 
with the life safety and disaster assistance missions.        
In conjunction with messaging, terminology further complicates matters. 
Communicating scientific information is challenging in general, particularly for 
FEMA and partners as most do not have a science background. Many publicly 
available weather products are technical and contain jargon, shorthand, and 
acronyms that are not widely understood outside of the field. Deciphering the 
verbiage can be time consuming and hinder understanding and interpretation as 
well as conveyance. As was noted by one respondent, “it is difficult to simplify the 
technical jargon to clearly understand the impact without oversimplifying.” In 
this case, educational components along with readily available resources (i.e. – 
definitions, links, etc.) would facilitate the process along with development of more 
user friendly, less technical products designed for a laymen audience.  
Inconsistencies or conflicting information amongst weather reports, 
forecasts, and sources was a frequently specified issue. As was best summarized by 
one of the respondents, “it seems that often there will be different forecasts from 
different sources…who do you trust.” Examples provided mentioned all types of 
sources, such as the state or county, the NWS and forecasters, and the media (to 
include social media). Conflict examples of inconsistency included occurrence 
between one another (i.e. - NWS vs. media vs. other), within each sector (i.e. NWS 
vs. NWS, media vs. media) or at different levels (i.e. – National vs. Regional vs. 
State vs. local). Furthermore, “conflicting reports from the media and 
eyewitnesses” were also discussed in the data. The process of de-conflicting 
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information or reports can be overwhelming and force personnel or leadership to 
make assumptions that are erroneous, invalid, or misleading. Lastly, the widely 
known challenge of hyping or sensationalizing an event, across a wide array of 
outlets, was also mentioned in the data. The effects of engaging in such acts are 
prevalent within communication literature, culminating in reception and 
assessment of information complications and potentially influencing decision 
making negatively via apathy and/or complacency. 
Equipment and Technical 
All of the aforementioned items discussed so far in this section depend on 
the availability of technology and communications to function. In finality, although 
not directly related to weather information utilization, ‘Equipment and Technical’ 
challenges respondents identified are problematic for the transmission of 
information and data as well as the life safety mission. The components in this 
category are the least numerous yet possess the ability to significantly impede 
information flow and facilitate catastrophic communication failure. Comprised of 
‘Timeliness’, ‘Security and Compatibility’, and ‘Equipment’, these challenges, 
described in more detail below, can directly impact operational areas.   
• Timeliness: current/accurate/up to date/timely/speed of info/receiving 
info in a timely manner/timeliness/too often or too little, updated forecasts 
based on observations/pop up situations/late/delayed/no 
notifications/updates, graphics/data slow to load, websites/resources not 
updating/refreshing timely/being kept current. 
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• Security and Compatibility: firewalls/can’t use google platform, 
software/compatibility issues, interfaces/tools/systems unavailable/not 
working, too many updates/upgrades.  
• Equipment: broken/frozen gauges, technical data/hydrographs not 
available/gauge non-working, gauge accuracy/reliability, communication 
issues/loss of equipment, computers not updated/working. 
One of the most frequently encountered technical issues as indicated by 
FEMA personnel concerns website refresh rates. Respondents indicated that 
websites often do not refresh or update as they should or in a timely manner, 
sometimes requiring manual assistance. Similarly, respondents also indicated an 
issue with graphics and data intensive files being slow to load and at times even 
requiring repeated attempts to do so. Additionally, analysis revealed a seemingly 
mismatch between user desired information issuance vs. actual information 
issuance, regarding the overall timeliness of weather information availability. 
Although a wide variety of perspectives emerged, addressing a breadth of resources 
and inclusive of multiple aspects, no real consensus emerged through data 
analysis. Not enough details of the actual items in question, description of the 
problem or perceptual view was provided to address this specific challenge area. 
Nonetheless, the notion of ‘timeliness’ was repeatedly observed in the data.           
Furthermore, respondents indicated a high level of security and 
safeguarding of FEMA computing infrastructure, resulting in access to external 
systems being blocked by firewalls. Most notably mentioned was the inability to 
access the Google platform, which NOAA/NWS utilizes extensively. Along with 
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firewall restrictions, data analysis determined that strict software guidelines tend 
to cause compatibility issues. In turn, this presents an obstacle for running certain 
interfaces and tools and limiting access to some systems. Additionally, 
maintenance of such infrastructure requires a consistent flow of updates to 
implement the most current security upgrades. Although necessary, respondents 
indicated that they often result in workflow delays and a variety of potentially time-
consuming errors during the installation process.           
Lastly, within the equipment realm, not communication or infrastructure, 
respondents also discussed malfunctioning gauges and hydrograph/data issues. 
Interruption of gauge monitoring systems were indicated to be problematic for 
accurate assessment completion. For example, a non-reporting gauge in a flooded 
area inhibits impact assessment, while erroneous data may result in unexpected 
consequences. Provided the technical expertise required to address this specific 
concern and all of the challenges in this category, resolution recommendations are 
not provided for these areas.                        
Summarizing, dependence on technology availability and functional 
communication is critical. Loss of or damage to equipment or towers (i.e. - radios, 
phones, computers, etc.) and disruption of services, internet, signal, etc., poses a 
significant operational challenge. These complications often accompany disasters, 
resolution of which, even if temporary, will facilitate responders’ abilities to assist 
survivors (i.e. – repaired/replaced devices, rebuilt/re-established infrastructure, 
restoration of services, etc.). Examples where this is most valuable includes rescue 
operations, supplies (i.e. – food, water, etc.), casualties, evacuations, and life-
threatening hazards (i.e. – hazmat incidents, weather, power lines, etc.).       
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Not specifically addressed in this work, several communication influencers 
were also described in the data as contributing factors that pose a hindrance to 
effective and efficient communication, situation awareness, and decision making. 
Intermingled amongst the survey and interview feedback responses, notions 
mentioned were uncertainty, accuracy, reliability, credibility, trust, apathy, 
validation, verification, and confidence. Often affiliated with one another, these 
elements contribute to information utilization and communication (reception and 
dissemination) aspects. Ethereal by nature, these areas are difficult to overcome 
yet pervasive throughout information management and communication processes. 
Despite the inability to completely eradicate these factors, measures to limit the 
effects can be implemented.  
  One of the more widely known challenges of communicating weather and 
climate information revolves around the inherent uncertainty within forecasts. 
Review of the data identified a desire for forecast uncertainty to be explicitly 
expressed, yet many respondents indicated it was either lacking or not well 
understood. The ‘unknown’ or ‘misunderstood’ uncertainty is difficult to convey 
when communicating threats to leadership and partners. Although person 
dependent, responses indicated that sometimes leaderships’ lack of understanding 
further exacerbates the problem. While forecast uncertainty is expressed, hazard 
variance and probabilistic conveyance is challenging. Understanding is deficient 
due to the variation between hazards combined with the statistical nature of 
uncertainty. Responses indicated textual or less statistical uncertainty notions are 
of greater value and preferred as they are more easily understood. Additionally, 
complexity of such scenarios is non-trivial, yielding further complications.                
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Furthermore, forecaster/forecast confidence and within oneself in regard to 
interpretation and analysis, was also regarded as an influencing factor, along with 
accuracy among forecasts and predictions. “At FEMA there is a demand for fast, 
accurate weather information and data. Understanding the accuracy and 
limitations of forecasts is helpful for relaying information”, noted one individual. 
Provision of weather forecast accuracy in general, prior to an event, as well as event 
specific concerns enhances understanding, facilitating the communication and 
decision making processes. Beyond forecasting, accuracy along with reliability of 
information and reports/reporting is important. As one respondent noted, this is 
of particular concern for “rural areas, where timely information on conditions can 
be limited and the flow of information slow.”         
    Hazardous weather and disasters often amplify miscommunication of 
accurate, reliable information. Resulting from technological innovations and the 
rise of social media, an overabundance of information is readily available through 
a multitude of outlets, both official and non-official. Therefore, while this influx 
facilitates information collection, “validating and verifying information and 
reports in a timely manner” has been hindered. Although, official partner or media 
sources are primarily utilized by FEMA versus other open source outlets, non-
factual or unsubstantiated information and reports remain problematic. For all 
reported information, one must “determine who/where is this coming from and 
locate a source to validate it.” Likewise, trust and credibility, dependent upon 
one’s experiences, perspective, etc., among sources was also discussed within the 
data as an influencing/guiding factor, particularly as it relates to accuracy from 
their perspective.       
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 5 provided an overview of the data analysis and results from the 
surveys and interviews of FEMA personnel I conducted for this study. 
Subsequently, this chapter extends the analysis by providing additional findings 
and conclusions through an in-depth review of the results from the perspective of 
the conceptual framework I proposed in Chapter 4. In particular, this analysis and 
review focuses on the applicability of the framework at the Federal level by 
providing an initial FEMA decision making model through the phases of CEM 
including decisions/actions and influencers as assessed from the data (section 6.1), 
a discussion of identified information and communication flow and proposal of an 
adaptation of the CERC communication model applicable to FEMA (section 6.2), 
an overview of identified FEMA weather utilization (section 6.3), an overview of 
the identified FEMA situational awareness structure (section 6.4), and ending with 
findings of FEMA personnel weather usage experience and training background 
(section 6.5).  
The major questions this research sought to answer were: (1) How is 
weather information utilized within FEMA?, (2) What are the primary elements 
and influencers of FEMA leadership decision making regarding weather?, and (3) 
How can FEMA best prepare for disaster operations for weather events? To 
address these questions, I investigated the following:  
1. What is the FEMA decision making process? 
a. What are the key elements FEMA requires for decision making? 
b. What are their decisions/actions/thresholds? 
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c. What factors influence decision making?  
d. What are the policy implications? 
2. What is the communication flow of weather information at FEMA? 
a. From whom/where do they receive information? 
b. To whom/where do they disseminate information? 
c. What are the communication challenges? 
d. How can communication be improved? 
3. How does weather information influence decision making within FEMA?   
a. How do they utilize weather information? 
b. What are the critical pieces of information? Why are they critical? 
c. What information resources/channels/mechanisms do they utilize?  
d. What are the challenges associated with weather information? 
4. How does FEMA maintain situational awareness?  
a. What impacts are they most concerned about? Why those impacts 
b. What is their situational awareness structure? 
c. What are the barriers to maintaining situational awareness?  
d. How can enhanced situational awareness be accomplished? 
5. What is the status of weather knowledge and training among FEMA? 
a. What is their weather experience/background? 
b. What weather training have personnel received?  
c. What weather training is available? 
d. What weather training is needed? 
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Data collection for this study occurred through a variety of mechanisms 
including surveys, interviews, observations, literature and policy reviews, 
evaluations, and existing weather and disaster databases. Analysis of the data 
provided a vast amount of insight into these questions, from which, I was able to 
formulate a wide spectrum of FEMA weather information processes including 
utilization, communication, situation awareness and decision making. Results of 
this work provide substantial foundational knowledge to build and expand upon 
for emergency management as a whole within academia. This is particularly valid 
for FEMA, as there is currently not a substantial body of knowledge in existence.           
6.1 FEMA WEATHER DECISION MAKING THROUGH CEM PHASES 
The contribution of weather information within the decision making 
process at FEMA is fundamentally mission critical and pervasive across all areas. 
Having discussed the many relevant components and processes relevant to the 
proposed conceptual framework of FEMA decision making, this section provides 
additional context and an overview of FEMA decision making (Q#1) including: (a) 
key decision elements, (b) decisions/actions, (c) influencing factors, and (d) 
decision support/policy implications. 
6.1.1 WEATHER INFORMATION AND DECISION MAKING 
Study participants consisted of various roles across FEMA from within 
situational awareness, operations, planning, historical preservation, threat, 
hazard, and risk assessment, disaster assistance, and field operations, among other 
roles. While participants occupied various roles, usage of weather information was 
required in a multitude of ways that were positionally dependent. Based on 
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analysis, the inherent value of weather information within FEMA and among 
partners is evident. Specific to decision making, weather information was 
incorporated through a variety of decision making elements. Included among them 
are as follows:     
• Threat Monitoring: situational awareness, potential immediate/long 
term threats/impacts from upcoming weather, potential after 
affects/impacts, life safety, operational impacts, what will lead to 
secondary disasters? 
• Assessment: event/incident assessment, level/scope/severity of event, 
debris/damage assessment/management 
• Mission: field applications/relevance to impacts to FEMA operations, how 
does this impact my region/impacts for FEMA, difficult to see how FEMA 
would respond/how do ‘we’ respond 
• Support: State/local resource needs/gaps, what are the unmet needs?, 
State/local capacity, assessing necessary needed assistance, those events 
that may involve FEMA  
• Operations: prior recovery operations, effect/impacts on current 
operations, government closure, status notifications, field operations 
• Assistance: potential for declarations/requests for assistance/FMAG 
declarations/requests 
• Life Safety: travel (smoke/visibility, debris, winter weather, floods), 
ongoing operations, potential threats 
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• Resources and Personnel: people/deployments (staff RRCC, deploy 
IMAT, deploy to field offices), resource movement/supply delivery 
coordination 
Threat monitoring and assessment of, were identified as the first steps of 
the decision making process toward understanding what if any decisions need to 
be made according to the mission. The primary areas identified include needed 
support, operational impacts, disaster assistance administration, life safety, and 
resource and personnel management. First and foremost, the most significant 
factor determined regarding FEMA decision making is assessing capacity and 
providing required support to State, Territory, Tribal and local jurisdictions before, 
during and after a disaster. As a result, all of the other factors either contribute to 
or depend on the level/type of support needed. Through the assessment of an event 
or potential event, the extent of the possible disaster and impacts can be 
determined which will guide the disaster assistance process. Depending upon the 
outcome of the qualification of disaster assistance, resources and personnel can be 
allocated appropriately to establish operations accordingly. Throughout this 
process, life safety of both survivors and personnel was determined to be important 
and is continuously monitored. Additionally, threat monitoring and assessment 
was also identified as being critical before an incident occurs, to provide situational 
awareness of potential disasters and possible requested support and/or assistance 
as well as during and following a disaster for secondary impacts.               
Decision making influencers will be discussed in a follow-on section. 
However, all of the aforementioned factors emerged from the data analyses as 
contributing to the FEMA decision making process and thus require utilization and 
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a good understanding of weather and climate information and data as a whole. 
Findings revealed that different roles and phases of a disaster require different 
decisions to be made and actions to be taken. Many of these activities frequently 
happen concurrently yet can be more cyclical in nature and may be revised as 
things change or more information becomes available.  
6.1.2 DECISIONS AND ACTIONS 
Data analysis revealed that activities at FEMA constitute a vast amount of 
short- and long-term decisions and associated actions requiring different 
informational elements. Although the decision making process itself was found to 
be consistent, the decisions themselves were more fluid. Feedback discussion often 
centered on damage incurred, impacts/potential impacts, threat, and 
State/Tribe/Territory requests. Overt discussions of concrete decision thresholds 
within the data were limited as respondents indicated that decisions were often 
subjectively dependent upon various factors. A variety of aspects influenced the 
process, as is discussed in the next section, complicating the process and making 
it difficult to standardize policies and procedures. Essentially, each scenario is 
unique with different contributing factors. However, the decisions themselves 
were indicated to remain fairly constant. Based on the analysis, a preliminary 
FEMA descriptive decision making model through all stages of the disaster 
lifecycle/CEM was developed. Described below in Table 6.1, information usage and 
decisions/actions vary between CEM phases/FEMA divisions.   
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Table 6.1. Initial descriptive FEMA decision making model through CEM 
phases based on survey and interview data analysis. Created by Somer A. 
Erickson.  
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6.1.3 INFLUENCING FACTORS 
Data analysis determined that the FEMA weather decision making process 
was similar to the process for all hazards and hazard types. To start with, 
Leadership must assess the threats and determine personnel, resources, posture, 
support, and assistance needs, among others. Tasked with a critical life safety 
mission, FEMA is a highly visible entity and their efforts are profoundly 
scrutinized. Designated with a multitude of functional facets which complicate the 
decision making process, a myriad of influencing factors emerged from data 
analysis conducted and are categorized as follows: (1) organizational, (2) 
individual, (3) operational, (4) informational, (5) impact, and (6) hazard. In 
addition, new information, event occurrence, and greater needs were also 
identified as influencing actions as they may cause a change in priorities, options 
or needs (Figure 6.1).        
Hazard factors identified include the actual hazard, timing, location, 
intensity, extent, likelihood and duration. The hazard itself was determined to be 
important to guide efforts and anticipate possible needs (i.e. – hurricane vs. 
tornado). Timing and location were deemed important as they may pose further 
complicating factors, while intensity, extent, and duration contribute to possible 
impacts. Additionally, the likelihood of an event was found to influence whether to 
act or not; however, the likelihood may also cause uncertainty. As a result, this 
uncertainty was found to hinder or delay decisions. Hence, a balance among 
components must be considered as leadership indicated that some decisions are 
required before and acceptable certainty level is garnered.  
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Figure 6.1. Identified FEMA decision making influencers resulting from 
survey and interview data analysis conducted. Black arrows indicate 
influences, while gray arrows indicate a feedback loop between decisions 
and actions as needed based on new information, event occurrence or 
greatest need. Created by Somer A. Erickson.   
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Through leadership interview data analysis, FEMA involvement was found 
to depend greatly on the severity and dispersion of human impacts, with further 
identification of important factors as those that cause or have the potential to cause 
greater impacts. Impact factors identified included population, 
risk/vulnerabilities, previous disasters, critical infrastructure, life safety/life 
sustaining, and large-scale events. The greater the population, the greater potential 
impacts and assistance required, including large scale events such as major 
sporting events, concerts, political conventions, etc. Existing vulnerabilities or 
those induced by previous disasters were also deemed a concern as they pose a 
threat to life safety and affect required support. Provided that a significant portion 
of the FEMA mission is dedicated to aiding recovery towards resiliency, impacts to 
and restoration of critical infrastructure is extremely influential.     
On a related note, data analysis revealed that informational factors such as 
source, channel/mechanism, complexity/technical, uncertainty, accuracy, 
confidence and inconsistency, also influence FEMA decision making. The source 
of information was found to be related to credibility. If a decision maker believed 
one source to be more credible than another, then they perceived the information 
differently. Furthermore, uncertainty and accuracy were mentioned in the data as 
contributing to credibility, while confidence in the information provider was also 
distinguished as influencing decisions. Lastly, information inconsistencies further 
lead to uncertainty, while complex or technical information is difficult to 
understand. Misunderstanding information can lead to faulty decision making and 
subsequently negative consequences.  
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Data analysis of leadership interviews determined that translating these 
decisions into actions creates additional operational considerations including 
ongoing disasters/personnel availability, priorities, partner needs, 
logistics/distance, and personal life safety. Ongoing disasters can limit personnel 
availability at times, which may require additional support from another FEMA 
regions or headquarters. Hence varying support efforts such as life safety vs. 
stabilization were found to influence prioritization and decisions. One scenario 
provided in the data concerned logistics, as travel distance requires advanced 
consideration, decisions may need to be made on a specific timeline. For example, 
a tropical system impacting an island will cause a greater amount of logistical 
issues than a landlocked region with multiple access points. In reference to any 
operational decision, one member of leadership noted that “first and foremost is 
personal safety.”    
Furthermore, both individual and organizational factors were identified as 
influencing FEMA decision making. Individual factors revealed from the data 
analysis include experience and background, knowledge and training, perception, 
and interpretation, and comprehension. Organizational factors identified include 
policy, political considerations, roles and responsibilities, leadership, and public 
perception. The decision makers experience or background with weather 
information and events along with knowledge and training influences perception, 
interpretation, comprehension, and self-efficacy. Beyond the individual are the 
organizational influences. Roles and responsibilities of the decision maker as well 
as leadership input were discussed as guiding establishment of priorities. Often, 
these priorities are also driven by associated policy and doctrine. Additionally, 
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public perception may contribute to decisions made and actions taken in certain 
circumstances. One example provided in the data is the notion of leadership 
deploying personnel to a State for the duration of a potential incident should any 
need arise. Having on-site personnel shows solidarity with the State and is often 
viewed favorably. Furthermore, data analysis assessed the influence of politics and 
political agendas as being intertwined at the highest levels. Further review of the 
data revealed that political influence at times impedes progress, yet it also 
accelerates progress on other occasions, depending on the scenario and political 
nuances.    
All of the aforementioned factors were derived from the data as influencers 
of FEMA decision making which ultimately contributes to disaster prevention, 
support, and resiliency. In addition, this process also depends on developing and 
maintaining relevant public policies and operational procedures. Due to the 
interdisciplinary nature of disasters, emergency managers must act as liaisons 
between various departments, agencies, organizations (both non-profit and for 
profit), and the public in order to carry out the policies and procedures put forth 
in support of the FEMA mission. Review of these policies and procedures 
determined reliance on many individuals with varying levels of expertise 
requirements and whom play a major role throughout the phases of the disaster 
life cycle. 
6.1.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 A variety of decision making factors and influencers were revealed through 
the analysis. Furthermore, all of these tasks and activities link to doctrine and 
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policy. Unlike planning, which serves as a disaster support guide, policy provides 
the legal authority and formalities to accomplish such tasks. Actual discussions of 
decisions thresholds among the data were limited, but respondents implied they 
were often subjective depending upon various aspects. Although a thorough policy 
analysis was not completed for this study, a vast amount of Federal emergency 
management policy exists. Given the relationship of policy to this work, a brief 
overview of certain policies and legal authorities was discussed in Chapter 2.   
While extensive planning, exercising, and training is imperative for effective 
disaster response, it also depends on developing and maintaining relevant public 
policies and operational procedures. Political agendas complicate matters, as there 
are varying perspectives and priorities including finances and public perception. 
Emergency management is highly politicized for two reasons, (1) disaster events 
affect the public and (2) the bulk of the financial support funnels through 
government sources. Unfortunately, emergency management issues are frequently 
not a high priority for elected public officials. Due, in part, to the high level of 
uncertainty surrounding hazards and low probability of event occurrence 
compared with daily concerns within a community. Best stated by McEntire 
(2004), “the major dilemma here is that we are confronted with a choice between 
more common, but less consequential events versus infrequent, but higher impact 
occurrences.” Furthermore, McLoughlin (1985) noted that “while emergency 
management issues have to compete with other serious issues for the time and 
attention of responsible officials, decision makers must become knowledgeable of 
key issues in order to make informed policy decisions and to support the 
emergency program manager in the implementation of policy initiatives.”   
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6.2 COMMUNICATION 
Respondents indicated a need not only for situational awareness training, 
but communication training as well, as many felt they lack this skillset. 
Communication is an important element of the information-situation awareness-
decision making process. Therefore, it is important to assess the communication 
flow of weather information (Q#2) to include (a) information reception, (b) 
information dissemination, and (c) communication challenges. This section not 
only addresses these areas, but also proposes a mechanism for (d) improving 
communication.    
6.2.1 INFORMATION RECEPTION  
Numerous sources and mechanisms, as determined through assessment of 
the data, are utilized by FEMA (Figure 6.2) throughout the information and 
knowledge management, situational awareness, and decision making processes. 
Among these sources, a variety of mechanisms were utilized to access weather 
information including (1) emails/reports, (2) briefings, (3) phone, (4) 
television/radio, (5) computer/internet/websites, (6) social media, (7) 
tools/programs/software, as well as (8) personnel. This information is then further 
communicated according to the process outlined in Figure 6.3, as discerned from 
data analysis. The two primary sets of FEMA personnel involved in this process 
were determined to be FEMA Watchstanders and FEMA Leadership (i.e. – 
administrators, division directors, etc.). In addition, field operations personnel 
also contribute to this process when active/deployed. Externally, 
States/Tribes/Territories and other partners/ESFs were found to be the primary 
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core partnerships through which information is communicated through. Data 
review indicated that, typically, the ESFs do so as standalone entities, while local 
emergency managers communicate information to the State/Tribe/Territory, who 
communicates it to FEMA. Some of the supporting ESF agencies may also work 
with the public (i.e. – the Red Cross). Local officials connect with the public as well, 
as do States/Tribes/Territories indirectly through local jurisdictions, media 
events, community meetings, etc.  
 
Figure 6.2: FEMA information mechanisms resulting from survey and 
interview data analysis conducted. Created by Somer A. Erickson. 
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Figure 6.3: FEMA communication process based on survey and interview 
data analysis conducted. Solid black arrows indicate communication flow, 
while the dashed black arrow indicates indirect communication and the red 
dashed arrow indicates a disconnect. Created by Somer A. Erickson. 
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6.2.2 INFORMATION DISSEMINATION  
FEMA respondents indicated directly disseminating information to 
partners/ESFs and States/Tribes/Territories. From there, relevant information is 
disseminated onward to local jurisdictions. However, respondents indicated that a 
breakdown sometimes occurs in passing information along to local officials having 
the State/Tribe/Territory as the conduit and vice versa. FEMA not directly 
communicating with local officials, at times results in information that is ‘lost in 
translation’. Additionally, while the public may have to work with FEMA after a 
disaster, FEMA has not historically communicated well with the public. 
Information is primarily passed to the local jurisdictions through the 
State/Tribe/Territory to be disseminated to the public. Personnel indicated during 
data collection that a lack of effective communication has led to misconceptions of 
programs, support availability, etc. Consequentially, communication between the 
public and FEMA was one area for improvement identified during data analysis to 
facilitate greater understanding of what FEMA provides. Doing so would provide 
critical information to better prepare the public by enhancing awareness of disaster 
assistance programs, qualifications, procedures, and timelines to more effectively 
manage expectations. Enhanced FEMA communication could also ease the 
negative perception that is frequently conveyed about the agency. Not all, but many 
issues and concerns from the public could be remedied. Doing so before an event 
when communication is more readily available would be most effective, rather than 
after when communication mechanisms are compromised. Ideally, people should 
not receive such information for the first time during and after an event. However, 
communication during and after an event remains an important function.    
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Extending beyond dissemination, it is important to listen and have two-way 
communication. FEMA personnel indicated there is no formal, widely available 
mechanism or process in place to collect feedback, answer questions or address 
information requests from the publics, aside from Disaster Recovery Centers 
(DRC) instituted after an event to assist survivors and National Processing Service 
Centers (NPC) designated to register survivor applicants for assistance. Currently, 
information is collected more ad-hoc through media and social media outlets, and 
various engagement opportunities through committees, groups, functions, etc. 
Any feedback that is acquired may or may not be properly reviewed or considered 
by relevant personnel. However, there are several logistical obstacles hindering 
implementation of a standardized feedback collection system. While all of the 
communication channels available today (i.e. – social media) make it is easier to 
reach a greater number of individuals, it is far more difficult to address a large 
quantity of specific inputs. It can also be difficult to serve a variety of audiences as 
FEMA deals with multiple publics. Inundation of data would likely ensue requiring 
management of elicited feedback. Compilation, review, assessment, sorting, 
distribution, and delegation of the input would require additional personnel, 
resources, and support. None of which were identified as readily available.        
6.2.3 COMMUNICATION CHALLENGES  
Additional communication challenges identified via data analysis include 
(1) visuals, (2) messaging, (3) terminology, (4) dissemination and format, and (5) 
inconsistency. More thoroughly discussed in Chapter 5, this section provides a 
brief overview and extension of the communication challenges as described below.    
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• Visuals: visual graphics not available/not the graphics needed, better 
graphics/visuals/with radar/not user-friendly products/graphics, colors 
are difficult to read/color coding, need timing across region/states, region 
specific information/graphics/just my area of responsibility.  
• Messaging: convey information and impacts/effective communication of 
threats/explain/brief weather/models in briefings/reports to senior 
leadership/others, knowing what to include/pass along and not to, 
summarizing products/information, language barriers/more Spanish 
products/translating information and severity.  
• Terminology: complex information, technical forecasts/scientific 
lingo/too much use of technical jargon/have to spend time deciphering the 
language, use of acronyms, shorthand used in products, need definitions.  
• Dissemination and Format: dissemination of information in an easy to 
understand/more user-friendly format/easy to understand 
information/format, dissemination during a large geographic response, 
providing and receiving important information, preparing for 
dissemination/briefings/reports, communication in general, jurisdiction 
issues/who reports what. 
• Inconsistency: conflicting/varying/inconsistent messages/information 
between NWS/media/state/county, forecasters providing conflicting 
information/interpretation from different forecasters, conflicting reports 
from media/eyewitnesses, hype/sensationalism/inflation/overexcitement 
of media/partners/leadership, etc., de-conflicting info. 
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Weather graphics across the board are not consistent in terms of format, 
color schemes, availability, etc. They are also not publicly available to meet specific 
users’ needs. Currently, there are no widely available graphics or forecasts 
specifically tailored to and designed for FEMA regional areas. This shortfall 
requires personnel to compile information from a multitude of sources, interpret 
and analyze accordingly as relevant, and utilize multiple visuals to depict the 
overall scenario. These activities take both time and resources to conduct and allow 
for potential human error. Given the non-meteorological background of most 
participants yet provided the critical role of communicating weather information, 
this was identified as a primary challenge along with messaging and terminology. 
Data analysis highlighted the lack of adequate weather training among 
FEMA respondents with limited to no background experience working with 
weather products and subsequent terminology, nor do they possess an 
understanding of basic weather concepts and phenomena. Weather products are 
often complex and highly technical, making use of acronyms and sometimes 
shorthand. As such, it can be difficult for FEMA to understand the information, 
translate it, and communicate it. Adding to this conflict, respondents described 
encountering informational inconsistencies. Observationally speaking, 
inconsistencies or perceived inconsistencies of weather information and sources 
can be rampant at times, further complicated by hype. Emotional inputs or 
over/under excitement from the weather community were determined as 
influencers that can confuse and impact FEMA decision making, actions, and 
operations, especially if wide spread variations exist amongst source outlets or 
personnel.           
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Several additional communication elements were also identified via data 
analysis as influencing factors for communication perception. These include (1) 
uncertainty, (2) accuracy, (3) confidence, (4) trust, (5) credibility, (6) reliability, 
(7) validation and verification, and (8) apathy. Establishing trust and credibility is 
widely known to be important within the communication literature along with 
reliability. However, as weather is not an exact science, uncertainty, accuracy and 
confidence complicate matters. These complications motivate personnel to 
validate and verify information and data through other sources, which may aid in 
resolution or further hinder the disparity. Furthermore, repeated null or perceived 
null events also lead to apathy amongst all users, made more complex by each 
individual’s perspective and perception.   
6.2.4 COMMUNICATION IMPROVEMENTS: FEMA AND CERC 
FEMA occupies the unique role to facilitate disaster management activities, 
yet they also serve as a ‘crisis manager’ of sorts. Although they are not responsible 
for the disaster event happening, they are often blamed for various components. 
The aforementioned discussed communication gaps contribute to this 
misunderstanding, consequently damaging their credibility. These gaps remain 
constant and therefore continually perpetuate a negative reputation. As such, 
communication is important for both public information, and reputation 
management. In the case of FEMA, while they are not at risk of losing profits per 
say, there are implications with regards to their ability to effectively serve the 
public, assist survivors, and complete their mission.             
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FEMA could enhance mission critical activities, public perception, and 
program utilization by more effectively communicating their mission (i.e. – what 
do they do?), processes and procedures (how do they do it?), timeframes (i.e. – 
deliverables), and Federal, State/Tribe/Territory and local efforts and activities 
(i.e. – ongoing efforts). Not only would this assist the public, but also the media, 
partners, etc. A communication process needs to be implemented across all phases 
and levels of emergency management to advance the FEMA mission of assisting 
those impacted by disasters through increased awareness of what can, what is, and 
what will be accomplished in order to elicit appropriate actions.    
In the public health sector, practitioners from the CDC in conjunction with 
academic subject matter experts developed the Crisis and Emergency Risk 
Communication (CERC) framework (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). The CERC 
model is a good fit to be utilized in conjunction with CEM as it covers a broad 
spectrum of areas and is inclusive of all phases. Combining elements of both 
structures, a guiding framework for communication practices within FEMA and 
emergency management is proposed (Table 6.2). This proposed communication 
model serves as a companion to the descriptive decision making model discussed 
in the previous section. Adoption of the CERC model in emergency management 
for weather hazards would streamline communication across all stakeholders. It 
would also provide a structured framework that can be utilized for a variety of 
threats beyond weather and health hazards. In applying this model within 
emergency management, FEMA would be a good lead agency for the field as the 
CDC is for public health professionals. Along with training components, this model 
aims to improve communication effectiveness.    
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Table 6.2: Adaptation of the Crisis and Emergency Risk (CERC) model for 
FEMA implementation based on Reynolds & Seeger (2014) as proposed by 
Somer A. Erickson.   
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While public health and weather events are very different types of hazards, 
they present similar yet complex communication challenges. Both types of hazards 
must be managed through varying phases of risk and crisis. As is the case with 
health threats, when dealing with weather threats it can be difficult to motivate 
people to action before the threat emerges. Once a threat is imminent for either 
threat type, additional information is required for awareness and life safety. 
Realization of a threat then brings about additional response or support with 
continued communication and information flow to elicit appropriate actions. 
Following a health threat or weather event it is important to assess what happened 
and evaluate communication and operational activities to identify ways to advance 
support and improve communication mechanisms.                              
 Following from risk and crisis communication and management and the 
nature of disasters, efforts in line with pieces of the CERC model are already 
utilized across the emergency management spectrum. However, they are done so 
on a less consistent and much more haphazard basis. Given the similarities 
between both health and weather threats, the CERC model is applicable for 
weather hazards, but has not been widely utilized in this capacity. Utilization of the 
CERC framework for weather threats is particularly valuable within emergency 
management and FEMA. It is within these associated agencies that all levels of 
public safety officials not only respond to and manage events but also must prepare 
and inform their jurisdictions for potential or impending threats. Maintaining 
communication with all types of stakeholders throughout all phases of a threat and 
event is crucial for success of the mission.  
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The CERC model emphasizes six communication principles: (1) Be First, (2) 
Be Right, (3) Be Credible, (4) Express Empathy, (5) Promote Action, and (6) Show 
Respect (Reynolds & Seeger, 2012). Each of these components are important for 
effective risk and crisis communication. However, sometimes these priorities 
conflict with one another and one may have to decide which one(s) are more 
important or feasible. For example, it can be difficult to be first with information if 
an event occurs or a threat has materialized. Additionally, there might be a tradeoff 
between being first and being right. Nevertheless, communicating relevant 
information in any capacity is still valuable. Reception of information is also going 
to depend on the publics’ perception of the source of information, agencies or 
entities involved, among other areas. For this reason, working together as a team 
and showing solidarity with one another in all forms of public communication 
serves to increase the impact and strengthen credibility. Doing so will also provide 
a venue for standardized, consistent messaging vs. conflicting or mixed messages. 
In congruence with the underpinnings and based on the nuances within the 
emergency management sector, the following modifications to the overarching 
guiding principles of the CERC model are proposed: 
1. Be Timely (First): Make sure to communicate facts in a timely manner.  
First is best, yet not at the expense of accuracy. FEMA is often not the first 
to communicate, as they are not the originator, but rather a supporter.  
2. Be Honest (Right/Credible): Being right, honest establishes credibility. 
Be sure to include what is known and what isn’t and when it might be.  
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3. Be Empathetic (Show Respect): Be sure to express empathy/show 
respect as survivors have suffered a trauma and are likely emotional. 
Convey what actions are being conducted.    
4. Be Informative (Promote Action): Provide relevant information 
regarding available assistance and support along with action-oriented 
information (self-efficacy/uncertainty). 
5. Be Understandable: Know your audience, use common terminology and 
include appropriate personnel and partners.  
Utilizing CERC is this context and narrowing the principles from six to five 
makes it a bit easier for practitioners to remember and enforce. There was also 
some overlap between some of the existing principles, as such, relevant areas were 
combined when possible. In addition, some of the principle’s titles were changed 
to more accurately reflect the topic of each and ease memorization. These newly 
proposed changes provide a more refined, robust set of guiding principles for more 
effective communication throughout the disaster lifecycle. In conjunction with the 
adaptation proposed in Table 6.2, the results of these proposed modifications offer 
further advancement and utilization of the CERC model within FEMA and 
emergency management. Furthermore, CERC coincides well with the National 
Incident Management System and National Response Framework, previously 
discussed, which provides the general template for the management and structure, 
respectively, for all types of incidents nationwide. 
Furthermore, for emergency management and FEMA, the CEM framework 
accounts for the CERC stages differently, yet can be categorized within. 
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Accordingly, the pre-disaster stage includes mitigation and preparedness, the 
disaster onset stage includes preparedness and response, the disaster ongoing 
stage includes response and recovery, and the resolution stage includes recovery 
and mitigation. The final stage evaluation is not specifically accounted for as a CEM 
phase, although it is present in various forms throughout and often carried out 
following a disaster. To highlight the importance of evaluation throughout all 
phases, and the value of incorporating those findings back into operations, 
activities, and efforts, I propose adding evaluation as a component within the CEM 
phases (Figure 6.4).         
 
Figure 6.4: Adaptation of Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) 
based on NGA (1979) as proposed by Somer A. Erickson.  
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6.3 FEMA WEATHER UTILIZATION 
Existing literature suggests that misaligned disaster responses are often 
associated with information shortfalls. However, all types of threats, hazards, and 
disasters involve utilization of weather information in some capacity, regardless of 
cause. As such, weather information and data are a critical element of FEMA 
decision making. To gain an understanding of how weather information influences 
FEMA decision making (Q#3), it is important to understand information (a) 
utilization, (b) requirements, (c) sources, and (d) challenges.   
6.3.1 WEATHER INFORMATION UTILIZATION 
Starting with utilization of weather information, the six primary areas 
identified in the data analysis include (1) situational awareness, (2) analysis and 
assessment, (3) communication, (4) planning, (5) disaster assistance, and (6) 
decision making. Further described below, each area consisted of several 
additional refinements for each category. The details of which were previously 
discussed in Chapter 5.     
• Situational Awareness: Monitoring, Reporting, Briefings, Life safety of 
field personnel/Impact on operations, and Climate/Trends/Patterns.  
• Analysis and Assessment: Interpretation, GIS mapping/modelling, 
Risk Assessment, Hazard Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Damage 
Assessment. 
• Communication: communication infrastructure, development, 
information dissemination, and Messaging/Outreach. 
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• Planning: Crisis planning, Deliberate planning, Hazard Mitigation 
planning, Continuity of Operations (COOP) planning, and 
Develop/conduct exercise scenarios 
• Disaster Assistance: Preliminary Damage Assessments, Develop Event 
Summaries, and grant determinations/eligibility.  
• Decision Making: Posture/Activation, Resource allocation, Assess 
needed support/Mission Assignments, and Field applications. 
Through inspection of the data, weather information utilization across the 
agency was found to be considerable and significant. It was determined that 
virtually all FEMA types of personnel are required to utilize weather information. 
Assessment revealed that each positional role utilizes weather information for 
different goals and at varying levels of complexity. One of the underlying yet 
extremely critical elements FEMA personnel utilize weather information for is to 
maintain situational awareness amongst FEMA and partners. Associated with the 
situational awareness component, communication of such information to a variety 
of users was also determined as important. More technical or advanced users 
within the agency indicated requiring weather information and data for more 
refined analysis, assessment, and mapping. All of which supports planning efforts, 
mitigation measures, determination of disaster assistance qualifications and 
eligibility, and overall decision making.       
As weather information is essential across all phases of disaster, a brief 
overview of weather information utilization within FEMA is provided as follows, 
according to CEM phase:  
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Mitigation 
During this phase, meteorological data is utilized to assess hazards in an 
area and when combined with vulnerabilities, understand the potential impacts. 
Jurisdictions use these risk assessments to identify and prioritize any necessary 
projects and formulate or modify relevant policies and/or plans accordingly.     
Preparedness 
During this phase, weather information is utilized to assist emergency 
management and the public alike. Emergency management officials utilize 
weather information for planning purposes, based on the risk assessment, and for 
conducting outreach with the public. Planning activities support response efforts 
by ensuring a coordinated response while educating the public regarding the 
hazards they face and precautions to take for their safety.     
Response 
When the need arises to respond to an incident, monitoring weather 
conditions is necessary to ensure safety and identify any additional threats for both 
responders and survivors. Weather information is also used to determine required 
response level and provide any necessary support and assistance.   
Recovery 
As in mitigation, meteorological data and associated risk assessment during 
recovery can identify any new projects and assist with formulation or modification 
of plans/policies accordingly. It also aids in the effort to restore communities after 
an event has occurred and rebuild them more resiliently. 
205 
6.3.2 INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS 
Information requirements identified consisted of four primary components 
(1) weather information, (2) non-weather information (i.e. – environmental), (3) 
communication items, and (4) impacts. Each component consisted of additional 
sub-components, as listed below. Furthermore, an extensive amount of specific 
informational requirements emerged from the data which are categorized within 
each sub-component which were previously discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.   
• Weather Information: Historical Data, Forecast/Predictions, Current 
Conditions/Situation Overview  
• Non-weather information: General Information, Time of year, 
Confidence/Uncertainty, Topography/Terrain, Flood maps/plains, 
Levee/Lock/Dam data 
• Communication: Visuals, Overviews/Summaries, Outreach/Education 
• Impacts: Consequence Management, Life Safety, Human, Critical 
Infrastructure, Property Damage, Insurance Losses, Environmental, 
Agriculture and Livestock, and Economic. 
Identified weather information requirements were easily categorized into 
(1) historical data, (2) current conditions, and (3) forecasts/predictions. Related 
to, but not comprised within the weather information component were a few 
additional non-weather factors, to include those within the environmental system 
(i.e. – what, where, time of year, etc.). This sub-component also included areas 
such as topography, flood plains, levee systems, etc. As information was 
determined to be communicated to a variety of audiences and users, elements of 
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communication were also implicated as requirements, such as (1) visuals, (2) 
verbiage, and (3) outreach products. Lastly, provided the mission of FEMA, impact 
information was crucial for decision making and action taking. Discussed more 
extensively in Chapter 5 and below, the overall impact components included life 
safety along with infrastructure and property damage.  
6.3.3 SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
A multitude of sources to acquire weather information and data were 
referenced by FEMA respondents, as depicted in Figure 6.5. Primarily, the internet 
and television were listed as the most frequently accessed mechanisms along with 
partners (i.e. – NWS, States, ESFs, etc.). The distribution of sources and 
mechanisms is a reflection of personal preference, role and responsibility, 
tasks/goals, along with location and conditions present when accessing weather 
information. For example, field personnel conducting damage assessments were 
determined as more inclined to utilize phone apps for personal/life safety vs. a 
Watchstander who monitors all venues of information from a specialized, uniquely 
designed, and technologically advanced facility.        
• NWS: National, Region, and Local websites, calls, briefings, and tools  
• Television/Radio: local and national 
• Social Media: Facebook and twitter 
• State EM offices: web systems, EM calls, and local officials 
• Private sector: internet, apps, and software   
• Open source media: photos and videos  
• Apps: FEMA, Local/national media, and private sector  
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• FEMA: briefings, reports, liaisons, and the field  
• Other Agencies: USGS, USDA, USFS, USACE, NASA, NWCG, NIFC 
 
Figure 6.5: FEMA sources of information resulting from survey and interview 
data analysis conducted. Created by Somer. A. Erickson. (Note: National 
(NA), Regional (RE), Local (LO), Facebook (FB), Twitter (TW), Weather (WX), 
Other (OT)). 
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6.3.4 WEATHER INFORMATION CHALLENGES 
Multiple sources of information and communication mechanisms can be 
helpful, yet they can also pose a challenge for navigation, communication and 
information collection, processing, and management. The most frequently 
mentioned issue was locating information and navigating resources. Many 
respondents indicated that there was too much information, that it was not always 
well understood where to get it from, and that they had to collect information from 
too many different resources. Once information is located, it was also determined 
that it is not always well understood, as they had difficulty interpreting and 
analyzing the information and subsequently communicating the information. As 
FEMA regional offices are nationally and regionally based, they are not usually 
located in the disaster area or are as familiar with an area as would be ideal. This 
adds an extra layer of complication to correctly assessing a situation as some of the 
demographics, vulnerabilities, and local nuances may not be easily or adequately 
captured or accounted for in the decision making process. Beyond these 
components, equipment and technical issues proved to be a challenge either 
preventing access or stymieing the process. Although equipment and technical 
issues along with website design complexities are difficult to overcome beyond the 
organizational level, both internally and externally, other problem areas identified 
can be addressed through training, decision support, and enhanced product 
development.        
• Resource Navigation: data collection, resource availability, too many 
resources, and products and alerts 
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• Knowledge and Understanding: roles and services, prioritizing 
hazards and threats, weather phenomena and basic meteorology concepts, 
weather phenomena, and education and training 
• Interpretation, Trends and Analysis: informational and geographical, 
interpretation, analysis, demographics and vulnerabilities, and impacts 
• Communication: visuals, inconsistency, dissemination and format, 
messaging, and terminology 
• Equipment and Technical: timeliness, security and compatibility, and 
equipment 
6.4 FEMA SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Maintaining situational awareness was deemed instrumental throughout 
the decision making process and CEM phases. As such, it is important to 
understand how FEMA maintains situation awareness (Q#4) to include (a) 
important impacts, (b) situational awareness structure, (c) barriers, and (d) 
improving situation awareness. This section not only addresses these areas, but 
also proposes recommendations for (d) improving situation awareness within 
FEMA.    
6.4.1 IMPACTS 
Not only has weather information been deemed an important component of 
FEMA decision making, but impacts as well, as they contribute significantly to 
situational awareness for potential response. Impacts significantly drive 
emergency management and FEMA activities, which guides and facilitates the 
decision making process. Primarily discussed within the data were impacts that 
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influence life safety and sustainability, hinder response and recovery operations, 
and preclude resiliency. Although assessed among different weather hazard types 
(i.e. – winter, severe, etc.), data analysis revealed general similarities in the results. 
Consequence management as a whole was referenced, to include analysis, overall 
impacts, and areas of impact (Figure 6.6). Some respondents discussed these 
aspects in more general terms, while others provided specific details. Two main 
areas identified include life safety/human impacts and infrastructure/structural 
damage. In addition, there was also mention of environmental, agricultural, and 
economic impacts along with discussion of insured vs. uninsured losses in 
reference to the NFIP. A more detailed discussion of impacts is also provided in 
Chapter 5.      
 
Figure 6.6: FEMA impact concerns resulting from survey and interview data 
analysis conducted. Created by Somer A. Erickson. 
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• Consequence Management: analysis, overall impacts, areas of impact 
• Life/public safety, life sustaining, threat to public, lives/mass 
casualties/life losses, personnel/field safety 
o public health/healthcare 
o evacuations, routes, transportation, ability to evacuate in time 
o mass care: sheltering needs, survivors, evacuees, food and water  
o stranded people/water rescues/rescue operations 
o emergency services/medical care 
• Human impacts: communities/population centers/people/urban 
areas/rural areas, affected/displaced/homes displaced, 
vulnerabilities/functional needs  
• Critical Infrastructure: schools, hospitals/medical, dam/levee 
breeches/failures, transportation (roads, barges, rivers, ports, railroads, 
airports, shipping, closures, navigation), utilities (nuclear, oil and gas, 
electric generation/power outages/downed lines, water and sewer) 
• Property/homes/damage/protection of property/structure 
damage/amount of debris/debris management 
• Individual vs. public losses, NFIP/uninsured 
damage/rebuilding per NFIP/compliance 
• Environment impacts 
• Loss of livestock/animals/pets/agriculture/plant impacts 
• Economic impact/private sector/lost businesses 
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6.4.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS STRUCTURE 
The situation awareness process consists of three primary stages (1) 
perception, (2) comprehension and (3) projection (Endsley 1988), utilizing inputs 
from the environment and decisions/actions as outputs. Included within the 
conceptual framework I proposed in this study, the information system serves as 
the mechanism that processes environmental inputs to produce standardized, 
refined, and explainable inputs for the situation awareness process. Furthermore, 
the situation awareness structure refers to the overall system in place to support 
and maintain situational awareness, with communication pivotal throughout.   
 
Figure 6.7: FEMA situational awareness structure as determined from survey 
and interview data analysis conducted. Dashed blue line indicates the 
separation between inputs and application as well as a transition from non-
leadership to leadership roles. Created by Somer A. Erickson. 
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Maintaining situational awareness is a significant function within FEMA, in 
fact it is incorporated into the NRF (2008). Comprehensive, timely, and 
understandable information and visuals were deemed imperative for FEMA 
decision making. Incorporating a variety of elements, partners, and sources, the 
system is designed to ensure effective, efficient, and consistent processing, output, 
and flow. Based on data analysis, the overall FEMA situational awareness structure 
(Figure 6.7) relies primarily on Watchstanders and field personnel to manage the 
information and produce systematic outputs for Leadership. The structure relies 
heavily on information and knowledge management processes and utilizes 
WebEOC software, a Crisis Information Management System (CIMS), as a 
repository.   
The FEMA information management process identified consist of five 
primary elements (1) monitor, (2) collect, (3) interpret, (4) analyze, and (5) 
disseminate (Figure 6.8). These elements are congruent with the Incident 
Command System (ICS) which (1) collects (monitor and collect), (2) evaluates 
(interpret and analyze), and (3) disseminates information (DHS, 2017c). A variety 
of information sources are monitored throughout this continuous process. Data 
and information are collected, interpreted, and analyzed from among the various 
sources as relevant. The newly created information is then compiled and 
disseminated. Once received by leadership, the information is then processed into 
knowledge and situational awareness through the three stages of (1) perception, 
(2) comprehension, and (3) projection (Endsley 1988).   
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Figure 6.8: Continuous and constant FEMA information management cycle 
as determined from survey and interview data analysis conducted. Created 
by Somer A. Erickson. 
6.4.3 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS BARRIERS 
Identified barriers in maintaining situational awareness consist of a variety 
of aspects ranging from issues associated with knowledge and information to 
perception and comprehension to technological. First, knowing what sources to 
monitor and what to monitor was a concern as something might be missed or 
overlooked. In relation, it was identified that being able to navigate resources in a 
timely manner as well as determine availability of required information was 
important. Inability to locate information or impacts or unavailable information 
or impacts hinders the overall process. Too many resources complicates the 
process further, timewise, and injects uncertainty. Likewise, too much or too little 
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information produces the same results. Once information is located, having an 
understanding of basic weather concepts and terminology for appropriate 
interpretation and analysis is critical. In addition, analysis and projection depend 
on knowledge of geographical and topographical features along with 
demographics, vulnerabilities, and local nuances. Furthermore, the 
communication and dissemination of information throughout this process was 
deemed essential in the data, yet can be problematic due to inconsistencies, lack of 
relevant/understandable visual displays, and overall effective communication 
practices. Furthermore, all of these identified areas can be compounded by 
technological and equipment failures as well as incompatibility between partner 
systems and vice versa.    
Further complicating this process, Watchstanders, field personnel, and 
leadership all indicated receiving information from a variety of sources and 
mechanisms. Respondents also identified as having different experiences and 
training backgrounds, which further contributes to their interpretation, 
perception, comprehension, and projection as relevant. Some of these influences 
overlap among the three groups which allows additional opportunities for the 
system to breakdown. If something breaks or is incorrectly interpreted, analyzed, 
applied, or conveyed, the error could be perpetuated to the decision making and 
action stages with potentially devastating results. Additionally, uncertainty can 
result from a number of factors, such as weather information, understanding and 
comprehension, interpretation and analysis, projection, etc. Effectively 
communicating this uncertainty can also be quite difficult as well as managing it 
during the decision making process.           
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6.4.4 IMPROVED SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
Enhanced mechanisms for ensuring and maintaining 365/24/7 effective 
situational awareness were put into place following Hurricane Katrina as a result 
of PKEMRA (2007). Since then, FEMA has been working to standardize the 
facilities, personnel, functions, operations, policies, and procedures. Two problem 
areas identified in this study were standardization differences and training. 
Regions with fully functional, operational, and dedicated ‘Watch’ centers, were 
observationally notably more knowledgeable, thorough, skillful, and proactive in 
comparison to those that are not. Thus far, six of the ten regions plus headquarters 
have been standardized, leaving four regions more vulnerable. Some of the 
elements of the standardization effort continues; however, leadership has since 
changed along with priorities and budgets. Emphasis on continuation of the full 
standardization process to remain a priority is recommended to enhance 
situational awareness for those four regions and to better serve FEMA partners 
and constituents. Not only would this assist with situational awareness in those 
areas, but since the agency/regions are interconnected, it would enhance 
communication, situational awareness, and decision making agency wide.  
Additionally, despite weather playing such a crucial role for the FEMA 
mission, weather experience and training is lacking within the agency with limited 
access and availability. Training development and requirements provide the 
necessary knowledge and skills required for working with weather. However, 
varying types of training and exercises is needed for the different levels and users. 
The training developed in conjunction with this study and discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7, serves as a foundational module for all types of personnel. Shorter, 
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topic-based components designed for leadership in order to better serve their 
limited time availability and informational requirements have also been developed 
and are starting to be piloted. Assessment also revealed the need for an advanced 
module for higher end GIS, data intensive, analytical, and technical users as well 
as refresher modules for personnel to maintain currency. The latter two modules 
are currently in development. Furthermore, awareness through participants, 
announcements, and conducted offerings has grown, garnering interest in 
adaption and tailoring of these weather training modules for other audiences, 
which I have also addressed and continue to do so upon request.       
6.5 FEMA WEATHER EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING 
First and foremost, training was determined to be an integral component of 
the initially proposed communication, situation awareness and decision making 
conceptual framework (Figure 4.1). As such, primary emphasis was placed on 
understanding current weather experience of FEMA personnel, training 
availability, and potential needs to support development of training elements. 
Chapter 7 discusses the weather training development in more refined detail. 
However, this section provides an overview of the overall status of weather 
knowledge and training among FEMA personnel (Q#5), based on survey and 
interview data analysis, including: (a) experience, (b) previous training, (c) 
available training, and (d) needed training. 
6.5.1 EXPERIENCE AND BACKGROUND 
Experience and/or background play an important role in the decision 
making process as contributing factors of risk perception. Additionally, education 
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also effects interpretation, comprehension, and understanding of the threat and 
decisional outcomes. Experience wise, of the defined ranges, ~40% overall 
indicated having five years or less of weather experience, with ~15% indicating 
more than twenty-five years, most of whom indicated military tenures (Table 6.3). 
Educationally, ~83% of survey participants had acquired at least a bachelor’s 
degree (Bachelor’s ~46%, Master’s ~37%, Doctorate ~1%), with ~12% less than. 
WEATHER EXPERIENCE TOTAL 
Less than 1 year 11% 
1 to 5 years 29% 
6 to 10 years 15% 
9 to 15 years 16% 
16 to 20 years 3% 
21 to 25 years 7% 
More than 25 years 15% 
No Response 3% 
Table 6.3: Total survey participants weather information usage experience 
based on results from the data analysis conducted.  
6.5.2 WEATHER TRAINING RECEIVED  
Although educated with some weather usage experience, the lack of formal 
weather training among survey participants was evident. The majority of 
participants (~82%) listed ‘on the job’ experience via other colleagues (~53%) or 
self-taught through ‘trial and error’ (~29%) as their primary sources for weather 
knowledge. Further supporting the need for development of educational weather 
components, only 4% had received formal weather training (Table 6.4) via the 
NWS SkyWarn program, a state emergency management conference, and/or one 
of the military branches (army, navy, air force, marines, coast guard, national 
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guard, etc.). Furthermore, although not necessarily representative of FEMA 
Leadership in general due to small sample size (N = 8), those personnel whom 
participated in the interviews also did not indicate having a vast amount of weather 
training. However, they did all indicate having weather experience or background 
for at least fifteen years or more.  
WEATHER TRAINING TOTAL 
Colleagues/On the job training  53% 
Self-taught/Trial and error 29% 
Formal weather training 4% 
None 5% 
No Response 6% 
Other: SkyWarn Spotter Training (2), 
Military (2), State EM Conference 4% 
Table 6.4: Total survey participants weather training sources based on 
results from the data analysis conducted.  
6.5.3 WEATHER TRAINING AVAILABLE 
 Review of existing literature, emergency management related degree 
programs, and FEMA training doctrine, yielded a few available weather training 
options, with far fewer geared towards emergency management officials. Some 
modules were designed to be topic specific (i.e. – tornadoes, hurricanes, etc.), 
while others were inclusive of all hazards. One of the more robust options for 
emergency managers is the ‘OK-First’ program developed and conducted through 
the Oklahoma Mesonet. Offered as in resident courses primarily for state and local 
personal, the course is limited in scope and does not address the needs of FEMA 
personnel.  
220 
The University Corporation for Atmospheric Research (UCAR) in Boulder, 
Colorado, also hosts a more inclusive weather module entitled “Anticipating 
Hazardous Weather and Community Risk”, that is offered via online. FEMA 
incorporated this module as part of the online Independent Study (IS) course suite 
through the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) (IS-2.71) (FEMA, 2019a). 
EMI also offers a few additional topic specific weather courses via online and in-
resident. More recently, since 2010, the FEMA sponsored National Disaster 
Preparedness Training Center (NPTC) located with the University of Hawai’i, has 
also developed topic specific weather modules for emergency management and 
related disciplines. All of these aforementioned training options are also suited 
more towards local and state officials, as many are too specific and technical. 
Additionally, some of the degree programs offer weather education elements, but 
not all do currently, are limited, and not always required.  
6.5.4 WEATHER TRAINING NEEDS 
At FEMA, weather training needs were determined to differ slightly 
between user types, dependent on roles and responsibilities. For example, GIS 
personnel require data intensive modules that most others do not. Some need 
more understanding, while others need more navigation. Leadership also has 
different needs than others further complicating training development. Non-
leadership personnel primarily requested a three to five day in-resident course 
covering all hazards. The online format of the UCAR/EMI weather module is 
helpful for accessibility, yet the in-resident format of an OK-First like program is 
generally preferred due to the more technical subject matter, availability of subject 
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matter experts, and greater access to real-world scenarios. However, leadership 
personnel who are also in need of weather training, will not attend such time 
intensive offerings. As such, hearing their concerns of time, needs, demands, and 
span of responsibility, alternative educational mechanisms are being employed. 
The next chapter (Ch. 7) discusses operationalization of the FEMA training 
component inclusive of understanding weather information and phenomena, as 
well as navigating resources, with discussion focused on data analysis, 
development of curriculum, and course evaluation assessment. As weather is such 
a vital part of disaster operations, yet lacking in educational components among 
emergency management, particularly FEMA, it is my intent to continue to develop 
training modules addressing various meteorological elements to be included as 
part of the FEMA Qualification System (FQS) that has recently undergone 
significant creation and revision.                 
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CHAPTER 7: FEMA WEATHER AND CLIMATE TRAINING  
This chapter provides an overview of the resultant “Weather and Climate 
for Situational Awareness” training I developed for FEMA personal and partners 
as determined from the data analysis. This chapter starts with discussion of 
additional data collection, analysis, and findings of weather topics of interest 
assessed from the data analysis (section 7.1), weather information 
personnel/respondents are unable to locate (section 7.2), data analysis indications 
of weather information they do not understand (section 7.3), and skillsets 
respondents hope to acquire regarding weather usage (section 7.4). Section 7.5 
provides an overview of the training I developed, followed by a discussion of the 
After Action Review (AAR) I conducted from course evaluations and discussions I 
administered in conjunction with course offerings (section 7.6).    
Survey respondents were asked to identify items within four primary areas: 
(1) topics of interest, (2) items they are unable to locate, (3) areas they do not 
understand, and (4) skills they hope to acquire. Expectedly, some redundancy 
exists among these categories versus those previously discussed and some overlap 
amongst each other. Overall, the data analysis of responses for this section 
validated findings from other sections and allowed for different categorization and 
hence comparison. The ideas discussed furthers the notions discussed previously 
and provides a foundation from which to build FEMA and emergency management 
weather curriculum and training.  
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7.1 TOPICS OF INTEREST 
A variety of topics evolved from the data analysis resulting in the emergence 
of the following categories: NWS products, basic meteorology, weather 
phenomena, climate/climatology, space weather, and earthquakes and tsunamis. 
While many respondents provided more specific interests, one individual stated 
that they were looking for “anything that may be useful that we typically wouldn’t 
think to look at or for.” 
• Products: overview/availability/issuance of current/experimental/new 
NWS products, products that can be used with local/state partners, weather 
monitoring products, differences between alerts/products, alert 
overview/how alerts are developed/reasoning/science behind 
watches/warnings/advisories, be more comfortable with weather related 
reports/diagrams, read/understand/use/know weather/events/sources of 
information/information resources/NWS products 
• Basic Meteorology: meteorology, hazard/weather scales, jet stream, 
high/low pressure systems, fronts/how they move/interact, impact of water 
temperature on weather, weather forecasts/predictions overview/science, 
geographical influences, weather maps, characteristics of weather 
trends/patterns/systems, important forecast/weather 
factors/variables/indicators, terminology 
• Weather Phenomena: knowledge of phenomena/threats/impacts 
o Fire Weather: drought, determine when fuel redirection helps 
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o Severe Weather: models, tools, products, severe thunderstorms, 
high winds, microbursts, tornado origins/behavior/indicators, 
tornado reports/assessments 
o Tropical Weather: surge, slosh/inundation models, hurricane 
characteristics/formation/track/behavior, models, tools, products  
o Water Weather: outlooks/products/hydrographs, precipitation, 
monsoons, river flood prediction/gauges, flood/inundation 
mapping, areal/flash/riverine flooding/hydrology overview/key 
indicators/causes, snow melt/spring runoff/impacts/effects 
o Winter Weather: winter storms, precipitation totals/amounts, 
snowfall/ice/types, resources/products/probability graphics   
• Climate/Climatology: historical data/sources for, storm summaries, 
long range forecasts, El Niño/La Niña impacts, climate change/trends, 
implications/how climate affects weather severity, how can we plan 
• Space weather: what space weather means for me, hazards, impacts 
• Earthquakes and Tsunamis 
Products were the most frequently mentioned topic of interest, as most 
respondents indicated a desire for an overview of weather associated 
products/alerts, resources, tools, etc. (i.e. – availability, time of issuance, updates). 
As one respondent noted, “’I’ would like an overview of NWS products to expand 
my knowledge of available information and websites related to weather and 
data”, while another noted wanting a “greater comfort level with ‘my’ ability to 
read, understand, and use weather products.” Respondents generally expressed 
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an interest in understanding the difference between products and the various 
‘alerts’ (i.e. – watches, warnings, advisories). Regarding alerts specifically, data 
analysis indicated a desire to understand how alerts are developed or what the 
reasoning/science is behind them. All items discussed included current, 
experimental, and new products with specific mention to weather monitoring and 
those products that could be used with local/State partners. Essentially, anything 
that would assist with their functions and ability to support the agency was 
primarily of interest, i.e. – “tools or resources that would help me understand 
weather and climate information to be used in my briefings/reports.”  
Numerous items categorized among basic meteorology and weather 
phenomena were also discussed. Basic meteorology consisted of primarily 
foundational weather concepts and principles (i.e. – highs/lows, fronts, jet stream, 
etc.) associated with “weather phenomena, threats, patterns, systems.” For 
example, on response stated, “how fronts affect overall weather, the different types 
of fronts and the anatomy of a frontal system combined with a storm.” Best 
summarized, respondents wanted to know “how do air masses, clouds, 
precipitation, temperature and the jet stream all work together/against one 
another?” Within the weather phenomena category, items were categorized 
according to the specific type of weather (fire, severe, tropical, winter, water) each 
area involved. A variety of further specific topical requests were identified 
including but not limited to terms, resources, processes, characterization, causes, 
associated hazards, and impacts.  
Climate/Climatology, Space Weather and Earthquakes were the final three 
topics of interest mentioned. Many respondents in the initial survey indicated they 
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had little or no understanding of climate and utilized such products infrequently. 
Many mentioned this as an area of interest and hoped to learn what comprises 
climate/climate change, trends, and implications with a desire to learn how to plan 
for climate. Sources of climate information and forecasts were also listed along 
with the need for historical data and storm summaries. Space weather was briefly 
discussed in the initial survey section as it is monitored by FEMA for 
communication impacts. In this context, respondents requested a space weather 
overview along with associated hazards and impacts and any regional implications. 
Lastly, earthquakes and tsunamis were also a requested topic. Although there are 
some alert elements tied to the NWS and these phenomena are natural hazards, it 
was not explicit as to why this topic was requested. Possible explanations include 
confusion over what ‘weather’ hazards encompassed, a desire for an all-
encompassing natural hazards training, or review of those elements tied to NWS 
protocols. Further study is required to determine the actual reasoning and line of 
thinking. All of the topics discussed in this section were initially included in the 
pilot training course, including the last three. However, over time the space 
weather and earthquakes and tsunamis units were eliminated as per evaluation 
feedback further discussed below.     
7.2 UNABLE TO LOCATE 
Similarly, items that respondents had difficulty locating were categorized 
among resources, space weather, climate/climatology, basic meteorology, and 
weather phenomena (fire, severe, tropical, winter, water). Issues encountered in 
this section depended upon role and experience. Those with more experience 
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typically provided more input, while those with less experience didn’t all respond. 
As one respondent best stated, “I am not very experienced with gathering weather 
information, so I have difficulty with locating most information and 
summarizing.” Another response, not categorized, stated that “I don’t know the 
program, but it used to be open to the public for free, but now it is only available 
privately and cost money.” With no indication of the program referenced or the 
area this relates to, there is no way to provide a resolution. Otherwise, most input 
for this section was highly specific and problem based. Some of the items listed are 
not actually available, rather than just not known. Regardless, feedback informed 
training development and provided additional areas for improvement.  
• Resources: links for Alaska, weather stories for Ohio, reliable weather 
map with explanation, best location for archived radar data, cumulative 
impacts for weather events, projected rainfall estimates for multi-day 
events, FEMA regional specific weather forecasts/graphics, new databases 
of information to develop better products, euro model data, weather 
terms/terminology/definitions/symbols/color coding, tidal/temporary 
wind/tide/stage gauge data, rural data, local data, crop property damage 
data/agriculture/vegetation cover/moisture data, GIS data/unavailable 
services hinders mapping, weather data from commercial aircraft 
• Space Weather: information that explains data 
• Climate/Climatology: La Niña/El Niño, historical data, projections 
• Basic Meteorology: current wind speed/direction for an area/specified 
time period, timing information for Region-wide activity 
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• Weather Phenomena  
o Fire Weather: reliable fire threat information in differing area of 
responsibility, hotspots/fire induced weather information, speed of 
fire spread vs. reporting with untimely or inconsistent fire updates 
o Severe Weather: confirmed tornado information (too much 
lag)/tornado tracks and reports, lightning data 
o Tropical Weather: surge estimates/storm surge information, 
pacific typhoon information/analysis 
o Water Weather: estimated levels of precipitation, flooding data, 
information relating to floods, current information/specific 
areas/how much flooding/what is flooding, river hydrology 
navigation, flood maps, extended river flood projections/projected 
inundation levels/impact projections/ updated impact statements, 
best source of water levels/estimated levels/depth of river/flash 
flooding, ice jam information 
o Winter Weather: snowfall totals for a specific system (i.e. – 2013 
blizzard), snowfall observed amounts/snow totals for previous 24 
hours/past 24-hour snowfall/how much/greatest amounts/depth 
reports, rates, ice amount/accumulation/conditions, cold weather 
data, snow/snowfall of record, snow melt page 
7.3 DO NOT UNDERSTAND 
Likewise, as was the case with the two previous sections, items that 
respondents do not understand were categorized among the following: tools, 
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models, space weather, climate, basic meteorology, and weather phenomena. Once 
again experience and role were factors as was indicated by the responses. Two 
respondents highlighted this notion stating that “with little experience, at this time 
I am unsure of what I don’t know” and “being from the operations world, I don’t 
directly access information. I typically ask Planning, but I don’t know what to 
ask for.” As was the case with the previous section, much of the feedback was more 
specific, with some similarities among other category responses. However, there is 
one new addition among the discussions that have taken place in this study, the 
notion of weather models.   
Not much was mentioned on the topic of weather models elsewhere, yet 
survey responses in this portion indicated a desire to understand weather models, 
composition, differences, and result variations. Since this topic was not specifically 
addressed in the survey or study not much is known about FEMA utilization of 
models. However, one respondent provided limited insight stating that, “weather 
models are extremely important for development of reasonable actionable 
intelligence, especially during nationally impactful incidents.” Another 
respondent relayed a reservation of FEMA model usage stating that “sometimes 
models cause more concern than help, especially when broadcast to the public.” 
Further study of this topic within FEMA is needed to assess the utilization of such 
information as it goes beyond the extent of this research. Given concerns regarding 
untrained personnel utilizing model information, this subject was not included in 
the weather training. In the future an abbreviated unit covering models may be 
considered if further study reveals relevancy and a need.    
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• Tools: HURREVAC, HAZUS, satellites/water vapor/imagery/pictures – 
what does it mean? How is it used? What effects does it describe? doppler 
radar – reading radar images/reflectivity/best display to use, ASOS 
• Weather Models: why different models have vastly different results, what 
is the difference in modeling systems, little readily available information on 
NOAA/NWS models, history of reliability of models  
• Space Weather: anything/everything, a mystery/cryptic, SWPC graphs, 
Coronal Mass Ejections (CME) and the disruption, solar weather reports 
• Climate: El Niño/La Niña, Climate Change/Global Warming, prediction  
• Basic Meteorology: barometric pressure, dew point/humidity, cloud 
types/structures/what they can do, weather related concepts, scales for 
different weather, interrelationship of high/low pressure, split flow regime, 
impacts of wind, progression/magnitude of watches/warnings, 
terms/terminology/acronyms/shorthand (i.e. - favorable conditions, 
‘wedges’, upper trough), symbols on weather/convective/wind maps 
• Weather Phenomena  
o Fire Weather: fire/humidity scales, droughts to floods cycle  
o Severe Weather: anything by SPC, Convective Outlook/forecast 
discussion terminology, severe probabilities/what do percentages 
mean/information discussed within mesoscale discussions, 
tornado/severe weather met terms – mesoscale, mesoanalysis, 
mesocyclone, convection/convective, Tornado Emergency, wedge, 
cells, supercells, derecho, wind shear, helicity values/significance in 
tornado potential and severe weather events 
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o Tropical Weather: PSURGE/slosh model/inundation data, 
pineapple express, hurricane track/what factors determine track 
o Water Weather: hydrology, 20% chance of rain, arid vs plains vs 
coastal, estimated precipitation, river hydrologic information, flood 
warning (river), Cubic Feet per Second (CFS) flow rates/how that 
impacts downstream/upstream gauges/floodgates/locks/dams, GIS 
inundation mapping products, high water marks, flood 
gauges/locations, flood plains/100 vs 200-year flood zones/NFIP 
o Winter Weather: nor’easters, alberta clipper, naming winter 
storms seems confusing, mixing terms (i.e. - snow showers used to 
be a snow vs. rain term), snow water equivalent/change confusing 
In congruence with the ‘Topics of Interest’ section, tools were among the 
areas mentioned as not well understood. Items listed within the ‘Tools’ category in 
the ‘Topics of Interest’ section included a spectrum of all hazards. In this section, 
respondents more heavily emphasized those associated with hurricane analysis 
(i.e. – HURREVAC, HAZUS). Additionally, difficulty understanding space weather 
and climate was again prevalent, as discerned from the data analysis. Furthermore, 
although some ideas within the ‘Basic Meteorology’ and ‘Weather Phenomena’ 
categories were repeated from other areas, there were also a few new mentions, as 
described below. Aside from discussion of new terms, feedback focused on more 
scientific and statistical notions. The understanding of the concepts discussed in 
this section are vital for effective communication and decision making. Enhanced 
awareness of these areas would support a more informed decision making process.  
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7.4 HOPE TO ACQUIRE 
Of the four study areas addressed in this chapter (Ch. 7), this section elicited 
the most extensive data and consequentially more substantial findings for training 
development. Data categorizations included the NWS, navigation, knowledge and 
understanding, interpretation and analysis, communication, and support and 
decision making. A variation among roles and responsibilities and experience 
levels of survey respondents supported a more comprehensive view of FEMA 
weather skills and needs in general. The resulting weather training was designed 
utilizing these primary desired skillsets as the overall guiding objectives in 
conjunction with findings from all of the elements included in this study.      
• NWS: mission/overview/process/function/what they do/what they can 
provide, build better relationships/collaboration/coordination, learn 
dissemination mechanisms from NWS to FEMA, how NWS uses social 
media, how to receive alerts, meeting/knowing/connecting to weather 
people/networking/contacts 
• Navigation: resource/tool/NWS website navigation/location/where to 
find/usage, tips and tricks/strategies/practice/comfort finding resources, 
resource availability/best/helpful/good, where to get the best data/data 
sources/data acquisition, information/data/tools for briefings/reports, 
difference between radar and Infrared/Visible/Water Vapor Satellites, 
decipher/interpret/science/capabilities/limitations of Radar/Satellite, 
technical/technology knowledge/capabilities to support FEMA operations, 
decision support tools/products for impacts/decision making 
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• Knowledge and Understanding: general/basic weather/climate 
patterns/concepts/events/information, most important items to report, 
weather systems/phenomena/threats/effect/impacts, weather forecasting 
process, reliability/accuracy of models/forecasts/predictions, common 
terminology/terms/proficient/recognition, products/resources/tools 
• Interpretation and Analysis: ability to read maps better/basic weather 
interpretation/translation, identify key trends/identifiers, interpret 
data/websites correctly to real life expectations/make informed analysis, 
enhance data analysis skills/assess ‘so what’, ‘what does bad look like’, 
utilize weather databases/what they mean, how to map weather in GIS/GIS 
mapping/KML in google earth, identify current/potential impact of weather 
types/how hazards impact/may impact/effects on public 
• Communication: how to report the weather when not a 
meteorologist/speak meteorologist/technique to communicate weather 
information/messaging a forecast/briefing tips/present/communicate 
weather accurately, how best to provide information to public, 
confidence/more comfort with weather information/more confident in 
information I provide, ability/ideas to create/learn to develop better 
weather products using NOAA information  
• Support and Decision Making: incorporate/use/apply weather in my 
role, how weather pertains to FEMA Mission/applications in the field, 
provide better/more situational awareness of weather/help with the 
decision making process, report to leadership/answer RA questions, 
support the RRCC, acquire information/resources for state/local mitigation 
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plans/what can be done to mitigate risks/knowledge of data/information 
for mitigation planning decisions, long range planning 
input/products/understanding to make better planning decisions, 
discussion of trigger points for posture/deployments/future concerns 
affecting our readiness/how weather will impact team readiness 
FEMA’s extensive usage of NWS information, data, tools, products, and 
services solicited an interest in learning about the NWS from many of the 
respondents, i.e. - “what office is responsible for what.” As one respondent noted, 
“I would like to see a description of who is doing what within the National 
Weather Service. Having a clear understanding of where to go for information 
will help in future research and inquiries.” Another noted that, “I want to have a 
better understanding of NWS, how they collaborate with FEMA, what this looks 
like for the N-IMAT teams, and a better understanding of weather, weather 
patterns, and how and where to gather the information I want.” Not only did 
respondents express an interest in learning about the mission and function of the 
NWS, but also what they can provide. Ultimately, increased awareness of the NWS 
and associated products and services facilitates the situation awareness and 
decision making processes at FEMA.      
Navigation was one of the more frequently mentioned areas, as most 
participants indicated difficulty in navigating NWS websites, products, resources, 
tools, etc. Data analysis identified difficulty in locating resources, knowing the best 
available, and acquiring data. Furthermore, respondents desired instruction on 
manipulating and working with weather/NWS information, data, and tools. As one 
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response stated, there were issues with the “functionality of NWS websites, very 
difficult to find specific products. Websites are hard to navigate, necessitating 
keeping a list of links for easier reference.” Another response stated that “all of the 
NWS websites are overly complicated, especially the local offices sites. Different 
formats from office to office makes it difficult to coordinate regional level 
products. Sometimes just local NWS forecasts tend to get lost in the website 
jungle.” Other individuals requested assistance on “how to access and simplify the 
copious data produced by NWS for consumption by the normal population of 
adults in the region.” Furthermore, respondents requested assistance with 
utilization and navigation of weather support tools. Examples of tools mentioned 
in the data include, HURREVAC, NWSChat, EDD, Radar, Satellite, etc. 
As with the ‘NWS’ and ‘Navigation’ categories, the next two categories, 
‘Knowledge and Understanding’ and ‘Interpretation and Analysis’ are related. 
These two categories build upon each other leading to the final two categories 
‘Communication’ and ‘Support and Decision Making’. Many respondents reported 
an interest in gaining knowledge and understanding of basic weather and climate 
concepts, phenomena, hazards, impacts, and terms. In relation, there was also a 
desire to understand weather predictions and associated accuracy and reliability, 
along with the forecasting process in general. These two areas were mentioned in 
conjunction with gaining an overall perspective on weather related products, 
resources, and tools and knowing what is most important to monitor and report. 
As one respondent noted, there is a desire for “better general knowledge and 
understanding of weather concepts”, while another stated interest in gaining “an 
overall awareness of weather and climate, weather patterns, and forecasting.”  
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Extending beyond knowledge and understanding, respondents conveyed 
the requirement to interpret and analyze weather hazards, threats, and events for 
FEMA. As such, survey responses indicated a need for further insight into reading 
weather maps, interpreting weather information, translating weather data, and 
identifying key trends. Collectively, adequate training in these areas support 
respondents’ desires to “enhance data analysis skills” and “make informed 
analysis” in accordance with “real life expectations.” These stipulated requests 
from respondents were found to be consistent with findings previously discussed 
in Chapter 5, concerning analysis of interview data collected from members of 
FEMA leadership. The data indicated that personnel need to acquire a “better 
understanding of the ‘so what’” and “what does ‘bad’ look like”, which is assessed 
and decided based on analysis of “current or potential weather impacts or effects 
on the public and FEMA’s mission.”  
More specialized respondents indicated an interest in gaining experience 
utilizing weather databases to enhance GIS mapping capabilities. A skillset only 
relevant for personnel in certain positions, the goal to visualize analysis through 
GIS mapping has further reaching implications. Unlike ‘Watchstanders’ who 
manage a 24/7/365 operation, GIS personnel indicated serving more on an ‘on-
call’ basis. As such, despite not having an active GIS role, many ‘Watch’ personnel 
respondents indicated they too wanted the knowledge and capability to do so in 
order to facilitate the process. In addition to ‘Watchstanders’, this was also found 
to be true for other roles such as planning, recovery, mitigation, etc. Non-GIS 
respondents as a whole indicated collaborating with relevant GIS personnel 
accordingly to complete requested mapping tasks.  
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Overall, as one respondent best summarized, “FEMA personnel are looking 
for a greater understanding of weather impacts, weather threats and NWS 
products.” However, two additional categories emerged from this section, 
‘Communication’ and ‘Support and Decision making’. The ‘Communication’ 
category primarily consisted of aspects surrounding respondents’ abilities to 
communicate weather information to senior leadership, partners, and the public. 
This included being comfortable and having confidence doing so and developing 
appropriate products to assist. Focusing more on the weather elements and flow of 
information, the survey did not specifically address this aspect. However, the topic 
was discussed by a multitude of respondents with relevancy to their roles and 
responsibilities.  
Lastly, the final category for this section revealed through data analysis, 
‘Support and Decision making’, was fairly robust, containing various elements. 
While decision making as a whole was discussed in further detail in Chapter 6, this 
section provides a brief overview of the related skills respondents hope to acquire 
for this purpose. In general, respondents were hoping to gain a more informed 
perspective of how to incorporate, utilize, and apply weather in their respective 
roles, the field, and to support the FEMA mission. Generally speaking, respondents 
hope to enhance their situational awareness capabilities in order to facilitate the 
decision making process in support of the National/Regional Response 
Coordination Centers (N/RRCC), States/Territories/Tribes, FEMA Senior 
Leadership and beyond. In addition, respondents indicated looking for ways to 
mitigate risks, support planning efforts, enhance team readiness and provide 
better assessments for deployments and future concerns.     
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7.5 WEATHER TRAINING COURSE OVERVIEW AND DESIGN 
Weather directly accounts for nearly all Federally declared disasters, yet 
remains integral throughout all phases of disasters, regardless of type. Essential, 
weather information is utilized in a multitude of capacities from steady-state/ 
monitoring to NRCC/RRCC activations through designation of Joint Field Offices 
(JFOs). Weather information is mission critical for maintaining situational 
awareness at FEMA through the information management cycle described in 
Chapter 6, life safety/life sustaining missions, and for conducting various 
assessments to support decision making regarding operations, planning, disaster 
assistance, etc. It is imperative that personnel understand weather phenomena 
and terminology, appropriate application of this knowledge, and navigation of 
weather products and resources to adequately serve leadership and partners.  
There is a limited amount of readily available weather training currently, 
and existing courses do not adequately serve the operational needs of FEMA. To 
address this gap, I developed a weather training course for FEMA personnel 
utilizing results of the survey data analysis I conducted. Initially designed to 
specifically address the operational needs of FEMA ‘Watchstanders’, I conducted 
a pilot course entitled “Weather and Climate Analysis for Situational Awareness.” 
Pilot course participants included two ‘Watchstanders’ from each of the ten FEMA 
regions and five from FEMA HQ. Each region is designated approximately ten 
‘Watch’ personnel while HQ has approximately twenty-five, hence the initial 
equivalent participant allotment of 20% per location.   
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Feedback and data analysis from the initial survey administered to 
‘Watchstanders’ guided early development of the piloted course. Subsequent 
course evaluations in conjunction with additional survey data collection and 
analysis, advanced development of the FEMA weather training component toward 
standardization. Designed to support monitoring, collection, interpretation, 
analysis and dissemination of weather information and data, the course now serves 
as the weather training component for the qualification program established for 
FEMA ‘Watch’ staff. Since the piloted course, numerous FEMA personnel 
occupying a myriad of positions and tasked with differing roles and responsibilities 
have also found the training beneficial, in addition to various partners.  
The first four sections discussed in this chapter in conjunction with results 
from other sections served as a guide for training development. Based on survey 
responses and subsequent data analysis, the course is designed around the five 
primary weather types (fire, severe, tropical, water, winter), yet also includes an 
NWS and product overview, activities inclusive of communication concepts and 
practices, as well as several resource and tool navigation opportunities. The goal of 
the course is to advance skillsets and qualifications for improved hazard 
assessment, resource navigation and communication through enhancement of 
weather knowledge, interpretation, and analysis. Course objectives area as follows: 
• Increase knowledge of basic weather concepts and principles 
• Enhance navigation of weather resources, information, and data  
• Facilitate understanding of weather products and services  
• Improve weather analysis and interpretation capabilities 
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Meteorological topics addressed basic meteorology components along with 
various weather phenomena and associated hazards including flooding, winter 
weather systems, tropical storms and hurricanes, severe storms and tornadoes, 
drought and fire weather. There is also a unit covering climate along with seasonal 
influences and patterns. Additional non-weather units include a course overview, 
NWS overview, and navigation of available resources and tools. Sessions and 
associated activities were designed to address:  
• NWS product and service availability  
• Fundamentals of weather and climate 
• Hazardous weather monitoring and resource navigation 
• Weather information and data analysis and interpretation  
• Information reception, dissemination, and communication 
• Practical application 
Based on initial survey data analysis, identified topics resulted in 
development of thirteen units. Following each unit, there was an associated activity 
culminating with a practical exercise at the end of the course. Activities include 
applying knowledge, navigating resources, and/or utilizing relevant tools. The final 
exercise was designed to engage the participants in a realistic scenario through 
application of the knowledge they gained, and performance of functions as 
required in the real-world. Preliminary units developed for the piloted course 
included fundamentals in addition to topic specific units and associated overviews 
and resources as outlined in Table 7.1.  
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PILOT FEMA WEATHER COURSE UNITS 
UNIT 1: Course Overview 
UNIT 2: National Weather Service Overview 
UNIT 3: Weather Resources and Tools 
UNIT 4: Basic Meteorology, Phenomena, and Hazards 
UNIT 5: Severe Weather and Radar 
UNIT 6: Tropical Weather 
UNIT 7: Winter Weather 
UNIT 8: Water Weather 
UNIT 9: Fire Weather 
UNIT 10: Space Weather 
UNIT 11: Earthquakes and Tsunamis 
UNIT 12: Communication Principles and Practices 
 
Table 7.1: Pilot ‘Weather and Climate for Situational Awareness’ course units 
based on results from the data analysis conducted on the initial survey. 
Further analysis of administered course evaluations (discussed in greater 
detail in the next section) identified needed revisions, resulting in modifications 
being made accordingly. Additional modifications have been made over time based 
on continued feedback, evaluation, and audience. However, fundamental 
components and format have not changed. Adjustments implemented overall, 
primarily served to refine and focus the course, as well as update relevant content. 
For the pilot course, space weather and earthquakes and tsunamis were included 
as units but were later removed from the training for the final version of the course 
(Table 7.2), based on follow-up course evaluations conducted. A climate section 
was also added to address the lack of understanding and utilization discovered in 
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the initial survey data analysis. Additionally, various elements from the 
communication session were absorbed into other areas of the training, versus a 
standalone unit.  
FINAL FEMA WEATHER COURSE UNITS 
UNIT 1: Course Overview 
UNIT 2: National Weather Service Overview 
UNIT 3: Weather Resources and Tools 
UNIT 4: Basic Meteorology, Phenomena, and Hazards 
UNIT 5: Severe Weather 
UNIT 6: Tropical Weather 
UNIT 7: Winter Weather 
UNIT 8: Water Weather 
UNIT 9: Fire Weather 
UNIT 10: Climate 
 
Table 7.2: Final ‘Weather and Climate for Situational Awareness’ course 
units based on results from the survey data analysis and course evaluations. 
Several types of assessments were administered throughout this iterative 
process to establish knowledge gained, identify weather needs, and evaluate course 
objectives. In addition to the survey, a pre and posttest were administered to 
determine baseline knowledge and evaluate course effectiveness. Test questions 
were formatted as multiple choice, matching, true/false, and essay. Overall, 
participants improved their multiple choice, matching, and true/false scores by 
20% on average. Additionally, all participants scored greater than 75% on the essay 
portion, which required participants to apply knowledge gained through analysis 
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and interpretation of scenarios and assess hazards and impacts. Results from the 
pre-test further verified a need for the course, while the post test results showed 
significant improvement. One participant noted an additional benefit, stating that 
“the test showed ‘me’ how much I didn’t know and need to learn.” Furthermore, 
to identify strengths and areas for improvement, course evaluations were 
conducted daily as well as overall. Questions addressed areas determined by the 
course objectives to assess participants overall satisfaction, guide revisions, as well 
as determine future directions and ideas for course evolution. 
7.6 WEATHER TRAINING EVALUATIONS AND AFTER ACTION REVIEW 
The purpose of the pilot course review was to refine the course and revise 
content for future offerings. Analysis of course discussions, evaluations, and 
assessments identified several strengths and areas for improvement. Results 
suggest that the course was very well received yet extending the course from three 
and a half days to four or five would enhance future offerings. Overall, these 
findings support course evolution and serve to guide future development of 
additional trainings, materials, etc. as deemed necessary. Additionally, 
recommendations and best practices are discussed to enhance the course, address 
identified gaps, and determine future directions.  
Following completion of the pilot course, open ended evaluations were 
conducted. The intent of these evaluations was to provide an overall assessment of 
the pilot course offering. Analysis of these evaluations guided revisions to ensure 
an effective course design and relevant content. Participant responses were 
compiled and coded accordingly. After several rounds of coding the solicited 
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feedback, the analysis revealed four primary categories: (1) Content and Materials, 
(2) Presentations and Personnel, (3) Functional Activities and Exercise, and (4) 
Logistics. Pulling from organizational learning, I then utilized an After Action 
Review (AAR) framework. Frequently utilized in emergency management for 
exercise and disaster response assessments, I found this framework more 
appropriate for the data collected and easier for structuring analysis and results. I 
categorized the data within the four categories that emerged from the data analysis 
and then derived strengths, areas for improvement, recommendations, and best 
practices.  
7.6.1 CONTENT AND MATERIALS 
Within this category, three strengths and two areas for improvement were 
identified along with associated recommendations and/or best practices for each. 
Strengths: 
1. Weather hazards addressed were inclusive of all FEMA Regions.  
2. Training manual designed to allow participants the ability to take notes 
and serve as a reference/resource manual for future informational needs. 
3. Provided tools and resources along with demonstrations and navigation 
assisted with interpretation and information/product location. 
Areas for Improvement: 
1. Enhance impact assessment and evaluation of weather hazards. 
2. Incorporate daily weather briefings.  
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Participants felt that the subject matter presented, addressed the weather-
related concerns for all regions with only minor suggestions for enhancement. 
Additionally, the group felt that special care had been taken regarding their needs 
in terms of collecting and interpreting information. Many participants also noted 
that some of the content was new to them, which they felt expanded their 
perspective of situational awareness.  
The training manual was very well received, as one participant noted “it was 
very professionally done, useful, and informative.” Each unit of the course was 
included, which consisted of the PowerPoint slides accompanied by main points, 
resource links, terminology, and designated space for notes. In addition, the final 
sections included activity and assessment handouts as well as available resource 
guides and quick reference sheets.   
Resources were discussed throughout the presentations as relevant, with an 
additional session dedicated to intensive navigation of tools, existing products as 
well as experimental ones. Participants were more familiar with some resources, 
yet they were unaware of others that are also available. The resource session 
allowed participants to voice their opinions and address questions or challenges 
faced with regards to resource and information navigation. Participants found the 
resources provided to be extremely informative and helpful for their duties and 
responsibilities. Additionally, participants indicated the NWS overview and 
decision support session was helpful for gaining an understanding of how the NWS 
can assist FEMA throughout the disaster lifecycle. 
Furthermore, participants felt that enhancing discussion of impacts from 
each specific weather hazard would assist them with performing assessments on 
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the job. Some of the session materials and presentations addressed hazard specific 
impacts, yet others were lacking. Although some units may not have adequately 
addressed impacts, group consensus showed that the activities were geared 
specifically toward application and analysis to determine threats and impacts.  
In addition to the units, a weather briefing was provided on the first day of 
the course as part of the facility tour. Many of the participants suggested a weather 
briefing be included in the curriculum each morning during the duration of the 
course. Data analysis findings indicated that doing so would provide an 
opportunity for participants to learn from the presenters regarding ways to 
articulate weather hazards, identify the most relevant information, and 
presentation structure, as well as provide an opportunity to address pertinent 
questions.   
Best Practices: 
1. Continue to include climate/seasonal content for long-term situational 
awareness. 
2. Due to the eco-friendly/green initiative, budget constraints, and travel, 
providing training manual and materials in an electronic format is helpful. 
3. Providing a supplemental resource, terminology, and note-taking manual, 
is helpful as the training manual is distributed electronically. 
4. Conduct daily weather briefings specific for the course or attend briefings 
conducted by other entities each morning. 
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Recommendations: 
1. Briefly navigate the most important/utilized websites at the beginning of 
the course with a follow-up session later regarding miscellaneous and 
experimental resources.  
2. Include extreme and historical events as a reference point to enforce the 
range of severity/intensity and support threat and impact assessment.   
3. Incorporate added discussion and provide guidance on impacts associated 
with each weather type to include examples and “what if” scenarios.  
4. Utilize examples and real-life scenarios including case studies.  
5. Implement a practical session designated to address communication skills 
and assessment of briefing style, structure, design, and format.  
7.6.2 PRESENTATIONS AND PERSONNEL 
For this category, two strengths and one area for improvement were 
identified along with associated recommendations and/or best practices for each.  
Strengths: 
1. Use of subject matter experts as presenters from NOAA/NWS centers 
located throughout the nation as well as those within the local area. 
2. Professional, consistent, and well-designed materials. 
Area for Improvement: 
1. Utilization of more plain language/layman’s terms to describe and explain 
weather phenomena, associated hazards, and concepts.  
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Session instructors were chosen for their ability to communicate and area 
of expertise. Each instructor was responsible for developing materials required for 
their unit based off of the guidance I provided to them. When relevant, National 
expertise was utilized via video and/or teleconference (i.e. - a hurricane specialist 
from the National Hurricane Center (NHC)). Regarding the chosen instructors, 
one participant stated that the “NWS instructors were very professional, 
passionate, and knowledgeable about their topic”, while another stated that “the 
passion and knowledge of the instructors made me want to learn more.” 
A presentation template was developed for the course materials, which 
provided consistency throughout the course regardless of instructor. Subject 
matter experts were instructed to make use of graphics, videos, and animations as 
appropriate to balance needed textual information. Instructors were also 
encouraged to populate associated training manual pages with main points to 
enhance understanding, provide explanation for reference, and limit note taking.  
 Furthermore, participants varied regarding perception of conveyance of 
complexities inherent to weather analysis. Although many instructors did utilize 
common terminology and provided definitions, some of the units were a bit in-
depth, regarding technical descriptions and explanations, then was necessary.    
Best Practices: 
1. Continue to utilize NOAA/NWS subject matter experts from across the 
country. Involve National centers and other NWS regions if/when possible.  
2. Utilize the format of the training manual and presentations in future 
development.   
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Recommendations: 
1. Enhance participant involvement during sessions by encouraging more 
responsive rather than passive engagement. Incorporate additional 
participant response elements (i.e. – questions). 
2. Ensure all sessions balance technical descriptions and plain language 
explanations.  
3. Monitor field specific terminology usage, defining terms when necessary, 
and include in the resource guide glossary.   
7.6.3 ACTIVITIES AND EXERCISE 
Participants provided the most amount of feedback for this category with 
four strengths and two areas for improvement identified through data analysis, 
along with associated recommendations and/or best practices for each.   
Strengths: 
1. Functional activities reinforced material learned, provided interactive 
opportunities, and were relevant to participants’ roles and responsibilities.  
2. Pilot course provided participants opportunities to interact with fellow 
FEMA ‘Watchstanders’ and NWS personnel. 
3. Tabletop exercise allowed participants direct interaction with NWS 
personnel while in small groups. 
Area for Improvement: 
1. Organization and format of regional briefings conducted after the tabletop 
exercise. 
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2. Test and evaluate participants’ skills and ability to apply course concepts 
during steady-state/monitoring, N/RRCC activation and to support JFOs. 
Participants felt that activities situated with each session were valuable and 
helpful for applying the concepts learned, enhancing navigation skills of the 
resources provided, and furthering understanding of material. Activities, such as 
weather Jeopardy and the online NWS resource scavenger hunt, were highly 
touted by the participants. Participants indicated these activities allowed for 
interaction amongst the group while “helping to test and teach” as one participant 
noted. Participants were encouraged to interact with the NWS team members 
whom were floating around assisting and checking with participants on 
troubleshooting. Doing so allowed participants the opportunity to ask questions 
and engage with NWS personnel.   
 Provided the missions and associated responsibilities and services the 
‘Watch’ offices provide, participants feel they have limited ability and options to 
associate with other FEMA regional Watchstanders. However, respondents 
indicated frequent coordinate with one another via email and phone. Participants 
found that the course allowed them to meet with fellow FEMA counterparts and 
discuss operations as well as make valuable connections within the NWS. 
 For the practical exercise, NWS team members facilitated small groups of 
five or less and proposed various scenarios to elicit information usage, resource 
navigation, and impact assessment. The exercise was geared toward stimulating 
discussion and advancing participant application of knowledge learned. 
Participants indicated the exercise was extremely valuable, allowing them to think 
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through different scenarios in order to identify challenges regarding 
understanding, information usage, and resource location. As one participant 
noted, “the small group size and immediate availability of the NWS 
mentors/instructors helped me to focus and apply appropriate NWS products 
and share knowledge.” 
 Utilizing the information gathered throughout the tabletop exercise, the 
participants were asked to apply the current weather of the day to their region and 
provide a briefing to the group. Participants found the session useful for reviewing 
others briefing procedures, yet several challenges were identified. Encountered 
challenges included time, briefing templates, graphical depiction, and difficulty 
applying current weather conditions and threats to their region. Templates and 
materials spurred discussion regarding regional variations, yet assessment of 
briefing procedures and operations between regional counterparts was not 
streamlined, standardized, nor clearly defined.      
FEMA ‘Watchstanders’ require a versatile set of skills as was previously 
discussed. Course activities in conjunction with the tabletop exercise at the 
conclusion of the course, addressed many functional aspects of their roles and 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, more realistic scenario portrayal through a 
functional exercise would allow for a more complete evaluation of applied 
knowledge and provide a more thorough assessment of participants abilities, while 
testing key functions within the overall response system.  
Recommendations: 
1. Develop and incorporate additional functional activities.  
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2. Include other potential partners such as the United States Geological 
Survey (USGS), the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), etc. 
3. Request participants bring regional briefing templates. 
4. Provide regionally based scenario packets that include both text and 
graphical materials for usage in participant briefings.   
5. Develop a methodology and/or metrics to streamline assessment of 
briefing structure, format, style, information, etc. 
7.6.4 LOGISTICS 
Participants provided the least amount of feedback for this category with 
only one strength and two areas for improvement identified through data analysis, 
along with associated recommendations and/or best practices for each.   
Strengths: 
1. It was helpful to be outside of our normal working facility and location. 
Areas for Improvement:  
1. Provide prerequisites and additional information to course participants in 
advance for completion and/or review to prepare them for the ideas, 
concepts, and resources that will be discussed during the course.   
2. Extend course from 3.5 days to 4 or 5 days to allow adequate time for 
sessions, completion of activities, functional exercise, and additional 
networking opportunities. 
 Overall, participants were complimentary of the format consisting of 
presentations, activities, and breaks with interactive learning opportunities 
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interspersed throughout the course, culminating in a tabletop exercise and briefing 
session on the final day. Time constraints restricted sessions and activities from 
fully engaging participants or ensuring thorough understanding. Additional time 
would have helped to maintain a slower pace, inclusion of additional activities to 
extend application of learned concepts, and networking. Additionally, the course 
was designed to be an in-resident, beginner course regarding foundational 
concepts of weather, water, and climate. However, some participants asked for 
possible inclusion of pre-requisites such as completion of existing online courses, 
review of relevant materials, and/or resource list familiarity, among others. 
Best Practice: 
1. Continue to provide the local area handout but distribute to participants 
before arrival so they have time to review policies and important 
information as well as learn about the area and facility. 
Recommendations: 
1. Provide a list of resources/websites for participants before arrival to 
familiarize themselves with resources utilized during the course.  
2. Assess how this training can be integrated into the FEMA training concept 
and establish an inclusive program that addresses the needs of FEMA 
personnel with consideration for other methods, levels, budget, etc. 
3. Consider course expansion to allow adequate time for questions, activity 
completion, resource navigation, and explanation of complex concepts. 
4. Review course content and identify potential efficiencies that can be 
achieved through development of FEMA Independent Study (IS) modules.  
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The pilot course succeeded in incorporating content relevant for FEMA 
‘Watchstanders’, communicating complex weather concepts effectively, and 
providing standardized materials through the training manual. Several 
participants compared experiences with other pilot courses noting that the 
“Weather and Climate analysis for FEMA Watchstanders” course was consistent 
amongst presentations, carefully reviewed for formatting and typos, as well as 
professionally designed and well organized. As one participant noted, “a lot of hard 
work, time, and effort went into this course and it shows”, while another 
commented that “it was a fantastic first class by first rate instructors.”   
The greatest challenge participants indicated was the desire and need for 
additional time. Extension of the course would allow sufficient time for knowledge 
absorption, completion of activities, extension of application and additional 
networking opportunities. Furthermore, development and completion of pre-
requisites before arrival would conserve time spent on fundamental concepts and 
allow ample time for discussion of complex topics and application. Additionally, 
review of mechanisms to introduce foundational concepts prior to the course, 
would further solidify concepts during the in-resident portion. Nonetheless, 
despite the time constraint, participants were overwhelmingly generous with 
positive feedback stating repeatedly how relevant, helpful and informative the 
course was for FEMA functional requirements. All but one of the participants 
stated they would recommend the course to others and felt that “it was a good use 
of time” noting they planned to share the materials with their fellow colleagues. As 
noted by one participant, it as an “excellent, very well-done pilot course with great 
potential.” 
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
This study examined FEMA utilization and communication of weather 
information for maintaining situational awareness in support of decision making. 
The culmination of this work advances the profession and discipline of emergency 
management by providing a sound methodology and decision making framework 
for FEMA, in relation to weather information. The utilization of which is applicable 
for FEMA beyond the scope of this study and can be extended analogously to be 
inclusive of all hazard types. The implication of this work is enhancement of FEMA 
leadership weather decision making capabilities in support of timely, relevant 
decisions and more effective, efficient operations to ensure their ability to mitigate, 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters leading to saved lives and 
property.  
Since beginning this work, FEMA has simplified their mission to “helping 
people before, during, and after disasters” (FEMA, 2019d), yet overall the agency 
remains not well understood externally by the people they serve. Review of the 
survey and interview data collected indicated the majority of FEMA respondents 
have a non-weather background and are hired, rather, for other skills. Although 
demographics were not a focus of this study, many emergency management 
officials predominantly have a background in law enforcement, public safety, etc. 
FEMA is no exception as the majority of personnel are comprised of former or 
current military service members. Many come to the agency with little to no 
background or experience in meteorology or weather hazard usage and having 
completed no formal weather training. Therefore, the assumption of FEMA 
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personnel as laypersons is valid, as they rely heavily on others for weather 
interpretation, assessment, and communication.   
In addition, the educational background of the respondents varies from 
high school to graduate degrees, with the majority ceasing education at the 
bachelor’s degree level. Frequently, personnel indicated having obtained higher 
education atypically through a variety of programs available to them later in life. 
The range of disciplines of those that indicated possessing some form of higher 
education, varies greatly and comes from a wide variety of fields. A wide variety of 
emergency management degree programs have come into existence over the past 
two decades. While many FEMA personnel have taken advantage of that option, 
those programs have yet to permeate the agency. Furthermore, many of those 
degree programs exclude weather and climate as a pivotal part of the curriculum. 
The primary focus for training within FEMA and partners, places emphasis 
on operations, planning, policy, and procedures. Currently, there are no 
qualification requirements or training available with regards to weather, despite 
its criticality to the sustainability of the mission and resiliency of the nation. 
Provided the extensive usage of weather information for their roles, in conjunction 
with their overall lack of weather training, respondents expressed interest in 
educational opportunities. Collectively, responses indicated a desire to acquire 
“more general weather information”, enhance their “ability to read weather 
maps better” and learn “website navigation, strategies, and practices.” In 
relation, data analysis revealed a few recommendations for areas of improvement 
with regards to NOAA/NWS. Ideas conveyed within the feedback suggested, “more 
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plain language briefings”, “working on website consistency”, and “making the 
website format easier to use so I don’t need a three-day class to use it.”  
Although warning systems have improved over the last several decades, 
navigating disaster response continues to present various challenges due to 
communication, a lack of outreach/education, too much information, multiple 
sources, etc. Additionally, emergency management perspectives in academia are 
not well defined. For emergency management, there is an increased need for multi 
and interdisciplinary research. Hence, I choose an interdisciplinary route for this 
exploratory study using qualitative research methods to gain an in-depth 
perspective of weather information utilization and decision making influences.  
Through data analysis it was determined that informational needs depend 
on the types of decisions that need to be made and the actions that need to be taken. 
Furthermore, the influencing factors identified through data analysis further 
substantiate the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 4 of this work, which 
in turn drives training development. Ensuring that decision makers fully 
understand weather information is imperative for the FEMA mission overall. 
Providing greater decision support for FEMA and all emergency managers, along 
with implementation of weather training mechanisms, enhances situational 
awareness and hence decision making capabilities.   
Data analysis of qualitative surveys and interviews yielded several findings. 
First and foremost, (1) operational decision making at FEMA is heavily influenced 
by a multitude of factors including (a) organizational, (b) operational, (c) 
individual, (d) informational, (e) impact, and (f) hazard. Further complicating 
matters, FEMA utilizes a variety of information sources and communication 
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mechanisms including media/social media, State/Tribe/Territory, private sector/ 
apps, television/radio, internet/web, ESFs/partners, NWS, and other agencies, yet 
(2) a communication gap exists between FEMA and the public. Furthermore, (3) 
utilization of weather information across FEMA is substantive for the purposes of 
(a) situational awareness, (b) analysis and assessment, (c) communication, (d) 
planning, (e) disaster assistance, and (f) overall decision making. (4) Maintaining 
situational awareness of weather hazards is an essential and mission critical FEMA 
function requiring (a) environmental information (weather and non-weather 
information), (b) impact information, and (c) communication elements, through 
an information management process of (a) monitoring, (b) collecting, (c) 
interpreting, (d) analyzing, and (e) disseminating. However, (5) FEMA personnel 
lack weather experience, knowledge and training overall, posing significant 
challenges.  
These findings resulted in (1) a proposed decision-making conceptual 
framework, in conjunction with a (2) descriptive decision making model, and (3) 
identification of associated influencers. Extending this work beyond theoretical 
notions into praxis, (4) an adaptation of the CDC’s Crisis and Emergency Risk 
Communication (CERC) model is proposed for FEMA utilization, and (5) 
operationalization of a FEMA weather training module for situational awareness 
was designed and implemented. Additional recommendations from these findings 
and results include: (1) development of weather driven FEMA decision/support 
policy for standardized coordination, (2) implementation of CERC principles 
within FEMA and emergency management for enhanced and continuous 
communication practices, (3) incorporation of evaluation into the Comprehensive 
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Emergency Management (CEM) framework as a standalone element in accordance 
with CERC, and subsequent incorporation of evaluation findings consistently 
within FEMA for advancement of programs and procedures, (4) enhanced decision 
support and development of State and FEMA Region weather products, graphics, 
and overviews, etc. for improved situational awareness, and lastly, (5) inclusion of 
weather training requirements within FEMA qualifications for increased 
knowledge and awareness in support of more effective decision making and 
operations. 
Knowledge of emergency management in general is limited academically 
among the literature as it has more tacitly evolved over time. Extensive gaps exist 
regarding the discipline itself, theoretical notions, and understanding of general 
constructs, behavior, and processes within the field. Knowledge of behavioral 
decision making along with policy considerations and ramifications within 
emergency management and FEMA is lacking. Extending the research conducted 
in this work, reviewing climate information utilization, needs, gaps, and influences 
would be valuable for advancement of climate resiliency and incorporation within 
the agency. Additionally, further detailed study of FEMA decision making with 
regard to specific hazards, disasters, groups, and partners, as well as extension 
through policy recommendations is required for advanced contribution to the 
discipline.  
Several identified areas for additional future work include (1) continued 
development and validation of the proposed FEMA decision making framework, 
(2) assessment of the effectiveness of FEMA and emergency management decision 
making, (3) further review of influencing factors and to what extent each affects 
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decisions, (4) determine effectiveness of the “Weather and Climate for Situational 
Awareness” training and the implications/influence on FEMA decision making, (5) 
advancement of CERC and utilization within emergency management, (6) as well 
as development of FEMA response/support policy for specific weather hazards. 
Going forward, I plan to focus on these areas through collaboration with scholars 
among various disciplines to advance the field and begin to formulate theories in 
support of all levels of emergency management and throughout all phases of the 
disaster life cycle. 
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